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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Conventional risk and reliability assessment techniques are insufficient when it comes 
to analysing extraordinary events on-line. The reason for this lies in the nature of 
extraordinary events, which are the result of dependent or multiple failures leading to an 
unstable operation. Thus, novel and unconventional techniques are required to analyse 
and quantify the risk related to extraordinary events.  
This thesis describes advances regarding perception, prediction, and prevention of 
extraordinary events. The focus of this work has been on the operation of the power 
system, where prediction and prevention of extraordinary events are required on-line 
and in the day-ahead operation planning. 
A central part of the perception of extraordinary events lies in the identification of the 
transition from a stable to an unstable state being a fundamental and critical 
characteristic of extraordinary events. Together with the realisation that situational 
awareness is a requirement for the implementation of remedial actions, this provides a 
basis for the development of solutions to predict and prevent extraordinary events. A 
methodology for analysing extraordinary events is presented in this thesis, identifying 
the requirement to perform transient dynamic multi-level contingency studies to 
properly address the risk of extraordinary events.  
Measures to improve the situational awareness are presented, in form of vulnerability 
indicators. These measures are of both a predictive and preventive nature, with 
vulnerability indicators supporting the operator to predict the risk of extraordinary 
events providing a decision base regarding implementation of manual preventive 
actions. Furthermore, a concept to assess the transfer capacity of critical power transfer 
corridors is presented. This concept is proposed to be utilised in the development of 
automatic controls, to prevent extraordinary events through appropriate mitigating 
actions.  
The predictive and preventive measures presented in this thesis describe conceptual 
solutions for decreasing the risk of extraordinary events. These measures depend on 
further development of tools and techniques in order to be integrated in, and supportive 
for, the tools used for operating the power system. 
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SAMMANFATTNING 
 
 
Denna avhandling beskriver forskningsresultat relaterade till stora strömavbrott av ett 
tekniskt ursprung, d.v.s. avbrott som inte är resultat av extrema väderpåkänningar eller 
andra icketekniskt relaterade orsaker.  
Stora strömavbrott kan innebära kostnader för samhället med upp till flera miljoner 
kronor per avbrott. Underliggande orsaker till stora störningar i elkraftsystemet är i 
allmänhet komplexa att analysera då dessa händelser ofta innebär aktivering av många 
komponentskydd samt bortkoppling av en mängd komponenter i elkraftsystemet.  
Avhandlingen ger en beskrivning av underliggande orsaker och händelseförlopp för att 
ge en ökad förståelse av stora strömavbrott. Då risken för strömavbrott är svår att 
uppskatta med hjälp av vedertagna verktyg, så innehåller denna avhandling en 
beskrivning av metoder specifikt utvecklade för att analysera dessa händelser. 
Avhandlingen innehåller även beskrivning av metoder för att motverka framtida 
strömavbrott.  
En slutsats av denna forskning är att den studerade typen av strömavbrott är ett resultat 
av att elkraftsystemet blir instabilt. Detta innebär att åtgärder för att öka stabiliteten eller 
lösningar som snabbt kan tillämpas för att motverka instabilitet är av stor vikt för att 
hindra framtida strömavbrott. Även verktyg som förbättrar insikten i elkraftsystemets 
störningskänslighet bidrar till att öka systemoperatörens möjligheter att styra systemet 
med en godtagbar risknivå.  
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
 
The thesis is divided in two parts, where the first part includes a summary and 
clarification of the concepts and contributions of this work, while the second part 
consists of appended papers which include the main results and conclusions of the work 
performed during this PhD project.  
PART I – MAIN REPORT 
In Chapter 1, the background of the PhD work is described together with the 
specification of objective, scope and limitations. This chapter also provides an overview 
of the scientific contributions that are the main outcome of this PhD project.  
Perception of extraordinary events is presented in Chapter 2. This provides suggestions 
on how to classify extraordinary events based on their main attributes related to: 
sequence, cause, and mitigating solutions. The core contributions to support an 
increased understanding of extraordinary events originate from the identification and 
definition of critical characteristics. 
Prediction of extraordinary events is described in Chapter 3. Here the criteria from risk, 
reliability, and stability analyses together with the fundamental characteristic of 
extraordinary events form a framework for the methodology to predict and assess the 
risk of extraordinary events. 
Measures for prevention of extraordinary events are presented in Chapter 4, including 
results from case studies used to test these solutions.  
A summary of the appended papers is provided in Chapter 5. This includes a description 
of the author’s contribution and the relevance that each paper has to this thesis.  
A summary of this thesis is presented in Chapter 6, including conclusions and 
discussions, as well as suggestions for future work. 
Appendices are included at the end of Part I of the thesis, providing information about 
dynamic models used for studies of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 and the 
consequence data of historical extraordinary events.  
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NOTATION 
 
 
HILP High Impact Low Probability event – relating to extraordinary events, 
extreme contingencies, large disturbances, or blackouts; having a 
potentially high impact on society and a low probability to occur. 
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit – providing synchronised measurements of 
voltage and current phasors, i.e. measuring the system state which 
otherwise is estimated.  
PTC Power Transfer Corridor – interconnections between areas or systems, 
where transfer capacities may act as bottlenecks to the system at 
specific operating scenarios. 
SA Security Assessment – methods to evaluate the ability of the power 
system to remain in stable operation when subjected to pre-defined 
disturbances, including the analysis of transient phenomena in the 
power system. Often the term dynamic security assessment (DSA) is 
used when relating to SA based on dynamic simulations.  
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition – system for collecting 
measurements and other data to provide the operator with information 
on the operating state of the power system. 
SE State Estimator – estimating the system state, typically based on 
measurements gathered by the SCADA system. 
SIPS System Integrity Protection Schemes – providing protection against 
system separation and instability, used to increase security and to 
mitigate extraordinary events. Other terms, such as: special protection 
systems (SPS), system protection schemes (SPS), and remedial action 
schemes (RAS), are commonly used in the literature. 
WAMS Wide Area Monitoring Systems – system for improved monitoring 
applications utilising measurements from multiple PMU installations. 
Acronyms related to wide area control systems (WACS), protection 
systems (WAPS), as well as monitoring-control-and-protection 
(WAMPAC) are also found in the literature.  
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1.1 Background 
t is a well-established fact that a reliable supply of electric power is critical for the 
modern society. Since the function of the power system is to satisfy the system 
demand, a reliable supply of electric power implies that the power system itself 
needs to be sufficiently reliable and resilient to failures. It is therefore important to 
study and understand the risks related to failures that may cause widespread 
interruptions of the electric power, i.e. extraordinary events. This serves as the 
motivation behind this PhD work, where focus has been on increasing the understanding 
of extraordinary events and developing solutions to decrease the risk of future blackouts 
from an operational perspective. 
Extraordinary events in the electric power system refer to disturbances with potentially 
high societal impact and low probability to occur. Extraordinary events are referred to 
as blackouts, extreme contingencies, large disturbances, or sometimes as high impact - 
low probability (HILP) events.  
As the power systems become increasingly interconnected, extraordinary events may 
have an impact over large areas affecting the population of multiple countries. The 
Nordic power system, shown in Figure 1, is an example of a power system spanning 
several countries, where Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the eastern part of Denmark are 
synchronously interconnected. The system is further interconnected to the power 
systems in the surrounding area through multiple asynchronous connections to the 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Russia, and the western part of Denmark. 
The consequences of extraordinary events are widespread power interruptions, or even 
total blackout of an entire power system, resulting in considerable socio-economic 
losses and costs. Logically, it is impossible to prevent all unforeseen events in the power 
system; however, there is a high economic incentive to mitigate the consequences of the 
extraordinary events that do occur. As an example, the blackouts that occurred 2003 in 
the Eastern Interconnected power system, on August 14, and in the Nordic power 
system, on September 23, have an estimated cost between 4-10 billion U.S. dollars and 
0.5-2 billion Swedish kronor, respectively, (ELCON 2004; Energimyndigheten 2004). 
The risk of large disturbances, quantified by probability and consequence, may be of a 
similar level as the risk of smaller disturbances, as described by (Carreras et al. 2004). 
However, due to the uncertainties related to the probability and consequence of 
extraordinary events, there are difficulties to economically justify major reinforcements 
of the power system only based on decreasing the risk of extraordinary events, (IEEE 
2007; CIGRE 2010b). Furthermore, investments in new transmission lines may be 
highly controversial, where the recent case concerning the Hardanger connection in 
Norway serves as an illustrative example, (Hillberg et al. 2012a). Solutions to decrease 
the risk of extraordinary events are therefore often focused on improvements related to 
the operation and control of the power system in areas such as monitoring and 
protection related to e.g.: wide area monitoring systems (WAMS), or system integrity 
protection schemes (SIPS).   
I 
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FIGURE 1: MAP OF THE NORDIC POWER SYSTEM,  
AS PER 2012, FROM (SVK 2012) 
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–N–  750kV line 
–––  400kV line 
–––  275kV line 
–––  220kV line 
–––  <220kV line (joint op.) 
- - -  Planned/ under constr. 
Stations 
 Hydropower plant 
▲ Thermal power plant 
x Transformer/switching station  
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1.2 Objective, scope, & limitations 
The objective of this PhD project has been to develop models and methods to analyse 
the risk of extraordinary events, having the goal to increase the security and/or 
utilisation of the power system. 
In order to meet the objective, it has been necessary to obtain in-depth understanding of 
extraordinary events as well as knowledge of methods used to analyse the risk and 
reliability of the power system.  
It should be noted that this work has been focusing on the analysis of extraordinary 
events from an operational point of view, and not from a planning perspective.  
The following research questions have been defined:  
 What are the critical characteristics of extraordinary events?  
 How can the risk of critical characteristics of extraordinary events be 
addressed?  
 How can critical characteristics of extraordinary events be averted?  
To be able to answer these questions, the scope of the work has been divided in three 
main areas: 
1.  Perception of extraordinary events: categorisation of events, 
analysis of causes, and identification of critical characteristics  
2.  Prediction of extraordinary events: identification of study 
requirements and the development of a framework and 
methodology to analyse extraordinary events 
3.  Prevention of extraordinary events: assessment of methods to 
prevent extraordinary events, including solutions for:  
i. Improved situational awareness of the operating state – through 
vulnerability indicators. 
ii. Improved instability prevention – through methods for stability 
assessment and active mitigation using advanced protection and 
control techniques. 
Other promising mitigating solutions, such as advanced islanding schemes and 
restoration procedures are excluded from the scope of this work. 
The work of this thesis has been focusing on the operation of the power system, where 
prediction and prevention of extraordinary events are required on-line and in the day-
ahead operation planning. This means that methods to decrease the risk of extraordinary 
events from a longer planning perspective, e.g. preventive maintenance, have not been 
studied.  
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Further limitations to this work relate to the risk space and the type of events:  
 The risk and reliability analyses described in this thesis are limited only 
to extraordinary events, meaning that they do not reflect the total risk or 
reliability level of the power system. 
 The extraordinary events considered in this thesis are limited to events 
initiated by factors related to the power system, referred to as power 
system initiated extraordinary events.  
  
1.3. 
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1.3 Scientific contributions 
Increased understanding of extraordinary events in the electric power system is vital to 
develop risk analysis models and methods, and to implement appropriate remedies in 
order to limit the presence and consequences of future extraordinary events.  
The scientific contributions of this PhD project are summarised in this section, with 
detailed descriptions provided in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The scientific contributions are 
divided into the three research areas:  
A. Perception of extraordinary events 
B. Prediction of extraordinary events 
C. Prevention of extraordinary events 
 
A. PERCEPTION OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
The ability to identify power systems vulnerabilities to extraordinary events lays the 
foundation to the question of perceiving extraordinary events. This PhD work 
contributes to improve the perception of extraordinary events with the following aspect, 
referred to as scientific contribution A1:  
Identification of the transition to unstable operation as a fundamental and 
critical characteristic of extraordinary event.  
Previous studies have identified and described the similarities between many historical 
extraordinary events, regarding characteristics, sequence, and causes. Many studies 
describe how instability phenomena have occurred during specific events, and how this 
may be prevented in the future. However, the instability aspect has not previously been 
identified as the critical state of any blackout. In Chapter 2, it is described how the 
response of the power system changes after the transition to unstable operation – 
illustrating the criticality of the stability aspect for analysing of extraordinary events.  
 
B. PREDICTION OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
The ability to assess how vulnerable a power system is to extraordinary events lays the 
foundation to the question of predicting extraordinary events. This PhD work 
contributes to an improved prediction of extraordinary events by providing a 
methodology and a framework for analysing risk and vulnerability of extraordinary 
events during on-line operation and in the day-ahead operation planning.  
Risk, reliability, and stability of the power system together define the set of 
requirements for analysis and prediction of extraordinary events. These requirements 
are presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis, providing the basic framework for the analysis 
of extraordinary events. These requirements may be summarised into the following 
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statement, which is considered the first contribution to an improved prediction of 
extraordinary events referred to as scientific contribution B1: 
It is a necessity to perform transient dynamic multi-level contingency 
analyses on-line to be able to assess the risks and vulnerabilities related to 
extraordinary events during operation of the power system.  
Chapter 3 also provides a description of a methodology to analyse extraordinary events, 
together with two means to indicate vulnerabilities in the system. These indicators aim 
to provide on-line information of the systems vulnerabilities to the operator, and are 
regarded as the second contribution to an improved prediction of extraordinary events 
referred to as scientific contribution B2: 
Vulnerability indicator kmin and visualisation of the N – k secure operating 
region.  
These indicators should not be regarded as operating criteria (such as the N – 1 
criterion), but as indicators of the systems vulnerability to extraordinary events. Due to 
the significant uncertainties of assessing the risk of extraordinary events in terms of 
probability and consequence, this methodology focuses on assessing the shortest 
distance to undesired events. Implementing this methodology requires tools to perform 
multilevel transient dynamic contingency analyses on-line, the development of such 
tools have not been part of the scope of this work.  
 
C. PREVENTION OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
The ability to mitigate the causes of extraordinary events lays the foundation to the 
question of preventing extraordinary events. This PhD work contributes to the 
prevention of extraordinary events through solutions related to enhanced situational 
awareness.  
The vulnerability indicators kmin and the N – k secure operating region, presented as 
scientific contribution B2, may be utilised both in the prediction and prevention of 
extraordinary events. The implementation of kmin as an on-line predictor, i.e. a leading 
vulnerability indicator, would be especially useful in order to provide information on 
how the vulnerability may develop for future operating states. These indices provide 
enhanced awareness regarding multiple contingencies related to the actual and the 
predicted operating states, thus providing the operator with improved possibilities to 
implement actions to prevent extraordinary events. 
The equal-area criterion is utilised to assess the secure power transfer capacity of 
critical power transfer corridors of the system, presented in Chapter 4. This concept is 
considered a contribution to preventing extraordinary events, referred to as scientific 
contribution C1:  
The EAC on PTC concept  
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This concept is applicable in cases where a sub-system may be identified wherein all 
machines are defined as critical machines, i.e. where a critical contingency result in the 
acceleration of all synchronous machines within one sub-system relative the rest of the 
system. The tie-lines interconnecting the sub- and main systems may then be defined as 
a critical power transfer corridor on which the EAC on PTC concept can be applied.  
The EAC on PTC concept is not to be regarded as an entirely novel methodology, but as 
a novel way of utilising previously developed equal-area criteria methods.  
Chapter 4 provides a description on how to utilise the EAC on PTC concept when 
developing system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) designed to prevent 
extraordinary events.  
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
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2.1 Background  
Extraordinary events in the electric power system refer to disturbances with potentially 
high societal impact and low probability to occur. Extraordinary events are referred to 
as blackouts, extreme contingencies, large disturbances, or sometimes as high impact - 
low probability (HILP) events.  
In order to address the risk of extraordinary events the events themselves need to be 
understood. This chapter deals with: classification and categorisation of events, 
identification of event sequences and critical characteristics, as well as analysis of 
causes and possible remedies. 
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2.2 Classification of extraordinary events 
Extraordinary events in the electric power system refer to disturbances with potentially 
high societal impact and low probability to occur. Extraordinary events are referred to 
as blackouts, extreme contingencies, large disturbances, or sometimes as high impact - 
low probability (HILP) events.  
As each extraordinary event is unique, there are many possibilities to classify the events 
into groups. One possibility to classify the events is their main cause. In this thesis, the 
following two categories of extraordinary events are defined:  
1.  Natural hazard events: events caused mainly by factors related to 
the environment, such as adverse weather (extreme wind, icing 
etc.) or natural disasters (e.g. forest fires, landslides, earthquakes, 
or volcanic eruptions). 
2.  Power system initiated events: events where the main causes 
originate from technical or operational failures in the power 
system (e.g. component malfunction, faulty protective actions, 
operator errors, or overloading). 
Extraordinary events which are not included in these two categories such as deliberate 
or accidental actions by a third party are not addressed in this thesis.  
Disturbance duration and magnitude may be used for classifying the criticality of 
extraordinary events in a specific power system, as explained by (Doorman et al. 2004) 
and (Doorman et al. 2006). These two consequence dimensions, i.e. time and 
disconnected load, are utilised in Figure 2 to describe the consequences of some 
historical extraordinary events.  
Figure 2 presents events that occurred around the world between 1965 and 2009. The 
events categorised as natural hazard events or power system initiated events are marked 
in the figure by a circle or triangle, respectively. The outage data are based on 
information provided by several studies, where the approximated average duration, 
disconnected load, and energy not supplied is collected in Appendix B.  
As shown in Figure 2, it is possible to differentiate between the two defined event 
categories. This apparent distribution of events originates mainly from the duration of 
the event, and is based on the difference between these two event categories, namely 
their impact on society:  
Natural hazard events are often characterised by extensive tripping and 
destruction of power system components. Such direct impact on the 
mechanical structures of the power system, as well as on other 
infrastructures, may significantly delay the restoration process prolonging 
the duration of the blackout.  
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Power system initiated events have a relatively short duration, since, if no 
major mechanical breakdown occurs, restoration mainly relates to the re-
energisation and re-synchronisation of power system components.  
 
FIGURE 2: HISTORICAL EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, 
CATEGORISED AS NATURAL HAZARD EVENTS OR POWER SYSTEM INITIATED EVENTS, 
MARKED BY A CIRCLE OR TRIANGLE, RESPECTIVELY 
Since the duration of an event depends on several factors, such as the type and location 
of faults, the location and availability of resources, and the predefined emergency 
procedures, there are several outliers to this general distribution of events, as indicated 
in Figure 2.  
Similarly as the causes and duration differentiate the two event categories, so do the 
most obvious counteractions:  
Natural hazard events may in many cases be prevented by increased 
mechanical dimensioning of power system components and structures, and 
locating them in a less exposed environment.  
Power system initiated events may in many cases be prevented by 
increased electrical dimensioning of power system components, including 
more backup and parallel connections.  
Dimensioning the power system to withstand extraordinary events is normally limited 
by financial restrictions.  
EU 2006 FR 1978
BR 1984
BR 1996
BR 1999
BR 1999
BR 2002
JP 1987
AU 2004
MY 2005
MY 1998
US 1965
US 1996
US 1996
US 2003
NO 1992
SE 2005
NO 2005
FR 1999
BR 1985
BR 2009
CA 1998
US 1977
US 1998
SE 1983
NO 2004
FI 2003
SE 2003
NO 2007
DK 2002ES 2001
GR 2004
UK 2003
IT 2003
BE 1982
RU 2005
UK 2008
US 2008
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
0.1 1 10 100 1000
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 [M
W
]
Duration [hours]
Outliers
Natural hazard events
Power system initiated events
Chapter 2 
 
Perception of Extraordinary Events 
 
15 
In this thesis, only extraordinary events initiated by factors related to the power system 
have been studied. Therefore, in the rest of this thesis, the term extraordinary event is 
referring only to power system initiated events.  
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2.3 Sequence of extraordinary events 
Many historical extraordinary events have similarities when it comes to the sequence of 
the event. The possibility to express events following a generic sequence has been 
proposed in several studies, such as: (Knight 1989; Efimov and Voropai 2006; Lu et al. 
2006; Pourbeik et al. 2006; IEEE 2007).  
The sequence of extraordinary events presented in this thesis, illustrated in Figure 3, is 
described by the following stages: 
1.  Originating from a normal operating state, the sequence of events 
is triggered by a failure with an unforeseen impact on the 
operation of the power system. The failure moves the operation 
into an alert state where the system is vulnerable to further 
failures. Correct remedial actions are necessary to prevent the 
system from deteriorating. 
2.  Depending on the utilisation and topology of the grid, either 
thermal aspects or stability are the limiting factors in the next 
phase: 
i. The thermal overloading will lead to protective actions, 
disconnecting components in a cascaded manner. Remedial 
actions are required to prevent instability, and often there is 
enough time to implement such actions manually. 
ii. At a certain point, stability limits are exceeded. This marks 
the critical point of the event and from this point 
onwards the system is unstable. Remedial actions are 
imperative to regain stable operation.  
3.  The instability initiated cascade is characterised by power and 
frequency oscillations, voltage decay, and a decay or rise in 
frequency. This leads to the triggering of multiple component 
protections, and the affected region may be widespread. This 
phase is very fast and in most cases only predefined automatic 
remedial actions are able to limit the extent of the cascade. 
4.  The system will eventually stabilise in a restorative operating 
state, characterised by several unsynchronised islands, some of 
which experiencing a total blackout due to the generation facilities 
of the island being unable to meet the demand.  
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FIGURE 3: GENERIC SEQUENCE OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
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The generic sequence presented in Figure 3 provides new insight into the behaviour of 
extraordinary events in the way that the system always reaches instability before a 
blackout occurs. In (Hillberg et al. 2012b), it is explained that the violation of stability 
limits constitutes a fundamental part of any extraordinary event, and that there is a 
considerable difference between the system response before and after this point.  
Before this point, remedial actions may constitute manually implemented 
corrective actions. In this way, the consequences of the event may be 
limited and the system can be restored into another secure operating state.  
After stability limits have been violated, remedial actions are only possible 
through predesigned automatic control and protection systems. Such 
remedial actions are difficult to design and increases the complexity of the 
power system, but if an instability initiated cascade is not prevented the 
system will face a large and uncontrolled disturbance. 
Thus, in order to properly understand and analyse extraordinary events it is imperative 
to acknowledge the criticality of the transition from stable to unstable operation. This 
implies that the transition from stable to unstable operation should constitute the core in 
any risk analysis of extraordinary events. Therefore, in this thesis:  
The transition from stable to unstable operation is defined as a fundamental and 
critical characteristic of an extraordinary event. 
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2.4 Causes of extraordinary events 
Causes of extraordinary events are complex and several factors influence the final 
consequences of an event. Causes may be divided into root causes and contributing 
causes, which are in (DOE 1992) defined as: 
A root cause is the cause that, if corrected, would prevent recurrence of 
this and similar occurrences.  
A contributing cause is a cause that contributed to an occurrence but, by 
itself, would not have caused the occurrence.  
Hence, identification of the real root causes is important to mitigate future extraordinary 
events. Differentiation between root and contributing causes can however be difficult, 
and may also be very case specific. Some general aspects of root and contributing 
causes are presented in (Johansson et al. 2010): 
 Extraordinary events may have several contributing causes but only one 
single or a few root causes.  
 Root causes of power system initiated events are more often related to 
system operation than to actual equipment failure. 
 Contributing causes are often directly related to failure and excessive or 
premature disconnection of equipment; with hidden failures of 
protective equipment as a recurrent contributor. 
Based on the analysis of historical extraordinary events, presented in (Johansson et al. 
2010), the insufficient situational awareness is identified as a root cause of significant 
importance. The reason for behind the importance lies in the relationship between 
situational awareness and the implementation of remedial actions: 
If an operator or an automated system is unaware of the vulnerabilities that 
the system is facing, it is unlikely that the correct remedial actions are 
taken which could have mitigated the consequences of an event.  
Thus, insufficient situational awareness makes the system increasingly vulnerable to 
extraordinary events since the system may be exposed to completely other threats than 
those that the operator are aware of. From the studies of historical blackouts, it is clear 
that enhancements of the situational awareness may contribute significantly to decrease 
the power systems vulnerability to extraordinary events. Therefore, in this thesis:  
The lack of situational awareness is defined as a significantly important cause of 
extraordinary events.  
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2.5 Mitigation of extraordinary events 
As indicated in Figure 3, remedial actions are important at every stage of an 
extraordinary event. Remedial actions are here referring to actions, either manual or 
automatic, taken to limit the consequences of an event and maintain the integrity and 
stability of the power system.  
The possibility to implement remedial actions to prevent a large disturbance lies in the 
situational awareness of the operator or the dedicated control or protection system. This 
means that enhanced monitoring solutions, enabling improved situational awareness, 
can provide essential contributions to reduce the vulnerabilities in the power system and 
to decrease the risk of extraordinary events.  
Uncontrolled system sectioning, as a result of instability, often leads to a blackout due 
to insufficient awareness and control of the islanded power systems. This implies that 
controlled islanding can limit disturbance propagation and the consequences of 
extraordinary events. A well functioning automated islanding scheme may be the 
difference between total system blackout and controlled load shedding. 
Automated actions to mitigate extraordinary events are often implemented as system 
protections, here referred to as system integrity protection schemes (SIPS)1. 
The functionality of various SIPS controls is explained in e.g. (CIGRE 2007a), 
including actions such as: generation rejection, turbine fast valving, fast unit start-up, 
automatic generation control (AGC) action, under frequency load shedding (UFLS), 
under voltage load shedding (UVLF), remote load shedding, automatic shunt switching, 
braking resistor, generator voltage set point change, controlled system separation, tap 
changer blocking, SVC voltage control, HVDC special control.  
As illustrated by Figure 4, the response time of SIPS actions has a similar time frame as 
the transient stability phenomena of the power system, implying the possibility of SIPS 
actions to improving the transient stability of the power system.  
                                                 
1 Several other terms and acronyms are used when referring to this kind of protection scheme, such as 
special protection systems, system protection schemes, or remedial action schemes, (Anderson and 
LeReverend 1996; CIGRE 2001; Madani et al. 2010). Due to the different terminology found in the 
literature, the use of these expressions has become rather mixed. In this thesis, the expression system 
integrity protection schemes is used since there is a tendency in the literature to use this more precise 
term, and I consider this as best reflecting the functionality of these protection schemes. 
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FIGURE 4: TIME FRAME OF POWER SYSTEM RELATED PHENOMENA, 
BASED ON (CIGRE 2001; NOVOSEL ET AL. 2004) 
System integrity protection schemes are increasingly utilised in power systems 
worldwide to provide additional power transfer capacity and enhanced reliability. In the 
Norwegian power system, SIPS implementation has been progressing since the 1980s 
and today generation rejection schemes control 20% of the installed capacity (Hillberg 
et al. 2012c). This intensified SIPS penetration implies an augmented operational 
demand in terms of both utilisation and complexity of the power system. 
As noted by (Patel et al. 2004), it is important that any SIPS implemented actions are 
sufficiently coordinated with component protection in order to achieve the required 
remedial action to mitigate an extraordinary event.  
In many ways, the installation of phasor measurement units (PMU) provides the means 
of improvements based on synchronous monitoring of voltage and current phasors 
throughout the power system. This is described by e.g. (Phadke et al. 1983) and (Phadke 
and Thorp 2006). 
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2.6 Summary 
Each extraordinary event is unique; hence, there are many possibilities to classify the 
events into groups. The group of extraordinary events studied in this thesis is referred to 
as power system initiated extraordinary events.  
Power system initiated extraordinary events originate from technical or operational 
failures in the power system, such as component malfunction, faulty protective actions, 
human errors, or overloading. This type of events can be characterised by the relatively 
short duration of the interruption. Since the events do not involve major mechanical 
breakdown, the restoration procedure is normally fast and mainly concerns re-
energisation and re-synchronisation of power system components. In this thesis, only 
power system initiated extraordinary events are studied. Therefore, the term 
extraordinary event is used in this thesis to refer to power system initiated extraordinary 
events if not stated otherwise. 
From the study of historical events, a generic sequence of events is presented in this 
chapter which emphasises the criticality of the state of instability as a fundamental part 
of extraordinary events. In this thesis, the transition from stable to unstable operation is 
defined as a fundamental and critical characteristic of extraordinary events. This 
reflects new insights into the behaviour and characteristics of extraordinary events and 
is therefore referred to as scientific contribution A1.  
As each extraordinary event is unique, the generic root causes of extraordinary events 
are difficult to identify, but the number of root causes of a single event are typically 
very low and more often related to the operation of the system than to actual equipment 
failure. Inadequate situational awareness is identified as a root cause to many events, 
and should be regarded as a main vulnerability to the system when it comes to 
extraordinary events. Remedial actions are important to prevent extraordinary events. 
The possibility to implement remedial actions lies in the situational awareness of the 
operator or the dedicated control or protection system as well as in the impact of the 
action taken. This implies that enhanced monitoring solutions, enabling improved 
situational awareness, as well as improved functionality of automated actions can 
provide essential contributions to decrease the risk of extraordinary events in the power 
system.  
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
PREDICTION OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS  
 
 
  
3.1. 
 
Background 
 
24 
 
3.1 Background 
In order to predict extraordinary events, tools and techniques able to identify and 
analyse critical event characteristics are required. From the perception of extraordinary 
events, described in Chapter 2, the transition to unstable operation is identified as a 
fundamental characteristic of extraordinary events. With stability being an aspect of 
reliability, which is one of several aspects incorporated in the general concept of risk, 
these three interrelated disciplines are in focus when it comes to the possibility of 
predicting extraordinary events. 
Sections 3.2-3.4 provide general descriptions of risk, reliability, and stability concepts, 
as well as on their relevance to the analysis of extraordinary events. The introduction to 
risk, reliability, and stability forms the basic framework and requirements to analyse 
extraordinary events. This framework is utilised to develop the methodology for 
analysing risk of extraordinary events presented in section 3.5. Two means of indicating 
vulnerabilities in the system are presented, referred to as: the kmin-index and the N – k 
secure operating region. 
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3.2 Power system risk 
Power system risk relates to multiple aspects, such as: safety, reliability, environmental, 
financial, and reputational. In this thesis, the focus is on risk related to reliability, and 
specifically to power system initiated extraordinary events. The risk of such events 
reflects only a subset of the total risk space, as illustrated by Figure 5. This means that 
the risk and reliability analyses described in this thesis are limited only to extraordinary 
events; hence, these studies do not describe the total risk or reliability level of the power 
system.  
In this section, general concepts of risk are described, including different definitions of 
risk and the description of two conventional risk assessment methods. The section also 
provides a discussion of power system risk in relation to the analysis of extraordinary 
events.  
 
 
FIGURE 5: RISK OF POWER SYSTEM INITIATED EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, 
A SUBSET OF THE TOTAL RISK SPACE 
 
3.2.1 Definitions of risk 
There are various definitions of risk, where an example is the definition in (ISO 2009) 
stating that risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives. (Nordgård 2010) presents a list 
of risk definitions, which is partly reproduced here: 
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Risk is: 
 a situation of uncertain outcome, where something of human value is at 
stake.  
 the uncertainty of: outcome, actions and events. 
 the expected loss. 
 the expected disutility. 
 the probability of adverse outcome. 
 the uncertain consequence of an event. 
 the two-dimensional combination of consequences and uncertainty. 
 a set of scenarios, each with a probability and a consequence. 
These relatively wide definitions imply that risk may be interpreted, expressed and 
assessed in various ways.  
In this thesis, no specific risk definition is preferred; instead risk is identified as the 
quantifiable danger depending on: the point of view of the beholder, the focus of the 
study, and the extent of the modelled system.  
Vulnerability may be defined as an expression of the problems a system will face 
maintaining its function when exposed to threats, and the problems the system faces 
resuming its activities after the event occurred, (Kjølle et al. 2012). As vulnerability is 
considered a component of risk, vulnerability indicators may be utilised to quantify risk 
from a certain perspective.  
3.2.2 Risk assessment methods 
As the variety of risk definitions implies, risk may be quantified by different 
parameters. In (ISO 2009), it is noted that risk is often expressed as a combination of the 
probabilities and the consequences of the event.  
Two conventional risk assessment methods, which utilise probability and consequences 
to quantify risk, are the fault tree and event tree methods. Figure 6 illustrates the fault 
and event trees in a bow-tie model, where threats lead to an undesired event further 
resulting in consequences. As the figure implies, the undesired event defines the 
interconnection between the fault and event trees; hence the definition of the undesired 
event is a key factor in this type of risk assessment method.  
In a fault tree analysis, the probability of the undesired event is assessed, 
based on threats, barriers, and logical interrelations (marked in Figure 6 as 
T1-3, BF1, and AND-/OR- gates, respectively). Barriers, also referred to as 
function events (Pottonen 2005), may be explicitly expressed in the tree 
each having a probability to prevent the undesired event from occurring. 
The logical interrelations, together with the barriers, build the fault tree 
leading from threats to an undesired event.  
The event tree consists of barriers branching the undesired event into 
various consequence levels (marked in Figure 6 as BE1-2 and C1-3, 
respectively). The probability of each consequence level may be assessed 
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by the probability of the respective branch and the probability that the 
undesired event occurs.  
 
 
FIGURE 6: CONCEPTUAL BOW-TIE MODEL, 
USED FOR RISK ASSESSMENT AND QUANTIFICATION, ILLUSTRATING INTERRELATIONS 
BETWEEN: THREATS, UNDESIRED EVENT, AND CONSEQUENCES 
Barriers in the fault and event trees may for example be different kind of protection 
systems. Such protection systems could be designed to prevent a threat to result in an 
undesired event (i.e. a barrier in the fault tree) or to limit the consequences of an 
undesired event (i.e. a barrier in the event tree). See section 4.1 for examples of threats, 
barriers, consequences, and undesired events which may be used in the analysis of 
extraordinary events.  
There are several challenges related to this type of risk assessment method, such as:  
 Identification of threats: the assessed risk level only reflects the risk of 
identified threats, not the risk of unidentified or hidden threats. 
 Identification of logical interrelations and barriers, and assessing the 
effect of barriers: the effect that a single fault has on the system and on 
the course of an event may depend on multiple system parameters and 
may differ considerably from one scenario to the other. 
 Assessment of the probabilities of threats and barriers: the probability 
of events, which might never have occurred previously, must be defined 
to quantify the risk level 
 Definition of the undesired event: as the undesired event is the interlink 
between cause and effect its definition is vital in order to correctly 
analyse the risk in question 
 Predicting the extent of consequences: with the consequences being the 
final outcome of an event, it provides an essential part of the risk 
assessment; however, the extent of the consequences is highly 
dependent on the assumptions made in other parts of the analysis, and 
may therefore involve a large level of uncertainty.  
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(Aven 2010) describes the importance of including the uncertainty perspective in risk 
analysis, since large uncertainties, related to e.g. probability and consequences, may 
undermine the credibility of quantified risk levels and thus their value as support in a 
decision process. Performing sensitivity analysis using e.g. fuzzy set theory is one way 
of considering the uncertainty perspective.  
3.2.3 Power system risk and extraordinary events  
In this thesis, the focus is on the risk related to power system initiated extraordinary 
events. This implies that risk assessment in this thesis is focusing only on extraordinary 
events; hence, this thesis does not consider the total risk level in the power system.  
The undesired event is the link between cause and effect in risk analysis, as illustrated 
by the bow-tie model shown in Figure 6. Thus, accurate identification and definition of 
undesired events is vital in order to correctly analyse the risk in question. The 
characteristics of the undesired events should represent the fundamental behaviour of 
the studied phenomena, reflecting: 
 a common result of identified threats, and  
 a critical point of the event which may lead to undesired consequences. 
Thus, the following question must be raised in order to specify the undesired events in a 
risk analysis:  
Which are the common critical characteristics of the studied phenomena?  
As described in Section 2.3, the transition from stable to unstable operation is identified 
as a critical point in the generic sequence of extraordinary events. The reason behind its 
criticality lies in the criterion that in order for the power system to operate, it is required 
to be stable. Since the transition from stable to unstable operation implies a breach of 
stability limits, if no remedial actions are implemented, this will result in an 
uncontrolled disconnection of generation and/or load, system separation, voltage 
collapse, and eventually blackout. Such events are likely to be widespread, and may 
affect the integrity of the whole power system. Based on studies of historical events and 
on the criterion of stable operation, it follows that the violation of stability limits 
constitutes a fundamental part of any power system initiated extraordinary event. Thus, 
the transition from stable operation to the state of instability may be defined as the 
undesired event for risk analysis of extraordinary events.  
Conventional risk assessment methods often quantify risk as a combination of 
probabilities and consequences, with the undesired event being a vital part as illustrated 
in the bow-tie model. Such methods rely on the precise assessment of probabilities and 
consequences to provide sufficiently accurate risk levels. Unfortunately, there are in 
general a multitude of challenges related specifically to the assessment of probability 
and consequences.  
Utilising conventional risk assessment methods to quantify the risk of extraordinary 
events requires the precise assessment of probabilities and consequences related to 
extraordinary events. Such assessment faces two main obstacles:  
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Since power systems are normally considered to be operating in 
accordance with the N – 1 criterion, extraordinary events typically involve: 
simultaneous occurrence of multiple faults, the presence of hidden faults 
or threats, maloperations, or that the system is actually operated outside 
the secure region. Thus, extraordinary events are rare but there are 
significant uncertainties related to the probability of their occurrence.  
As the consequence of an extraordinary event depends on the response of 
an unstable system, it may be characterised by oscillations and/or decay in 
voltage, frequency, and/or power, resulting in the triggering of multiple 
component protections. The region in the power system that is affected by 
such an event is complex to asses, and the final outcome of the event is 
thus highly uncertain.  
Thus, conventional risk assessment methods are not able to adequately assess the risk of 
extraordinary events. Unconventional risk assessment techniques and vulnerability 
indicators are therefore required to describe a systems risk of extraordinary events.  
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3.3 Power system reliability 
Risk related to power system reliability is an important part of the operation and 
planning of the power system. Power system reliability is often classified in two 
aspects: adequacy and security, with power system stability being a part of the latter, as 
illustrated by Figure 7.  
Power system reliability, adequacy, and security are defined and described in this 
section, which also includes a discussion of the relevance of power system reliability in 
the analysis of extraordinary events.  
 
 
FIGURE 7: CLASSIFICATION OF POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
3.3.1 Definitions of reliability 
Several proposals to define power system reliability can be found in the literature and 
some examples are provided below.  
“Reliability is considered as referring to the probability (in the heuristic sense of 
relative frequency over the long run) of satisfactory performance”, (Fink and Carlsen 
1978). (Billinton and Allan 1984) state that: “the ability of the system to provide an 
adequate supply of electrical energy is usually designated by the term reliability”. 
While (IEC 1990) defines reliability of an electric power system as the: “probability 
that an electric power system can perform a required function under given conditions 
for a given time interval”, noting that “reliability quantifies the ability of an electric 
power system to supply adequate electric service on a nearly continuous basis with few 
interruptions over an extended period of time”.  
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A common element among these three definitions is the use of the expression adequate, 
and that reliability is considered a measure over the long run or extended period of time. 
(Fink and Carlsen 1978) clearly state that reliability “is a function of the time-average 
performance of the system and its achievement is a system planning problem”. As 
described in the following section, these definitions do not suitably cover the security 
aspect of reliability. 
Other definitions are wider, which may also encompass operational aspects:  
“Reliability, in a bulk power electric system, is the degree to which the performance of 
the elements of that system results in power being delivered to consumers within 
accepted standards and in the amount desired“, (NERC 1985). 
Reliability is “a general concept encompassing all the measures of the ability to deliver 
electricity to all points of utilization within acceptable standards and in the amount 
desired” (CIGRE 1987). 
(Billinton and Allan 1984) in a way also cover this, with the statement that power 
system reliability “is extremely broad and covers all aspects of the ability of the system 
to satisfy the consumer requirements.”  
In this thesis, these wider definitions of reliability are favoured, and the definition used 
is: power system reliability is the overall objective of the system to perform its 
function.  
3.3.2 Adequacy & security 
Common among many reliability definitions is the subdivision of power system 
reliability in two aspects: adequacy and security, as illustrated in Figure 7. In this thesis, 
these aspects are defined as:  
Adequacy (or stationary functionality) is the ability of the power system to satisfy the 
consumer load demand. Adequacy considerations include component ratings and 
voltage limits under steady-state conditions. Adequacy relates to planned and 
unplanned component outages.  
Security (or dynamic functionality) is the ability of the power system to maintain 
interconnected operation. Security considerations include component ratings, voltage 
and frequency limits, loss of load, and instability. Security relates to disturbances and 
system failures, such as short circuits and the loss of system components. 
These definition are based on the definitions in (Guertin et al. 1978; Billinton and Allan 
1984; NERC 1985; CIGRE 1987; IEC 1990; CIGRE 1997). Even though these 
references differ considerably in their definitions of reliability, their definitions of 
adequacy and security are all very similar. (Fink and Carlsen 1978) show a major 
difference here: considering reliability a pure planning aspect while distinguishing 
security as an operating issue.  
As the above definition of security includes stability, an operating scenario is only 
secure against a set of disturbances if it remains in stable operation when exposed to any 
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of these disturbances (e.g. an N – 1 secure operating scenario implies that no single 
contingency results in instability). Thus, a requirement for security is power system 
stability, meaning that analyses of the power system stability are imperative when 
assessing reliability.  
There is a multitude of expressions relating to security and adequacy, and the different 
terminology is often confusing and is definitely a basis for misinterpretation. Below are 
some examples of the terminology used in the literature:  
Security may be referred to as operational security, operational reliability, 
dynamic reliability, transient security, or dynamic security. The two latter 
are used when referring to methods for assessing security, making the 
distinction with methods for adequacy referred to as steady-state or static 
security assessment methods (CIGRE 1987; Balu et al. 1992; 
EURELECTRIC 2004b; CIGRE 2007b; NERC 2010).  
(Fosso 1989) notes a difference between the interpretation and use of 
adequacy and security in planning compared with operation: In planning, 
adequacy refers to steady state and security refers to transient, while in 
operation, the expressions steady-state security and transient security are 
used.  
Operating states may be referred to as secure or insecure. (CIGRE 1997) 
identifies that the meaning of an insecure state is different in Europe 
(insecure = alert = potentially unstable and/or potentially inadequate, i.e. 
potentially unreliable) compared to North America (insecure = potentially 
unstable). Similarly, (IEC 1990) notes that in North America security “is 
usually defined with reference to instability, voltage collapse and 
cascading only”. This seems to imply that European literature does not 
consider both aspects of reliability to the same extent as American 
literature does.  
In German, adequacy and security are referred to as the stationary and dynamic 
functionality of the power system2, respectively. These expressions include the most 
significant attributes of the two aspects of reliability – namely:  
 adequacy is associated only with stationary conditions, while  
 security is associated with the dynamic system response.  
As noted by (Støa 1986), the techniques required to assess the aspects of reliability 
differ: adequacy can be assessed using steady-state techniques while security 
assessment requires dynamic techniques. Thus, the expressions stationary and dynamic 
functionality seem more appropriate than adequacy and security and are therefore 
included in the definitions in this thesis.  
It is important to realise that both adequacy and security play a role in the reliability of 
the power system, as pointed out in (CIGRE 1997) where it is stated that: “equal 
                                                 
2 Stationäre / dynamische Funktionsfähigkeit (eines Elektrizitätsversorgungssystems), (DKE-IEV 2007). 
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consideration must be given to what state the system ends up in after, say, the loss of a 
component, and how it gets there, if it can get there at all”, implying the requirement of 
considering transient simulations in reliability studies. Adequacy and security are also 
identified to contribute to reliability in different ways: “adequacy mostly with minor 
local interruptions, and security predominantly with large widespread ones”, (Støa 
1986).  
3.3.3 Security of electricity supply 
Sometimes the expression security of electricity supply is used, which in (IEC 1990) is 
defined as the: “ability of an electric power system to provide electric power and energy 
to end-users with evaluation of existing standards and contractual agreements at the 
point of supply”. A shorter definition can be found in the European directive (EU 2006): 
“the ability of an electricity system to supply final customers with electricity”.  
Security of electricity supply may be seen as a broader concept than power system 
reliability, encompassing also aspects such as energy availability and market structure. 
Power system reliability is, however, extremely broad – covering all aspects of the 
ability of the system to satisfy its consumers, (Billinton and Allan 1984); hence, security 
of electricity supply is in many ways a synonym for power system reliability, (Pérez-
Arriaga 2007). Furthermore, the expression security of electricity supply is yet another 
source of misinterpretation of the aspect of security.  
Therefore, security of electricity supply is an expression that should be used with 
caution, and if used it should be clearly specified what it covers.  
3.3.4 Reliability assessment methods and the N – 1 criterion 
Power system operating states, introduced by (Dy Liacco 1967) and revised by (Fink 
and Carlsen 1978), are widely used in operation planning and design of remedial 
emergency actions. Figure 8 provides examples of how the operating states are 
interpreted in the Continental European and Nordic power systems. Various terms are 
used to express the states of operation, but during normal operation (i.e. normal state) 
the power system is considered to be able to withstand any single contingency that the 
system operator considers credible.  
In many power systems, the N – 1 criterion is used as a reliability criterion for both 
planning and operation purposes, with the implication that the power system should be 
planned and operated in a state where no single contingency will result in the 
disconnection of load.  
The N – 1 criterion is based on the basic probabilistic idea that: the loss of any single 
component is pretty likely, while the simultaneous loss of multiple components is quite 
unlikely. The N – 1 criterion is commonly used in a deterministic manner, with no 
regard to the relative probability or the consequence of a specific outage. Sometimes 
however, semi-probabilistic approaches are used, based on e.g. decreased transfer 
capacities during adverse weather conditions or analysis of extreme contingencies based 
on experience, (CIGRE 2010b) and (Qi 2011).  
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FIGURE 8: INTERPRETATION OF POWER SYSTEM OPERATING STATES,  
FROM (A) THE ENTSO-E OPERATION HANDBOOK (ENTSO-E 2010),  
AND (B) THE NORDIC GRID CODE (NORDEL 2007) 
Varieties of the N – 1 criterion exist, such as: N – G – 1 and N – 2, implying that the 
system should withstand a pre-specified selection of multiple contingencies, (CIGRE 
2010b). In cases where the N – 1 criterion is not fulfilled, expressions such as N – 0 or 
N – ½ can be found, (Breidablik et al. 2003).  
N – 0 operation may imply a radial operating scenario, where any single failure (of a set 
of components) results in the outage of an area3.  
N – ½ operation reflects an operating scenario that is more reliable than N – 0, but less 
reliable than N – 1. Such a situation implies the dependency of system integrity 
protection schemes (SIPS), which have automated remedial actions that are designed to 
prevent blackout4. 
The N – 1 criterion has different interpretations in the planning and operation of the 
power system. In planning, each foreseen operating scenario should be able to cope with 
any single outage in order to be considered N – 1 reliable. Under operation, the N – 1 
criterion also involves the time aspect. In the Nordic power system, if two or more 
faults occur within a time frame of 15 minutes, they may be categorised as N – 2 faults 
and outside the dimensioning criteria of the system (Nordel 2007). This implies that 
preventive actions should be implemented within 15 minutes after a fault has occurred. 
Thus, the operator needs to be aware of the actual state of operation with a minimum 
latency in order to identify and implement sufficient actions within the stipulated time 
frame. Hence, in operation the N – 1 criterion has limited value during operation 
without sufficient situational awareness. 
                                                 
3 Since only a highly limited set of components affect the reliability of a radially operated area, a more 
precise expression for this operating scenario could be: M – 0, where typically M<<N. 
4 To properly reflect the dependency of the power systems on the automated response of a system 
integrity protection scheme, this operating scenario could be expressed as: N – SIPS. 
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The N – 1 criterion is a reliability criterion, used in both planning and operation, 
reflecting both the adequacy and security of the system. However, N – 1 contingency 
analyses are often performed using steady-state simulations, i.e. assessing the adequacy 
of the power system, with dynamic studies only performed on a limited number of 
contingencies, (CIGRE 1997). This means that if fulfilment of the criterion is based on 
conventional N – 1 contingency analyses, it may be difficult to verify if the operation is 
N – 1 secure.  
Conventional reliability assessment techniques often neglect the security aspect of 
reliability, (Vrana and Johansson 2011). This may be a remnant from the historical 
perspective of reliability studies – being on long-term planning. A main reason for this 
still being the case might be the simpler and faster means of evaluating adequacy 
compared with security, (CIGRE 1997), and a reluctance to define a study as an 
adequacy study. There is a trend towards the development and implementation of on-
line security assessment methods (referred to as dynamic or transient security 
assessment methods), as the value of secure operation is increasingly recognised by the 
power industry (CIGRE 2007b; Cirio et al. 2008). An example of work in this area is 
the R&D project iTesla: Innovative Tools for Electrical System Security within Large 
Areas (2012-2015), with the development of a toolbox to provide the system operator 
with security information based on semi-online dynamic security assessment. 
3.3.5 Power system reliability and extraordinary events  
Power system reliability is defined here as the overall objective of the system to perform 
its function, and is composed by the two aspects adequacy and security. Adequacy is 
typically associated with static conditions, while security is associated with the stability 
and dynamic response of the power system. Even though reliability is often considered 
as having these two aspects, conventional reliability assessment techniques are often 
limited to steady-state studies – thus assessing only the adequacy aspect of reliability.  
Since stability is identified as a critical attribute of extraordinary events, identification 
of contingencies leading to instability is fundamental when studying extraordinary 
events. Thus, in order to address the reliability of extraordinary events, the security 
aspect cannot be neglected. This implies that dynamic reliability assessment techniques 
are required, meaning that contingency analyses must be based on dynamic simulations.  
The criticality of exceeding stability boundaries constitutes the requirement of 
identifying stability limitations also in a system where limitations are defined by 
thermal capacities. This means that independent of the nature of the constraints during 
normal operation, after a number of consecutive contingencies the power system will 
face instability. This behaviour is illustrated in Figure 9, describing how multiple 
contingencies may affect the thermal and stability limits of a power transfer corridor. 
This figure is only conceptual and does not imply that stability limits necessarily are 
exceeded before thermal limits. On the contrary, thermal limits might be exceeded after 
only one or a few contingencies, but when the stability limits are exceeded the critical 
point of an extraordinary event is reached.  
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FIGURE 9: INDICATING THE POINT OF INSTABILITY AFTER MULTIPLE CONTINGENCIES,  
MODIFIED FROM (HILLBERG ET AL. 2012B) 
Power systems are normally considered operating in accordance with the N – 1 
criterion, which is a reliability criterion used for both planning and operation purposes. 
If the N – 1 contingency analyses are mainly based on steady-state simulations, it is 
uncertain if the operating state is N – 1 secure. Furthermore, ordinary N – 1 contingency 
analyses fail to identify the vulnerabilities related to events caused by multiple 
contingencies, as illustrated in Figure 9. Thus, in order to address the reliability related 
to extraordinary events, it is required to assess the dynamic functionality (i.e. security) 
of the system when exposed to multi-level contingencies.  
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3.4 Power system stability 
Since the dynamic functionality (or security) of the power system depends on the 
stability, it is important to understand the phenomena related to power system stability 
when assessing the reliability of the power system.  
Power system stability is defined by the dynamic response of all components in the 
system, and may be classified into three separate phenomena: rotor angle stability, 
frequency stability, and voltage stability, as illustrated in Figure 10. Each of these 
phenomena is separately described in this section, which also includes a discussion of 
the relevance of power system stability in the analysis of extraordinary events.  
 
 
FIGURE 10: CLASSIFICATION OF POWER SYSTEM STABILITY,  
BASED ON (KUNDUR ET AL. 2004) 
 
3.4.1 Rotor angle stability 
Rotor angle stability reflects the ability of the power system to maintain its 
synchronism, defined by the amount of damping and synchronizing torque available for 
each synchronous machine, (Kundur et al. 2004).  
Every disturbance in the system affects the operating point of the synchronous 
generators. The location, type and duration of the disturbance, as well as the transient 
behaviour of generators, are crucial to the rotor angle stability. The simplified power-
angle characteristics presented in Figure 11 can be used to illustrate different types of 
rotor angle stability phenomena.  
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FIGURE 11: POWER-ANGLE CHARACTERISTICS, 
(A) SMALL- DISTURBANCE ROTOR ANGLE STABILITY  
(B) LARGE-DISTURBANCE ROTOR ANGLE STABILITY 
Small disturbances perturb the system around the steady-state operating point, (PM,GS) 
in Figure 11A. The amount of damping torque controls the decay of the post-fault 
oscillations on the PE(G) curve. The maximum steady-state power production, PMmax, 
defines the theoretical limit of the small-disturbance rotor angle stability.  
Large-disturbance rotor angle stability is defined by the transient behaviour of the 
machine and the system, where sufficient decelerating torque (Adec) is needed to 
stabilise the post-fault system as illustrated in Figure 11B. During a fault, the machine 
accelerates due to the difference between mechanical and electric power, PM and PE, 
respectively. If, at fault clearing (GCT), the accumulated accelerating torque of the 
machine (Aacc) is larger than the available decelerating torque, the machine will 
accelerate past the unstable equilibrium point (PM,GU) and lose synchronism with the 
rest of the system. This condition is the basis of the well-known transient stability 
equal-area criterion: Aacc ≤ Adec.  
In (Kundur et al. 2004), rotor angle stability is classified as a short-term phenomenon. 
However, rotor angle stability phenomena may also be present as sustained power 
oscillations. Such long-term phenomena occur due to insufficient damping torque, and 
may be found especially in systems with long transmission distances. For the 
transmission network to cope with such oscillations, limitations may be invoked on the 
transfer capacity of the exposed connections. 
3.4.2 Voltage stability 
Voltage stability reflects the ability of the power system to maintain steady-state bus 
voltages, (Kundur et al. 2004), and is defined by the equilibrium of the power-voltage 
characteristics of each transmission connection in the power system.  
Voltage stability is mainly related to the amount of power transfer, the availability of 
reactive power, and the voltage dependency of loads.  
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Similarly as with rotor angle stability, voltage stability can be divided in small-
disturbance and large-disturbance phenomena as illustrated by the power-voltage 
characteristics shown in Figure 12. Here, the characteristics are shown for active power, 
but the same principles and similar characteristics are valid for reactive power. 
A B 
 
FIGURE 12: POWER-VOLTAGE CHARACTERISTICS,  
(A) SMALL-DISTURBANCE VOLTAGE STABILITY,  
(B) LARGE-DISTURBANCE VOLTAGE STABILITY 
Small disturbances perturb the system around the steady-state operating point, (VS,PT) in 
Figure 12A. The maximum steady-state power transfer, PTmax, defines the theoretical 
limit of the small-disturbance voltage stability.  
Large-disturbance voltage stability is defined by the possibility of the system to achieve 
a post-fault steady-state operating point (VS(post-fault),PT), see Figure 12B. This implies 
that the post-fault power-voltage characteristic is needed to be considered for the system 
to be operated in a state which is stable against large disturbances.  
Voltage instability may arise as short- or long-term phenomena, and may develop over 
several minutes depending on the time constants of loads, controls, and protection 
systems. 
3.4.3 Frequency stability 
Frequency stability reflects the ability of the power system to maintain a steady-state 
frequency (Kundur et al. 2004), defined by the generation-load balance of the entire 
system.  
Since the system load is always in a state of change, the frequency stability is heavily 
influenced by the amount of available frequency containment reserves, the equivalent 
speed-droop of the system, the system inertia, and the response of each turbine-
governor.  
The piecewise linear equivalent speed-droop characteristics of the generators, f(PG), and 
the frequency dependency of the load, f(PL) are illustrated in Figure 13. The steady-state 
frequency of any operating scenario is defined by the intersection between the load and 
generation in the frequency-power plane, implying that any change in load or generation 
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will result in a new equilibrium point or an unstable scenario in case the new curves fail 
to intersect.  
A B 
  
FIGURE 13: SPEED-DROOP CHARACTERISTICS,  
(A) FREQUENCY INCREASE AS A RESULT OF LOAD SHEDDING,  
(B) FREQUENCY DECREASE AS A RESULT OF GENERATION REJECTION 
The change in frequency and generation as a result of load shedding, 'PLS, is illustrated 
by Figure 13A. Here, the load curve changes from the pre-disturbance, f(PL1), to the 
post-disturbance, f(PL2). The new intersecting point (2) leads to an increase in 
frequency,'f, as a function of the frequency dependency of the load and generation. 
The final decrease in generation, 'PG(f), and total system demand, 'PLS – 'PL(f), is the 
result of the load shedding.  
Correspondingly, generation rejection, 'PGR, leads to a decrease in frequency, as 
illustrated by Figure 13B, where the intersecting equilibrium point changes from (1) to 
(2), in the pre-disturbance and post-disturbance system, respectively. The final decrease 
in generation, 'PGR – 'PG(f), and total system demand, 'PL(f), is the result of the 
generation rejection. 
These characteristics define the short-term frequency stability, and are related to the 
primary control of the generators. When analysing slower phenomena, the secondary 
and tertiary frequency control should also be considered. 
Frequency instability is often an issue after a system is separated into several 
asynchronous islands; hence, transfer capacity limits based on frequency stability may 
be enforced on corridors which fully separate two areas of a power system.  
3.4.4 Stability expressions and analysis methods  
Other expressions than the ones described above are commonly found in the literature, 
such as: small-disturbance stability, small-signal stability, large-disturbance stability, 
and transient stability. Since these expressions are sometimes used in a confusing 
manner, their descriptions are included here. 
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Stability related to disturbances having only a minor impact on the operating state of the 
system is defined as small-disturbance stability (also referred to as small-signal 
stability). Power system small-disturbance stability relates to the dynamic response of 
the power systems, and is often studied using modal-analysis methods on linearised 
models of the power system. The validity of such studies is limited to the relatively 
close vicinity of the operating point at which the system is linearised, implying that a 
small disturbance may only perturb the system to a minor extent from the pre-
disturbance operating point. Simulation models and tools used to study small-
disturbance stability need to realistically reproduce the dynamic behaviour of the power 
system. 
Stability related to disturbances having a significant impact on the operating state of the 
system is referred to as large-disturbance stability. Power system large-disturbance 
stability relates to the transient response of the power system when exposed to large-
disturbances, which may considerably alter the power flow and transfer capacity of the 
post-disturbance steady-state system. Large-disturbance rotor angle stability is the 
phenomenon typically intended when using the expression transient stability. 
Sometimes however, short-term voltage stability is also referred to as transient stability. 
It should also be noted that the transient phase of a disturbance refers to the dynamic 
state between the pre- and post-disturbance steady states. To assess the large-
disturbance stability, it is essential to study the behaviour of the power system during 
fault, i.e. the transient behaviour. Due to the non-linear nature of the transient behaviour 
during such disturbances, non-linear models are required to study large-disturbance 
stability.  
The expressions steady-state stability and dynamic stability are found in the literature. 
These expressions may be misleading, since the former might be interpreted to relate to 
steady-state tools and the latter is sometimes used to represent different stability 
phenomena. Therefore, it is recommended that neither steady-state stability nor dynamic 
stability are used to express stability phenomena in the power system. 
3.4.5 Power system stability and extraordinary events  
With the transition to an unstable state defined as a fundamental characteristic of 
extraordinary events, the stability of the power system needs to be analysed to assess the 
risk of extraordinary events. As described in (Hillberg et al. 2012c), studying the 
transient behaviour of the power system, i.e. the behaviour between the pre- and post-
disturbance states, is required when analysing extraordinary events: 
Power flow calculations can only give information on the pre- and post-
contingency states, and not whether the transition from one state to the 
next is stable. Only when the transition is stable and the system finds a 
post-fault steady-state, the analysis of a post-fault state is meaningful. 
Therefore, relying only on steady-state power flow calculations, inherently 
underestimates the vulnerability of the system.  
In order to cope with the underestimated vulnerabilities, utilities often operate with a 
safety margin to the steady-state stability limit. (Savulescu 2009) states that “no 
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contingency, no matter how severe, would cause transient instability” when a system is 
operated according to the safety margin, concluding that “given the current operating 
conditions and a dynamically selected set of major, yet credible, contingencies, there is 
no risk of blackout”. Concerning extraordinary events, however, there are fatal 
limitations of relying solely on a margin which is basically only supported by steady-
state calculations. As extraordinary events often include multiple successive or 
simultaneous contingencies, resulting in significant changes in the system operation, the 
transient dynamic impact on the system may be considerable. This is especially the case 
with increased fault clearing time, as a consequence of a protection system failure, 
which has a highly destabilising effect that is completely ignored in a steady-state study. 
Thus, a contingency regarded as non-critical in an analysis based only on power flow 
calculations, may be identified as leading to instability in a dynamic simulation. This 
implies that the models and simulation tools used for stability analysis of extraordinary 
events are required to properly reproduce the dynamic response of the power system 
exposed to disturbances, comprising also the transient behaviour. Furthermore, if 
considering only credible contingencies when assessing the risk of blackouts, it is likely 
that low probability events are neglected. Since blackouts are often caused by low 
probability events, such analysis would underestimate the risk of extraordinary events.  
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3.5 Methodology for analysing risk of extraordinary events  
As described in this chapter, risk, reliability, and stability are three disciplines that are 
interrelated in the process of predicting extraordinary events. These three disciplines 
together formulate the requirement of performing transient dynamic multi-level 
contingency analyses on-line to be able to study the risks and vulnerabilities related to 
extraordinary events during operation of the power system. These requirements form the 
framework of the risk assessment methodology developed during this PhD work, where 
the following definitions have been made when referring to contingencies in 
extraordinary events: 
Critical contingencies are defined as contingencies leading to instability 
Critical contingency level is defined as the level of subsequent contingencies where 
critical contingencies occur 
Undesired event is defined as the transition from stable operation to a state of 
instability  
Due to the significant uncertainties of assessing the risk of extraordinary events in terms 
of probability and consequence, other measures and techniques are required. Therefore, 
the methodology presented here focuses solely on the distance to undesired events.  
The following sub-sections describe how a risk analysis of extraordinary events may be 
realised utilising this methodology and provide two different means to convey the 
shortest distance to undesired events: the kmin-index and the N – k secure operating 
region. 
3.5.1 Realisation of risk analysis of extraordinary events  
This methodology is focusing on the distance to undesired events, hence the 
identification of undesired events. From a bow-tie model perspective, the distance to 
undesired events implies the left-hand side of the bow-tie, i.e. the fault tree, as indicated 
in Figure 14. This figure is intended to illustrate how this unconventional methodology 
to quantify the risk of extraordinary events can be seen in a conventional risk analyses 
perspective.  
In order to assess this distance, the following requirements are part of the risk analysis: 
 identification of threats 
 identification of logical interrelations and barriers 
 assessing the effect of barriers 
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For power system initiated extraordinary events, to assess the distance to system 
instability it is required to: 
 identify a comprehensive list of contingencies 
 specify a set of operating scenarios 
 perform contingency analysis to the critical contingency level 
As a result of the requirements from stability, reliability, and risk analyses, transient 
dynamic contingency studies are identified as imperative to analyse extraordinary 
events. The undesired events, i.e. the transition to instability, are identified through 
multi-level contingency analyses. The required analysis depth of the contingency 
analyses is defined as the critical contingency level. Threats may be defined as the 
critical contingencies which, at the critical contingency level, lead to an unstable 
system.  
 
 
FIGURE 14: METHODOLOGY FOR RISK ANALYSIS OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS,  
ILLUSTRATED IN THE BOW-TIE MODEL PERSPECTIVE 
See sections 3.2.2 and 4.1 for further description of the fault tree and the bow-tie model. 
As previously stated, neither the probability identification nor the consequence 
assessments are explicitly included in this methodology, due to the significant 
uncertainties related to these quantities when considering extraordinary events.  
The required multi-level dynamic contingency analysis is in the following referred to as 
an N – k security analysis, where k is the critical contingency level. Thus, an N – 1 
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security analysis refers to a dynamic contingency analysis including only single level 
failures.  
To perform an N – k security analysis, a basic necessity is to define the study scope. 
This section provides a description of how the scope of the study may be defined, 
considering the following aspects:  
1.  Selection of a representative set of operating scenarios.  
2.  Definition of a list of independent single component failures.  
3.  Identification of a comprehensive list of dependent failures.  
Depending on the goal of the study, it might be relatively easy to identify a limited set 
of operating scenarios (e.g. during operation, the actual scenario is provided by the state 
estimator). In operation planning however, it might be necessary to utilise clustering 
techniques to identify a limited set of operating scenarios.  
The number of required independent single component contingencies to study depends 
on the size of the power system, and on the critical contingency level. The possible 
independent N – k contingencies may be identified as a selection of k contingencies 
from a set of n contingencies. In mathematics, this is defined as the binomial coefficient 
indexed by n and k, denoted ቀ݊݇ቁ and calculated as:  
ቀ݊݇ቁ ൌ
௡Ǩ
௞Ǩሺ௡ି௞ሻǨ. 
In the context of this methodology (where ݇ ا ݊ ), the above expression may be 
approximated to: ௡
ೖ
௞Ǩ . This approximation clearly illustrates how the selected set of N – 1 
contingencies (n) significantly impacts the required number of simulations in a multi-
level contingency analysis. For example, if the number of components considered 
potentially critical is decreased from 100% to 10%, the number of required simulations 
are reduced to: 10% (N – 1), 1% (N – 2), and 1‰ (N – 3). 
In Table I, the total number of components in the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is 
presented, together with the set of independent multi-level contingencies. These 
contingencies have been calculated according the binomial coefficient, with all the 
listed components considered potentially critical.  
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TABLE I. COMPONENTS AND INDEPENDENT CONTINGENCIES  
OF THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996 (IEEE 1999) 
Number of power system components 
Lines5 (l) 100 
Transformers6 (t) 16 
Generators7 (g) 96 
Compensation8 (c) 6 
Total no of components 218 
  
Number of independent N – k contingencies  
N – 1 ሺ݊ሻ 318 
N – 2 ቀ݊ʹቁ 5.0×10
4 
N – 3 ቀ݊͵ቁ 5.3×10
6 
N – 4 ቀ݊Ͷቁ 4.2×10
8 
 
Since the fault location on a line has an impact on the dynamic result, single failures are 
considered on both sides of each line and the set of single component contingencies are 
calculated as: 
݊ ൌ ʹ ൈ ݈ ൅ ݐ ൅ ݃ ൅ ܿ. 
In a real system, the number of installed components is often considerably larger than in 
a test system, resulting in an extremely high number of multi-level contingencies. For 
illustrative purposes, Table II lists the number of independent multi-level contingencies 
for a model of the Nordic power system. The contingencies listed here are calculated in 
the same manner as in Table I. The considered number of components includes 4000 
branches and 1100 generators, and is based on information of the Nordic power system 
model presented in (Johansson et al. 2009). This model includes lines down to 50kV as 
well as small scale generation; thus, it is likely that only a fraction of these components, 
e.g. lines >200kV and generation >100MVA, would be considered potentially critical. 
 
TABLE II. INDEPENDENT CONTINGENCIES OF THE NORDIC POWER SYSTEM 
Number of independent N – k contingencies 
N – 1 9100 
N – 2 4.1×107 
N – 3 1.3×1011 
N – 4 2.9×1014 
                                                 
5 Including AC overhead lines and cables, and merging lines which are fully in parallel. 
6 Including only transformers in the transmission system, i.e. not generator or load transformers. 
7 Generators which are identical and located at the same main bus may be merged if they are operated 
equally. As the generator operation depends on the studied scenario, this merging has not been done here. 
8 Synchronous condensers and shunt reactors.  
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The occurrence of dependent contingencies, such as common cause failures or cascaded 
component overloading, resulting in disconnection of multiple components may have 
substantial impact on the resilience of the system. Therefore, the analysis of dependent 
contingencies is of vital importance for a multi-level contingency analysis in order to 
assess the risk of extraordinary events. Dependent contingencies are subject to the 
system structure, and their identification requires knowledge of actual construction and 
location of system components.  
As the above description implies, the proposed methodology presents significant 
challenges due to the extensive requirements to dynamically study a large quantity of 
cases and contingencies. There are several techniques to reduce the number of necessary 
simulations, such as contingency screening techniques and operating scenario clustering 
techniques, as described by e.g. (Singh et al. 2006; Kile and Uhlen 2012). In order to 
properly assess the risk of extraordinary events, the loss of important information must 
be limited when using techniques to expedite the contingency analyses. Development 
and testing of such techniques are however outside the scope of this work.  
3.5.2 kmin vulnerability indicator 
The distance to instability may be indicated by various parameters: regarding transient 
instability, the distance to instability may be represented by the critical clearing time or 
the transient stability margin, while voltage instability might be represented using the S-
difference indicator or the impedance stability index, for information on these and other 
stability indices, see e.g. (Xue et al. 1988; Storvann et al. 2012). These stability indices 
are useful when specifying operational limits on power transfer capacities, as they 
provide information regarding the distance to instability of a specific operating state. 
However, since power systems are typically operated according to the requirement to 
fulfil the N – 1 criterion, indices based only on studies of the steady-state or single-
contingencies do not provide any information regarding the risk of multi-contingency 
events.  
When studying extraordinary events, multi-level contingency analysis are in focus and 
the shortest distance to instability can therefore be represented by the minimum number 
of subsequent contingencies that will lead to instability. In this PhD work, the shortest 
distance to instability is expressed by the kmin-index defined as: 
݇௠௜௡ ൌ ሺݏ௜ሻ ǡ ׊݅ 
where i is the set of contingencies that leads to an unstable state for a specific operating 
scenario, and s is the contingency level of each such set. In this way, kmin provide 
information on the risk of extraordinary events of the studied operating scenario and 
may be referred to as a vulnerability indicator.  
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The main purpose of the kmin-index is to provide information on the vulnerability of the 
system regarding extraordinary events. Conventional measures of providing system 
loadability limits, based on N – 1 security assessment, fail to provide information 
regarding extraordinary events due to several reasons: 
1.  If only single contingencies are assessed, the effect of multi-level 
contingencies is neglected. 
2.  If multi-level contingencies are considered, studies are typically 
limited to a list of major contingencies, thus neglecting other 
contingencies. 
3.  If probabilities of contingencies are considered, low probability 
events are normally neglected. 
4.  If basing the security assessment only on steady-state studies, 
transient stability phenomena are neglected.  
In order to assess the vulnerability to extraordinary events, it is required to analyse the 
transient behaviour related to low probability multi-level contingencies. The kmin-index 
may then be utilised to address the risk of extraordinary event for a system during 
different operating scenarios.  
The requirements for computing kmin are the same as the previously mentioned 
requirements for analysing extraordinary events: the execution of transient dynamic 
multi-level contingency analyses. As described earlier, such analyses involve a great 
number of simulations and it may therefore be necessary to utilise different kind of 
computational methodologies to be able to compute and present kmin as an online 
indicator. However, the described indicator does have an intrinsic reduction to some 
extent, since it is not necessary to identify all critical contingencies in order to find the 
critical contingency level. This implies that it is highly unlikely that all ቀ݊݇ቁ simulations 
are required to identify kmin, especially if the set of contingencies is ranked in a fairly 
plausible order of criticality.  
A proposal to further develop kmin and to visualise the vulnerability level of the 
operating scenario is presented as the N – k secure operating region. 
3.5.3 N − k secure operating region 
(CIGRE 1997; Uhlen et al. 2002; Morison et al. 2004; Sarmiento et al. 2009) suggest 
that a secure operating region may be defined based on different criteria, such as the 
power transfer capacity limitations on corridors or the secure generation within a 
specific part of the system.  
The secure operating region is basically determined by the thermal and stability 
constraints of the system, which, in fact, spans a multi-dimensional space. Thus, it may 
be complex to conceive the secure operating region without losing vital information. 
Furthermore an immense number of simulations are required to fully specify the 
distance to the security limit in all dimensions. However, it is theoretically possible to 
identify in which dimensions the system is most vulnerable. Assuming that a limited 
Chapter 3 
 
Prediction of Extraordinary Events 
 
49 
number of critical dimensions can be identified, these dimensions can be used to 
visualise a limited number of two-dimensional secure operating regions.  
In this PhD work, the concept of the secure operating region have been expanded to 
multi-level contingencies, defined as the N – k secure operating region. Dynamic multi-
level contingency analysis may be referred to as N – k security analysis, where N – k 
secure implies that the system can withstand k subsequent failures. Thus, the N – k 
secure operating region implies an operating region within which the system is secure 
against k subsequent failures. The N – k secure operating region is conceptually 
illustrated in Figure 15, where it is assumed that the power flow over two power transfer 
corridors (PTC) is identified as critical dimensions in the secure operating space.  
A B C 
 
FIGURE 15: N-K SECURE OPERATING REGION,  
VISUALISING THE ACTUAL OPERATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF: 
(A) N-1 SECURITY, (B) N-K SECURITY, AND (C) SIPS SECURITY,  
FROM (HILLBERG ET AL. 2012C) 
Figure 15A illustrates the N – 1 secure operating region, including the actual operating 
state, in the two-dimensional space defined by the power flow over two power transfer 
corridors. Expanding this region to consider the effect of multiple contingencies, 
visualising the N – 2, N – 3, and a general N – k secure operating region as illustrated in 
Figure 15B. The N – k secure operating region would thus provide insight into the 
security level of the actual operating state related to multiple contingencies. This 
information could be utilised to assess the necessity to plan for different kinds of 
remedial actions to limit the risk of extraordinary events. In this way, the increased 
security related to activated/installed SIPS could also be included in the visualisation as 
illustrated in Figure 15C.  
Critical contingencies that define the secure operating region may be identified from the 
dynamic contingency analysis; thus specifically identifying vulnerable components or 
regions in the power system which may require increased attention in order to reduce 
the risk or extraordinary events. 
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3.6 Summary  
This thesis deals with risk and vulnerability of extraordinary events in the power system 
from an operational perspective. These events involve multiple contingencies and 
instability, where the transition to an unstable state is identified as a fundamental 
characteristic and constitutes the core in the analysis of extraordinary events. 
Conventional risk and reliability assessment techniques are unable to provide sufficient 
information regarding the risks and vulnerabilities related to extraordinary events, one 
of the main reasons for this being the limitation of steady-state simulations, concluding 
that:  
Power flow calculations can only give information on the pre- and post-
contingency states, and not whether the transition from one state to the 
next is stable. Only when the transition is stable and the system finds a 
post-fault steady-state, the analysis of a post-fault state is meaningful. 
Therefore, relying only on steady-state power flow calculations, inherently 
underestimates the vulnerability of the system.  
Risk, reliability, and stability of the power system together define the set of 
requirements for analysis and prediction of extraordinary events during operation, 
resulting in the following prerequisites on analysis of extraordinary events:  
 dynamic reliability assessment techniques are required, since the 
instability of the power system is of critical importance 
 multi-level contingencies are needed to be analysed, to be able to assess 
the involvement of multiple contingencies 
 transient dynamic studies are required, since the instability phenomena 
involve large-disturbance instability  
This set of requirements can be summarised by the following statement: 
It is a necessity to perform transient dynamic multi-level contingency 
analyses on-line to be able to assess the risks and vulnerabilities related to 
extraordinary events during operation of the power system.  
This reflects new insights into the analysis of extraordinary events and is therefore 
referred to as scientific contribution B1.  
These requirements form the foundation of the methodology to analyse risks and 
vulnerabilities related to extraordinary events, where the following definitions are used 
when referring to contingencies in extraordinary events: 
Critical contingencies are defined as contingencies leading to instability 
Critical contingency level is defined as the level of subsequent contingencies where 
critical contingencies occur 
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Undesired event is defined as the transition from stable operation to a state of 
instability  
Due to the significant uncertainties of assessing the risk of extraordinary events in terms 
of probability and consequence, this methodology focuses on assessing the distance to 
undesired events. Utilising this methodology, two means to indicate the vulnerability of 
specific operating scenarios have been developed:  
the vulnerability indicator kmin and the visualising of the N – k secure 
operating region.  
These indicators should not be regarded as operating criteria (such as the N – 1 
criterion), but as indicators of the systems vulnerability to extraordinary events. These 
indicators aim to provide information of the systems vulnerabilities to the operator on-
line or for the day-ahead planning, thus contributing to an improved prediction of 
extraordinary events, and are referred to as scientific contribution B2.  
Implementing this methodology and indices require tools that are able to perform 
multilevel transient dynamic contingency analyses on-line for operation or in the day-
ahead planning. Development of such tools has not been part of the scope of this work.  
 

  
CHAPTER 4 
PREVENTION OF EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
 
  
4.1. 
 
Background 
 
54 
 
4.1 Background  
During this PhD work, measures have been developed for improvement of the on-line 
prevention of extraordinary events. The developed solutions are focusing on 
improvements of the situational awareness for the system operator and in the day-ahead 
planning. With the definition of the undesired event being the transition from stable to 
unstable operation, situational awareness may be related to the bow-tie model in several 
ways, as illustrated in Figure 16:  
1.  Threat: contingencies may result in undesired events if the 
operating state is less secure than the operator is aware of 
2.  Fault tree barrier: utilising a vulnerability indicator, such as kmin, 
the awareness regarding multiple contingencies can be improved 
and preventive manual actions may be implemented accordingly 
3.  Event tree barrier: large consequences may only be prevented by 
automatic actions, where successful operation of implemented 
SIPS depend on their awareness of the criticality of the situation  
 
FIGURE 16: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE BOW-TIE MODEL 
This chapter include description of concepts as well as results from case studies of the 
IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 and of historical events. The solutions for 
improvement of the on-line prevention of extraordinary events are presented in two 
categories:  
 Indicating risk of extraordinary events: providing enhanced awareness 
of the risk of extraordinary events utilising the vulnerability indicator 
kmin and the visualisation technique N – k secure operating region, 
during online operation.  
 Transfer capacity assessment of critical corridors: providing enhanced 
situational awareness based on the concept of utilising the equal-area 
criterion on power transfer corridors and in the designing of SIPS.  
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4.2 Indicating risk of extraordinary events  
Utilising the previously described vulnerability indicator kmin and the visualisation 
technique N – k secure operating region, a part of the total risk space related to 
extraordinary events may be assessed. Acknowledging the lack of situational awareness 
as a significantly important cause to extraordinary events, the proposed indicators 
provide information to the operator so that the vulnerabilities of the system state may be 
identified.  
This chapter includes descriptions on how the kmin-index may be incorporated into the 
on-line operation to improve the system operator’s awareness of the actual state of the 
system and off-line for day-ahead planning. The chapter also includes two case studies, 
illustrating the vulnerability level of historical events as well as for the IEEE Reliability 
Test System 1996.  
4.2.1 Utilising kmin during operation 
The kmin-index is expected to provide most value if computed during operation and in 
the operation planning phase. In this case, the indicator may be an integrated part of a 
(dynamic) security assessment (SA) module, as suggested in Figure 17.  
 
FIGURE 17: COMPUTING THE KMIN-INDEX,  
AS AN INTEGRATED PART OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT (SA) MODULES, DEPENDING ON 
INFORMATION FROM THE STATE ESTIMATOR (SE) 
The input to the SA is based on data of the operating state, mainly based on the results 
from the state estimator (SE). A conventional state estimator utilises measurement data 
gathered through the SCADA system to estimate the state of the system.  
PMU data available through WAMS may be used to provide an enhanced state 
estimator, which may be especially beneficial when performing on-line (dynamic) 
security assessment. A decreased time delay and an improved accuracy of the estimated 
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state may provide the possibility to identify extreme states where the system is most 
vulnerable and where the risk for extraordinary events is most significant. 
Suggestions of how the kmin-index could be used, as available from the on-line and off-
line SA modules, are illustrated in Figure 18-Figure 20. These figures are included for 
illustration purposes, with fictive data which does not reflect the result of any study. 
The on-line SA module provides a continuously updated kmin-index which could be 
monitored during operation, as exemplified by Figure 18. In this way, the vulnerability 
regarding extraordinary events of the actual operating point is clearly shown in relation 
to the vulnerability level of the preceding hours. The on-line kmin-index is proposed to be 
updated with the same frequency as the on-line (dynamic) security assessment. 
Figure 18 presents the fictive on-line kmin-index as a trend curve for the previous 24 
hours. 
 
FIGURE 18: ON-LINE KMIN-INDEX, 
DISPLAYING THE TREND CURVE OF THE PRECEDING 24-HOUR PERIOD 
An off-line SA module may utilise information based on both the actual operating state, 
provided by the state estimator, and the future states as forecasted in the day-ahead 
operation planning phase, including forced alterations due to unforeseen occurrences 
during operation. Such module could thus provide kmin as an indicator predicting 
vulnerabilities of future states, as illustrated in Figure 19. Here, particularly vulnerable 
future operating scenarios may be identified for which the predicted indicator is below a 
pre-defined “acceptable” kmin level. In this way, the operator can be made aware of 
vulnerabilities of future scenarios and measures can be taken to decrease the risk of 
extraordinary events. This utilisation may be especially useful in the day-ahead planning 
to prevent such vulnerable scenarios when possible.  
As a predictor, kmin may be referred to as leading indicator, providing information on 
how vulnerability and risk develop in the future, as described by (Kjølle et al. 2012).  
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FIGURE 19: PREDICTED KMIN-INDEX,  
DISPLAYING THE TREND CURVE OF THE SUCCEEDING 24-HOUR PERIOD,  
HIGHLIGHTING INTERVALS WITH ELEVATED RISK (KMIN<3) 
The computed kmin-index could easily be related to the distribution of the vulnerability 
level from historical data, as illustrated in Figure 20. In this way, the on-line or 
predicted kmin-index can give information of the relative vulnerability level of the actual 
or forecasted operating scenario. The utilisation of kmin in relation to historical levels 
may prove a useful indicator for operation planning, to define procedures for cases 
where the relative vulnerability level is increased.  
 
FIGURE 20: HISTORICAL KMIN-INDEX,  
DISPLAYING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE KMIN-INDEX ON A YEARLY BASIS  
The above described proposals illustrate how the kmin-index can be used as an indicator 
of the risk of extraordinary events. During operation, the kmin-index provides the system 
operator with improved situational awareness of the actual operation and a predictor of 
the risk level of the coming hours. In a similar manner, the kmin-index may be used 
during the day-ahead planning phase to assess the relative vulnerability level of the 
planned operation and to analyse the arming requirements of SIPS.  
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The risk level shown in Figure 18-Figure 20 is intended for illustration purposes only, 
and the actual values of the kmin-index will vary between different power systems. A 
valid question is if any power system is operated to withstand as much as four or five 
major contingencies without becoming unstable, and what could be considered an 
acceptable vulnerability level. The number of contingencies that a system can withstand 
is system specific, and depends highly on: how densely meshed the grid is, the location 
and amount of reserves, the power transfer level, and on the severity and timing of the 
contingencies. In order to be able to define an acceptable vulnerability level it is 
important to quantify economical impacts in the system: comparing the cost of a 
blackout with the benefit of more relaxed operational criteria. Such regulatory 
considerations have not been part of the scope of this thesis. 
Utilising the on-line kmin-index, it will be possible to identify operation scenarios with an 
increased risk level. It may also be possible to identify operational patterns, such as 
daily or seasonal, which could be used to improve the operational planning procedures. 
4.2.2 Case study of kmin for historical events 
The kmin-index may be calculated from the factual contingencies of historical events, 
providing information on the actual risk level at the time of the event. For such 
circumstances, the indicator only reflects the actual event, which may or may not have 
been the worst case. (Hillberg et al. 2012b) present an overview of the sequence of 
events of three historical extraordinary events: blackout in Sweden and Denmark 23 
September 2003, blackout of Italy 28 September 2003, and the disturbance in Europe 4 
November 2006. This overview is partly reproduced in Table III-Table V, and the 
sequence of the blackout in Brazil 10 November 2009 is included in Table VI.  
As can be identified from the description of these events, the actual contingency levels 
at which the systems became unstable were not very high. In the Italian blackout the 
risk level can be quantified as kmin ≤ 2, while in the other three events this is kmin ≤ 3. 
Thus, this study illustrates the importance of assessing the power systems vulnerability 
to multiple contingencies.  
Note that it is not possible to identify the critical contingency level without a multi-level 
contingency analysis, thus indicating kmin as less than or equal to the factual contingency 
level.  
The indicated kmin levels may be considered controversial since analysing the 
information from different perspectives may result in other conclusions. However, the 
conclusions drawn here are based on event descriptions provided by: (Elkraft 2003; SvK 
2003; UCTE 2004; UCTE 2007; ONS 2009; Chipp 2010; Filho 2010).  
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TABLE III. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO BLACKOUT IN SOUTHERN SWEDEN AND 
EASTERN DENMARK, 23 SEPTEMBER 2003, (ELKRAFT 2003; SVK 2003) 
Time Event 
12:30 An internal fault in a power plant led to the disconnection of 1.2 GW of 
generation in southern Sweden.  
12:35:00 A double-busbar failure resulted in the disconnection of two 400 kV 
transmission lines and an additional 1.8 GW generation in southern 
Sweden.  
12:35:00 
− 
12:35:10 
This resulted in a significant frequency decrease and massive oscillations 
of voltage and reactive power flow, leading to additional transmission line 
trips bringing the system to the verge of short-term voltage instability 
within ten seconds. 
12:35:10 
− 
12:35:20 
The decreased voltage level led to disconnection of load and an overall 
load decrease, which had a positive effect and stabilized the frequency at 
an appropriate level. 
12:35:20 
− 
12:36:40 
Insufficient reactive power support in the south led to a continuous slow 
voltage decay. After approximately 100 seconds, this resulted in the 
isolation of southern Sweden and eastern Denmark from the rest of the 
Nordic power system.  
12:36:40 The large production deficit in the islanded system, led to a total blackout 
of southern Sweden and eastern Denmark. 
 
Relating the above description to the definition of an undesired event being the 
transition from stable to unstable operation, to which the distance may be quantified by 
the kmin vulnerability indicator, the following should be noted:  
 This event is governed by two consecutive faults, after which the system 
experiences voltage instability resulting in a partial blackout. 
 The second fault is generally considered a double-contingency, thus 
from a multilevel contingency perspective this may be defined as a 
three-level contingency, i.e. kmin ≤ 3.  
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TABLE IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO BLACKOUT OF ITALY,  
28 SEPTEMBER 2003, (UCTE 2004) 
Time Event 
03:01:42 An earth fault due to excessive sagging and inadequate 
vegetation management caused the trip of a 400 kV 
transmission line in the corridor between the Italian power 
system and the rest of the continental European power system. 
After the line tripped, the excessive phase angle difference 
across the breaker prohibited reclosing of the line. This caused 
overloading of other lines in the same corridor. 
03:25:21 After around 25 minutes, a second 400 kV transmission line 
tripped, caused by thermal overload leading to excessive 
sagging and a flashover.  
03:25:25 
− 
03:25:34 
The system experienced rotor angle and voltage instability, 
simultaneously with several line trips due to heavy overloading. 
This resulted in the disconnection of the remaining transmission 
lines between Italy and the rest of the continental European 
power system. 
03:28:00 The high initial imbalance between load and production in Italy, 
together with instability phenomena, tripping of generation, 
and an insufficient load shedding, ultimately resulted in a total 
blackout of the Italian power system. 
 
Relating the above description to the definition of an undesired event being the 
transition from stable to unstable operation, to which the distance may be quantified by 
the kmin vulnerability indicator, the following should be noted:  
 This event is governed by the consecutive disconnection of two 400 kV 
transmission lines, after which the system experiences separation (i.e. 
rotor angle instability) and a blackout of the islanded part of the system. 
 Since the transmission circuits at lower voltage levels are not designed 
to carry the power of parallel circuits at higher voltage levels, from a 
multilevel contingency perspective this may be defined as a two-level 
contingency, i.e. kmin ≤ 2.  
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TABLE V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE DISTURBANCE IN EUROPE,  
4 NOVEMBER 2006, (UCTE 2007) 
Time Event 
21:38 
− 
21.39 
The manual disconnection of two 380 kV transmission lines in 
Germany led to increased loading of a third 380 kV line close to its 
protective limit. 
22:10:11 Manual actions to relieve the highly loaded line were 
implemented after around 30 minutes, but with adverse effect. 
22:10:13 
− 
22:10:28 
The highly loaded line tripped on overloading, triggering fast 
cascading failure leading to system separation in only 15 seconds. 
22:10:28 
− 
22:49 
The continental European power system operated as three 
unsynchronized islands for almost 40 minutes before successfully 
resynchronized. 
 
Relating the above description to the definition of an undesired event being the 
transition from stable to unstable operation, to which the distance may be quantified by 
the kmin vulnerability indicator, the following should be noted:  
 This event is governed by the consecutive disconnection of three 380 kV 
transmission lines, after which the system experiences separation (i.e. 
rotor angle instability). 
 Even though the first line was manually disconnected, from a multilevel 
contingency perspective the event may be defined as a three-level 
contingency, i.e. kmin ≤ 3.  
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TABLE VI. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO BLACKOUT IN BRAZIL,  
10 NOVEMBER 2009, (ONS 2009; CHIPP 2010; FILHO 2010) 
Time Event 
22:13:06 Three almost simultaneous single phase to ground faults led to the 
disconnection of two out of three 765 kV transmission lines. The third 
765 kV line was disconnected after only an instant, by the residual over-
current protection of shunt reactors.  
22:13:06 
− 
22:13:07 
The disconnection of the three lines led to activation of a SIPS which 
rejected 3.1 GW of generation. This action was however insufficient to 
prevent the instability.  
22:13:07 
− 
22:13:22 
Several transmission lines and generating units tripped because of power 
oscillations, resulting in voltage collapse and system separation. 
22:13:22 Approximately 40% of the Brazilian system load was interrupted. 
 
Relating the above description to the definition of an undesired event being the 
transition from stable to unstable operation, to which the distance may be quantified by 
the kmin vulnerability indicator, the following should be noted:  
 This event is governed by the almost simultaneous disconnection of 
three 765 kV transmission lines, after which the system experiences 
separation (i.e. rotor angle instability) and a partial blackout. 
 From a multilevel contingency perspective this may be defined as a 
three-level contingency, i.e. kmin ≤ 3.  
 
4.2.3 Vulnerability of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 
The risk of extraordinary events in the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is assessed 
based on studies performed together with PhD candidate Jarno Lamponen presented in 
(Lamponen et al. 2014) and is partly reproduced here.  
The study was performed on a model of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, with 
modelling details presented in Appendix A. Dynamic contingency analyses were 
performed on approximately 50 different operating scenarios. These contingency 
analyses include 3-phase short-circuit faults on transmission lines, transformers, and 
generators, with 100ms duration, followed by the disconnection of the affected unit. 
Partial N – 2 contingency analyses were performed in this study, where second-level 
contingencies were considered only for primary contingencies related to the inter-area 
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tie-lines. Furthermore, the system was assumed to have reached a stable equilibrium 
before the second-level contingencies occurred.  
Regarding component modelling, synchronous machines are the main contributors to 
the dynamic behaviour and stability of the power system. This means that sufficiently 
detailed and realistic synchronous machine models are required to be able to identify 
contingencies that could result in an unstable system. In order to use the IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996 for benchmark risk analysis of extraordinary events, 
dynamic models of synchronous machines are required. During this PhD work, dynamic 
models suitable for the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 have been developed for the 
synchronous machines, as well as for turbine-governor and excitation systems. These 
models are provided in Appendix A and have been used in several studies, presented in 
(Johansson et al. 2011a; Johansson et al. 2011b; Hillberg et al. 2012b; Hillberg and 
Toftevaag 2012; Hillberg et al. 2012c; Storvann et al. 2012; Lamponen et al. 2014). 
Further improvements of the dynamic models, specifically related to load recovery 
dynamics and excitation system limiters are found in (Storvann 2012). Other 
components and controls, such as tap-changers and power system stabilisers, also affect 
the system stability and need to be considered to realistically reproduce the response of 
the system to different contingencies. Furthermore, protection systems have a 
tremendous impact on the consequences of an unstable scenario; thus, protection 
systems (component as well as system protection) are necessary to include if attempting 
to study the breakdown sequence and the consequences of an extraordinary event.  
The results from the dynamic contingency analyses are utilised to identify a secure 
operating region for the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. Due to the weak inter-
connections between the three meshed areas, see single-line diagram in Figure A-1 in 
Appendix A, it is possible to identify critical transfer corridors from the system 
topology. These transfer corridors may then be used to visualise the secure operating 
regions of the system. Here, the secure operating region is visualised as the two-
dimensional space spanned by the power flow between areas A and B (PA-B) and the 
power export from area C (PCexport), as shown in Figure 21. 
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FIGURE 21: SECURE OPERATING REGIONS OF THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996,  
VISUALISING N-1 AND N-2 THERMAL AND STABILITY LIMITATIONS, ADAPTED FROM 
(LAMPONEN ET AL. 2014) 
Thermal and stability limitations related to the inter-area power transfer are visualised in 
Figure 21. Thermal limits are here defined by the long term emergency ratings of lines, 
as specified in (IEEE 1999). Frequency stability limits are based on the assumption that 
the frequency controlled instantly activated reserves (i.e. spinning reserves) equals the 
largest generator of the system. It is also assumed that these reserves are divided evenly 
between the three areas, implying frequency stability limitations on the inter-area 
transfer capacity for contingencies leading to islanded sub-systems. Rotor angle stability 
limits are represented by arcs in Figure 21. The N – 1 secure region is filled as a light 
blue area, inside which none of the studied single contingencies resulted in the violation 
of neither thermal nor stability limits.  
Figure 21 also illustrates how the N – 1 secure region may be subdivided in regions 
which are more or less secure against N – 2 events (dotted lines) and the fully N – 2 
secure region. Similarly, the N – 1 secure region can be extended with semi-secure 
regions (dash-dotted lines), where the N – 1 stable but outside thermal limits and N – 1 
unstable but inside thermal limits regions are marked N – 1STAB and N – 1THERM, 
respectively.  
It should be noted that the presented rotor angle stability limits presented as arcs in 
Figure 21, are approximations based on the result from approximately 30000 dynamic 
simulations. 
Two of the studied operating scenarios are marked in the figure as case 1 and 2. A 
description of these cases is included in Appendix A, and some of the results related to 
these cases are presented below.  
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For the operating scenario referred to as case 1, the following contingency was 
especially noted since it provides important findings related to the difference in result 
between dynamic and steady-state studies:  
Solving the power flow after disconnecting the tie-line between area A and 
C resulted in a stable solution, although with approximately 135 % 
overload of the B-C tie-line. If assuming that the overloaded line would 
trip, the system separates into two islands which could remain in stable 
operation depending on islanding control and the level of reserves 
available in each island. In a time domain simulation however, when 
applying a fault on the same tie-line followed by the disconnection of the 
line, the system is experiences rotor-angle instability which may lead to a 
large disturbance.  
These findings demonstrate an important difference between dynamic and power flow 
simulations. Thus, when considering performing contingency analysis using only 
steady-state tools, it should be taken into account that this disregards the transient 
phenomena of the power system. It may therefore be concluded that:  
Steady-state studies provide insufficient information to identify all critical 
contingencies. 
The operating scenario referred to as case 2 is secure against any of the single 
contingencies studied, and is well within the N – 1 secure region as shown in Figure 21. 
If system reserves follow the assumption above, this case would be outside the N – 2 
frequency stability limits. If the system reserves are distributed differently, the 
frequency stability limits will change accordingly. However, the case is also outside the 
N – 2 rotor-angle stability limits with a critical event identified by the N – 2 
contingency analysis. This critical event consist of the fault and trip of the tie-line 
between areas B and C (BLOCH-CLARK line) and the trip of the largest generator in area 
B (generator 221), where results from the dynamic simulation are presented in Figure 22. 
These results describe the value of performing multi-level contingency analyses to 
assess the risk of extraordinary events and to identify threats in the system.  
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FIGURE 22: N  2 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS RESULTS,  
SHOWING THE VOLTAGE ANGLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AREA A AND B 
FOR THE CRITICAL EVENT IDENTIFIED IN CASE 2, FROM (LAMPONEN ET AL. 2014) 
Since the transition to the state of instability is identified as the critical characteristics of 
extraordinary events, it is the stability constraints that are of main importance when 
analysing the risk of extraordinary events. Thus, if only stability constraints are 
considered when determining the N – k secure region, such an N – k stable region 
indicates the vulnerability of extraordinary events of an operating region in the same 
manner as the kmin-index does for a specific operating state. This concept is illustrated in 
Figure 23, where the kmin-index of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is visualised. 
Here, the N – 1 secure region from Figure 21 is extended with semi-secure N – 1 stable 
but outside thermal limits region (N – 1STAB), and similarly for the N – 2 secure region. 
Thus, the kmin ≥ 2 region is larger than the N – 1 secure region. It should be noted that 
thermal limitations may not be completely ignored, but the system response is 
completely different when violating thermal limits compared by the violation of 
stability limits.  
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
50
100
150
Time [s]
Generator 221 tripBLOCH–CLARK line trip
Voltage angle difference: GA-B [q]
Chapter 4 
 
Prevention of Extraordinary Events 
 
67 
 
FIGURE 23: STABLE OPERATING REGIONS OF THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996,  
VISUALISING THE KMIN-INDEX, ADAPTED FROM (LAMPONEN ET AL. 2014) 
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4.3 Transfer capacity assessment of critical corridors 
With the transition to an unstable state considered the critical characteristic of 
extraordinary events, identification of the stability limitations in the power system are of 
major importance to assess the risk of extraordinary events. As extraordinary events 
often include multiple contingencies resulting in significant changes in the system 
operation, instability phenomena often involve large-disturbance stability meaning that 
transient dynamic studies are required to analyse extraordinary events. This chapter 
presents measures related to transient stability assessment. The concepts are based on 
applying the equal-area criterion on critical power transfer corridors in the power 
system, and may be used to define secure power transfer capabilities and design 
solutions to prevent instability.  
4.3.1 PTC capacity assessment using the equal-area criterion 
Transient rotor angle stability is often analysed using equivalent modelling, such as 
single-machine infinite-bus equivalent models, where stability margins are determined 
using the renowned equal-area criterion (EAC) of a synchronous machine. Since 
stability stipulates that every machine needs to fulfil the equal-area criterion, several 
studies focus on the identification of critical machines which are likely to loose 
synchronism with the remaining system (Xue et al. 1988; Dong and Pota 1993; Haque 
1994; Ernst and Pavella 2000; Yi-qun et al. 2002; Ruiz-Vega and Pavella 2003a; Ruiz-
Vega and Pavella 2003b; Glavic et al. 2007; Huan et al. 2008).  
The EAC is based on the definition of the steady-state operating point of a synchronous 
machine. In the P-G -plane, the intersection between the electric power transmitted to 
the system, PE, and the mechanical power of the machine, PM, result in a steady-state 
voltage angle, GS, between the machine and the system equivalent, as illustrated in 
Figure 24.  
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FIGURE 24: THEORETICAL EQUAL-AREA CRITERION,  
USED IN TRANSIENT STABILITY ASSESSMENT STUDIES, WITH THE STABILITY 
REQUIREMENT DEFINED AS: AACC ≤ ADEC 
The EAC specifies that the available decelerating torque, required for a synchronous 
machine to maintain in synchronism with the remaining system when exposed to a 
contingency, needs to be at least as large as the accelerating torque that the machine 
acquires throughout the fault duration, i.e.:  
ܣ௔௖௖ ൑ ܣௗ௘௖. 
Which also implies that the maximum rotor angle, GMax, must be smaller the post-fault 
unstable equilibrium angle, GU,:  
ߜெ௔௫ ൑ ߜ௎. 
From the theoretical power-angle characteristics described by Figure 24, it is clear that 
the accelerating and decelerating areas can be calculated as:  
ܣ௔௖௖ ൌ න ൫ ெܲ െ ாܲሺ௣௢௦௧ି௙௔௨௟௧ሻሺߜሻ൯
ఋ಴೅
ఋೄሺ೛ೝ೐ష೑ೌೠ೗೟ሻ
 
ܣௗ௘௖ ൌ න ൫ ாܲሺ௣௢௦௧ି௙௔௨௟௧ሻሺߜሻ െ ெܲ൯
ఋಾೌೣ
ఋ಴೅
 
A machine which loses synchronism with the system is referred to as a critical machine. 
In the case with multiple critical machines, it is possible to cluster these into an 
equivalent one-machine-infinite-bus (OMIB) system. As described by e.g. (Xue et al. 
1988), it is possible to assess the transient stability margins against an equivalent of the 
remaining system utilising the extended equal-area criterion (EEAC). A single machine 
equivalent method (SIME) is proposed by (Zhang et al. 1997), which differs from other 
PM
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EEAC based methods by considering the time variance of machine parameters such as 
powers and speed. 
Another utilisation of the traditional equal-area criterion is suggested in (Dong and Pota 
1993; Haque 1994), where the transient stability margin and critical clearing time of 
critical machines are assessed without equivalent models.  
In this PhD work, the equal-area criterion is utilised to assess the secure power transfer 
capacity between two interconnected systems. In this manner, the EAC provide means 
of assessing the capacity of critical power transfer corridors (PTC) and of specifying the 
secure power transfer capacity of the interconnected power system. The EAC on PTC 
concept is applicable in cases where the topology of the network and the impact of a 
critical contingency may be described as:  
A sub-system may be identified wherein all machines are defined as 
critical machines. I.e. a critical contingency result in the acceleration of 
all synchronous machines within one sub-system relative the rest of the 
system. The tie-lines interconnecting the sub- and main systems may then 
be defined as a critical power transfer corridor. 
Figure 25 illustrates a power system where the EAC on PTC concept may be applied. 
The sub-system and main systems are interconnected through a corridor with m tie-
lines. As shown in Figure 25B, all generators within the sub-system accelerate against 
the main system after a critical contingency. 
A B 
 
 
FIGURE 25: TRANSIENT INSTABILITY OF A PTC  
(A) A PTC WITH M TIE-LINES CONNECTING A SUB-SYSTEM TO THE MAIN SYSTEM,  
(B) ACCELERATION OF ALL GENERATORS IN A SUB-SYSTEM (RELATIVE THE REST OF THE 
SYSTEM) AFTER A CRITICAL CONTINGENCY,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
In a similar manner as the steady-state operating point of a machine may be defined in 
the P-G -plane, the steady-state operating point of a sub-system can be defined by the 
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level of electric power that flows across a corridor between the sub-system and the main 
system, and the equivalent mechanical power of the sub-system resulting in the steady-
state voltage angle between the systems.  
The main difference between the EAC on PTC approach and other EAC based methods 
is the utilisation of the actual power flow and angle differences over a set of 
transmission lines, instead of assessing the power and angles of equivalent models. The 
benefit by this approach is the direct assessment of transfer capacity limitations, instead 
of focusing on the transient stability margins of critical machines.  
A difficulty that this approach faces is the approximation of the mechanical power of 
the sub-system. Figure 26 illustrates the significant difference in the calculated 
accelerating torque depending on assumptions regarding mechanical power. In 
theoretical descriptions of the equal-area criterion, mechanical power (or torque) is 
typically assumed to be constant. This assumption provides an easy means of assessing 
the accelerating (as well as decelerating) torques, which is illustrated in Figure 26A. In 
reality, the mechanical power of a single machine is depending on the speed-droop 
characteristics of the turbine-governor of the machine – i.e. typically frequency 
dependent. The equivalent mechanical power of a system consists of the mechanical 
power of the machines as well as of the loads in the system, which further complicates 
assessment of the accelerating torque. In Figure 26B, the accelerating torque is assessed 
using an approximation of the speed-droop of the system. This approximation of the 
response of the system is further described in the case study presented in section 4.3.3.  
A B 
FIGURE 26: ASSESSMENT OF ACCELERATING TORQUE, 
ASSUMING: (A) CONSTANT MECHANICAL POWER, (B) FREQUENCY DEPENDENT 
MECHANICAL POWER, FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
Figure 26 illustrates how the dynamics and control of the power system act as obstacles 
(or challenges) to the apparent straightforward manner of assessing the equal-area 
criterion implied by theoretical descriptions as illustrated in Figure 24.  
Utilising the equal-area criterion on a PTC, the transient stability margin and the secure 
power transfer capacity of the PTC can be assessed during operation. The concept could 
thus provide an enhanced awareness of the operating state. A requirement for the online 
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assessment is the availability of phasor measurements to monitor the voltage angle 
differences over the PTC as well as other synchronous measurements required to assess 
the areas of the equal-area criterion. This use of the equal-area criterion could be 
applied in multi-level dynamic contingency analyses, when studying the response from 
subsequent contingencies and the risk of extraordinary events. There are several 
possible application areas of the EAC on PTC approach, and one of these is related to 
the design and utilisation of SIPS which is further described in the following section. 
4.3.2 SIPS design using the equal-area criterion 
System integrity protection schemes (SIPS) are often designed to provide mitigating 
actions to prevent an extraordinary event from occurring. For such schemes, it is 
imperative that the mitigating actions are sufficient for the system to remain stable after 
an undesired event. The monitoring improvements provided by the implementation of 
PMUs can be used to enhance the situational awareness of conventional SIPS, providing 
robustness towards unforeseen disturbances. General improvements of this kind are 
discussed in (Johansson et al. 2011a; Hillberg et al. 2012c).  
Techniques for preventive and emergency transient stability control, based on the 
utilisation of the EAC, are described in (Ernst and Pavella 2000; Rosales et al. 2000; 
Ruiz-Vega and Pavella 2003a; Ruiz-Vega and Pavella 2003b), where the single-
machine-equivalent (SIME) method is used. The emergency control actions are defined 
on the basis of identifying critical machines, which are tripped in an iteratively manner 
until the system reaches stable operation. Other solutions, with emergency controls 
based on online PMU based measurements, are suggested in (Yi-qun et al. 2002; Glavic 
et al. 2007; Huan et al. 2008), where the EAC is utilised for identifying critical 
machines and assessing the adequacy of emergency control actions.  
Based on the EAC on PTC concept described in the previous section, a SIPS design 
method has been developed. The general approach of this method is presented here, and 
a feasibility study of the method is presented in the next section. Figure 27 illustrates 
how this method may be applied in the design and utilisation of SIPS. Here, the 
electrical power represents the flows across a corridor between the sub-system and the 
main system, while the mechanical power represents the equivalent mechanical power 
of the sub-system. The voltage angle represents the angle between the systems, i.e. over 
the PTC. 
In the case where a contingency decreases the power-angle characteristics of the PTC 
below the equivalent mechanical power of the sub-system, the power system will be 
unstable in the post-fault state, as illustrated by Figure 27A. This corresponds to an 
insecure operating scenario, where a critical contingency result in the continuous 
acceleration of the sub-system until it loses its synchronism with the remaining system. 
Considering the possibility of applying actions to prevent instability, a SIPS solution 
may be designed based on the equal-area criterion of the PTC. As a SIPS will have an 
inherent time delay, the corresponding SIPS activation angle and theoretical 
accelerating torque may be calculated and illustrated as shown in Figure 27B. The 
minimum level of SIPS remedial actions, required to prevent instability, may then be 
assessed as the maximum post-SIPS equivalent mechanical power of the sub-system 
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that satisfies the equal-area criterion. In this way, the resulting post-fault-post-SIPS 
steady-state can be identified as illustrated in Figure 27C. 
A 
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FIGURE 27: EQUAL-AREA CRITERION USED IN SIPS DESIGN,  
(A) AN INSECURE OPERATING SCENARIO, I.E. THE POST-FAULT SYSTEM IS UNABLE TO 
REGAIN STABLE OPERATION 
(B) THE INTRINSIC TIME DELAY OF A SIPS IS USED TO IDENTIFY THE CORRESPONDING 
ROTOR ANGLE AND THE ACCELERATION TORQUE 
(C) THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF SIPS REMEDIAL ACTION TO PREVENT INSTABILITY MAY BE 
ASSESSED BASED ON THE EQUAL AREA CRITERION  
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4.3.3 Transient stability assessment of the IEEE Reliability Test 
System 1996 
A case study has been performed to test the feasibility of the presented EAC on PTC 
concept and the SIPS design method. The study was performed on a model of the IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996, with modelling details presented in Appendix A. The 
studied operating scenario is referred to as case 1 and is also presented in Appendix A. 
A dynamic N  1 contingency analysis has been performed, including 3-phase short-
circuit faults on transmission lines, transformers, and generators, with 100ms duration, 
followed by the disconnection of the affected unit. In this analysis, faults have been 
studied with the short-circuit applied on either end of a transmission line.  
Results from the N  1 contingency analysis are presented in Figure 28; showing power 
flow (P), angle difference (G), and frequency difference (f), between areas B and C. The 
dynamic contingency analyses indicate that fault and trip of the A-C tie-line result in 
rotor angle instability; hence this is defined as a critical contingency. The dashed red 
curves in Figure 28B and Figure 28C represent contingencies where the short-circuit is 
on the C-side of the A-C tie-line. These contingencies have a significantly higher impact 
on the system than contingencies where the short-circuit is on the other side of the line. 
In Figure 28A, results from contingencies involving the A-C tie-line are not included. 
Further analysis of the critical contingency shows that all machines in area C accelerate 
out of synchronism relative the rest of the system. These results are presented in 
Figure 25B, showing the generator terminal voltage angles of all machines in the studied 
test system. Hence, for this contingency all machines in area C are considered critical. 
It is possible to design SIPS to improve the security of the analysed case. Here, the 
efficiency of three different types of arming and activation/triggering signals is assessed 
for a scheme based on generator rejection: 
 SIPSCB: Event-based, monitoring the trip signal of circuit breakers on 
the A-C tie-line  
 SIPSG: Response-based, monitoring the voltage angle differences over 
the B-C tie-line 
 SIPSf: Response-based, monitoring the bus frequency at both sides of 
the B-C tie-line 
A manual (or automatic) arming is assumed to limit the operating scenarios where the 
SIPS can be triggered. A thorough assessment of the arming procedures and activation 
signals is necessary to limit the risk of inappropriate SIPS actions. Arming procedures 
can be designed through identification of the operating criteria that defines the secure 
operating area, while an extensive dynamic analysis is needed to identify appropriate 
activation signals and their magnitude. Here, the analysis is limited to the presented case 
and contingencies.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
Prevention of Extraordinary Events 
 
75 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
FIGURE 28: N  1 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS RESULTS,  
(A) POWER FLOW, (B) ANGLE DIFFERENCE, AND (C) FREQUENCY DIFFERENCE,  
BETWEEN AREA B AND C  
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FIGURE 29: SECURITY ENHANCEMENT OF CASE 1 USING SIPS,  
(A) POWER FLOW, (B) ANGLE DIFFERENCE, AND (C) FREQUENCY DIFFERENCE,  
BETWEEN AREA B AND C  
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From Figure 28, the unstable contingencies are easily distinguishable in both 'GBC and 
'fBC, supporting their potential as SIPS activation signals. It is suggested that an internal 
arming is used together with a time delay, to prevent unwanted SIPS action during 
switching events. Based on the results of the dynamic contingency analysis, the 
suggested arming and activation signal magnitudes, as marked in Figure 28, are: 
'GBC - arming: 40° for 200ms, activation: 50° 
'fBC - arming: 0.2Hz for 200ms, activation: 0.25Hz 
G and f measurements are considered to be available, from e.g. a WAMS. The total 
delay between measurement and the implementation of mitigating action is assumed to 
be no longer than 100 ms which seams realistically achievable, based on actual 
measurements of a PMU based Wide Area Power Oscillation Controller as well as the 
delays of a Wide Area Monitoring and Control System presented in (Chenine et al. 
2009). 
The response after the trip of PTCAC, with and without the suggested SIPS, are 
presented in Figure 29 including the power flow, angle, and frequency difference 
between areas B and C. The dashed curves in Figure 29B, represent the fault with the 
short-circuit occurring at the C-side of the line. The system response of this contingency 
is too rapid for the SIPSG and SIPSf solutions to act before the system becomes unstable, 
and only SIPSCB results in a stable solution. All other curves in the figure represent the 
fault with the short-circuit occurring at the A-side of the line. For this fault, all the 
studied SIPS solutions results in a stable post-fault system, however, the event-based 
SIPSCB scheme shows lower levels of oscillations due to the more rapid activation than 
the response-based schemes. 
In order to minimise the vulnerability of the operation of the post-SIPS steady state 
system, it is important that the SIPS action is adapted to suit the actual operating 
scenario. Different solutions to identify appropriate levels of SIPS action are possible, 
and here the SIPSG actions are designed based on the EAC on PTC concept. The equal-
area assessment of the PTC for the identified critical contingency is done in three steps:  
1.  Identifying the instant of SIPS activation 
2.  Assessing the accelerating torque of the PTC before SIPS 
activation 
3.  Assessing the minimum necessary level of rejected generation to 
fulfil the equal-area criterion 
Based on the arming levels and time delays described above it is possible to identify the 
instant (tSIPS) and the corresponding activation angle (GSIPS) of the SIPS, as illustrated in 
Figure 30,  
GSIPS: GBC ≤ 67°  
tSIPS: t0 + 1.0s 
where t0 is the instant of the occurrence of the fault. 
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FIGURE 30: SIPS ACTIVATION ANGLE AND INSTANT,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
The power-angle characteristics of the PTC (the B-C tie-line) after exposed to the 
critical contingency is shown in Figure 31. Utilizing the identified SIPS activation angle 
(GSIPS) it is possible to assess the accelerating torque of the PTC at the instant of SIPS 
activation. Assuming a constant mechanical power of the system (P0M), the accelerating 
torque before SIPS activation (Aacc), as shown in Figure 31A, is approximated to: 
ܣ௔௖௖ȁ ଴ܲெ ൌ 5000MW° 
Here, the notation “|” is used to imply the restriction on accelerating torque based on 
the assumption of mechanical power. In reality, the mechanical power is not constant 
during a disturbance and the above assumption results in an over-conservative SIPS 
design. To assess the change in mechanical power, the frequency during the disturbance 
need to be considered. Assuming that the response of each turbine governor control may 
be approximated by the speed-droop, the system response can be approximated by a 
piece-wise linear speed-droop, R. The mechanical power of the system, as a function of 
the frequency change ('Z), can thus be approximated as 
ெܲሺο߱ሻ ൌ ቀͳ െ ο݂ൗܴ ቁ ൈ ଴ܲெ (1) 
where 'f is the per unit change in frequency and P0M is the mechanical power at the pre-
fault instant. The speed-droop of the system can be assessed during operation, studying 
the frequency response of a known disturbance, e.g. the trip of a generator, as: 
ܴ ൌ െο݂ οܲீൗ ൈ ܲீ  (2) 
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where 'PG is the production change and PG is the total system production. Analysing 
responses of generator tripping, the speed-droop of the test system is approximated to: 
R=4.3% 
Based on the frequency measurement in area C, presented in Figure 32, and the 
calculated speed-droop of the system, the approximate equivalent mechanical power of 
the sub-system, PM('Z), can be derived from equation (1). The accelerating torque 
before the SIPS activation, as shown in Figure 31B, is approximated to: 
ܣ௔௖௖ȁ ெܲሺο߱ሻ ൌ 3000MW° 
This area is drastically smaller than the area calculated using constant mechanical 
power. This implies that the impact of simplified assumptions is large, thus in order to 
design appropriate SIPS solutions sufficient details are needed to be considered.  
A B 
FIGURE 31: POWER-ANGLE CHARACTERISTICS AND ACCELERATING TORQUE OF PTC  
WHEN EXPOSED TO A CRITICAL CONTINGENCY, ASSUMING:  
(A) CONSTANT MECHANICAL POWER,  
(B) FREQUENCY DEPENDENT MECHANICAL POWER,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
 
 
FIGURE 32: FREQUENCY IN AREA C DURING THE CRITICAL DISTURBANCE  
MEASURED AT THE B-C TIE LINE, FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
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To check the validity of the assumption that during the transient phase of the 
disturbance the mechanical power of the sub-system can be approximated using the 
speed-droop, the mechanical power of all machines in area C is reproduced in 
Figure 33.  
A 
 
B 
 
FIGURE 33: TOTAL MECHANICAL POWER OF MACHINES IN AREA C (PMG),  
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME (A), AND ANGLE DIFFERENCE OVER PTCC (B).  
It is noticed that the response of the machines result in a continuous decay in 
mechanical power (PMG) during the studied time interval. The activation instant of the 
SIPS is assumed as previously mentioned, resulting in a decrease in PMG between 5-
10% from the pre-fault state to the SIPS activation instant. Relating the mechanical 
power of all machines in area C to the voltage angle difference over PTCC, PMG shows a 
more rapid decay during the first part of the increase in angle. This behaviour is similar 
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to the approximation of PM('Z), shown in Figure 31B. Normalising PMG on the pre-
contingency steady-state power exchange from area C, the results from Figure 33B and 
Figure 31B may be compared, as shown in Figure 34. This comparison shows a similar 
behaviour in the decay, however the decay in PMG is less than for PM('Z). This 
difference results in a higher accelerating torque, which is approximated to: 
ܣ௔௖௖ȁ ெܲீ ൌ 3700MW° 
The main reason for this difference lies in the time delays of governors, which has been 
neglected when calculating PM('Z). The accelerating torque is however considerably 
less than for P0M.  
 
FIGURE 34: ACCELERATING TORQUE ASSESSMENT FOR PMG,  
INCLUDING CURVE FOR PM('Z) 
The conclusions from this validity check is that:  
Assuming constant mechanical power of machines (i.e. PM = P0M) 
during the transient phase of a disturbance results in a largely 
conservative SIPS solution.  
The assumption that the response of the system can be approximated by a speed-droop, 
i.e. PM = PM('Z), provides results similar to when considering the total governor 
dynamics – however, with a more optimistic calculation of the accelerating torque. It 
should be noted that the equivalent mechanical power of a system may also depend on 
the loads in the system, which further complicates assessment of the true accelerating 
and decelerating torques.  
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In the following study, it is considered that the assumption PM = PM('Z) can be used to 
calculate the accelerating area with sufficient details to decide whether the system can 
return to a stable state of operation. Therefore, the continued design of the SIPS is based 
on an accelerating torque equal to 3000MW°.  
Assuming that the effect on the frequency in area C by the SIPS activation can be 
approximated by a linear decay, where nominal frequency is reached at the maximum 
angle, GM, the decelerating area can be assessed as shown in Figure 35. The minimum 
level of rejected generation that fulfils the equal-area criterion is then approximated to: 
PSIPS≥206MW 
resulting in a maximum angle equal to:  
GM=99° 
 
 
FIGURE 35: DECELERATING TORQUE ASSESSMENT,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
The functionality of eight different SIPS schemes have been assessed utilising the 
identified minimum level of rejected generation. All generations in area C have been 
considered during the selection process, and Table VII lists the available generators 
together with their pre-fault steady state production level and the related SIPS schemes.  
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There are two criteria in the selection procedure of generators that should be addressed:  
1.  The generators should have a power production level 
corresponding at least to the minimum level of mitigating actions.  
2.  The impact on the sub-system and on the PTC characteristics 
should be limited in order for the equal-area criterion to be 
utilised. 
For SIPS schemes with rejection of a single generator, only the machines on bus 321 
and 323 (G3) have sufficient production, i.e. PG≥PSIPS. These machines are selected to 
represent the schemes SIPSA1 and SIPSA2, respectively. Various generator selections are 
possible for SIPS schemes based on tripping several generators. Here three schemes 
have been selected: SIPSB1-B3. The schemes SIPSC1-C3 are based on single machines 
with production less than the identified minimum PSIPS level. 
 
TABLE VII. SIPS SCHEMES FOR GENERATORS IN AREA C,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
Bus number  
and generator ID 
Pre-fault  
production (MW) 
SIPS ID 
302 G1 10  B3 
302 G2 10   
313 G1 197  B3 
313 G2 197 C1  
313 G3 197   
315 G1-5 5x12   
315 G6 155 C2 B2 
316 G1 114 C3 B2 
321 G1 400 A1  
322 G1-6 6x25   
323 G1 155  B1 
323 G2 155  B1 
323 G3 350 A2  
 
The selected SIPS schemes are based only on the criteria of sufficient production level 
of the selected generators. The machines’ impact on the PTC and the sub-system can be 
difficult to anticipate, but the machines’ reactive power capability and the relative 
closeness to the PTC may be used to determine their influence on the voltage level of 
the PTC busses. From the single-line diagram, presented in Appendix A, it is noticed 
that bus 321 (SIPSA1) is relatively close to the PTC bus, thus this scheme might cause 
voltage instability in the sub-system.  
The system response to the selected SIPS schemes have been analysed, with results 
shown in Table VIII, Figure 36 and Figure 37.  
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TABLE VIII. SIPS ACTIVATION RESULTS,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
SIPS ID Rejected  
power  
PSIPS (MW) 
Maximum  
angle  
GM (°) 
Decelerating 
area  
Adec (MW°) 
Post-SIPS PTC  
power transfer  
PM1 (MW) 
A1 400 - (unstable) 
A2 350 76 3000 420 
B1 310 77 2800 450 
B2 269 82 3100 470 
B3 207 83 2000 500 
C1 197 84 1800 500 
C2 155 84 1400 520 
C3 114 - (unstable) 
 
As anticipated, SIPSA1 results in an unstable system. This is due to the location and size 
of the generator that is rejected in this scheme, leading to a significant voltage drop at 
the PTC and the system is not able to regain stability. Also SIPSC3 proved insufficient, 
which was expected from the insufficient level of rejected power. 
SIPSA2, B1, B2, shown in Figure 36, all respond as expected, resulting in stable operation 
with calculated decelerating torque approximately equal to the assessed accelerating 
torque. Better approximations of the accelerating and decelerating torque may be 
achieved by considering how the demand is affected by voltage changes in the sub-
system. Furthermore, the participation of each machine in the acceleration of the sub-
system also affects the results. Since the accelerating area of the PTC consists of the 
participation of each machine, the contribution of the rejected machines should be 
deducted from the total acceleration. 
It should be noted that the schemes SIPSB3, C1, C2, shown in Figure 37, have decelerating 
areas considerably smaller than expected. This is related to the reactive power capability 
of the machines participating in these schemes. The generators in these schemes were at 
their under-excitation limit, thus disconnecting these generators resulted in a voltage 
rise at the buses in the surrounding area affecting the total load of area C. Following the 
dynamic representation of loads, described in Appendix A, a rise in bus voltage on the 
load buses lead to increased active and reactive load. In this way, these SIPS schemes 
also increase the load of the sub-system, resulting in further decrease of the equivalent 
mechanical power of the sub-system. Hence, in order to properly assess the decelerating 
areas, also the SIPS affect on the load needs to be considered in the equivalent 
mechanical power. 
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From the results presented here, two main conclusions may be drawn:  
1.  It is possible to utilise the concept of applying the equal-area 
criterion on a power transfer corridor to design the functionality of 
SIPS. 
2.  It is not as straightforward to assess the accelerating and 
decelerating torques as simplified theoretical models would imply, 
meaning that: 
i. Realistic dynamic modelling, of e.g. turbine-governor systems, 
is required to simulate and assess transient stability margins. 
ii. Voltage and frequency dependencies of load, production, and 
losses, are needed to be considered when assessing the 
equivalent mechanical power of a system. 
Assumptions regarding the equivalent mechanical power of the sub-system prove to be 
of high importance for the success of the proposed concept. The speed-droop 
characteristic and reactive power capabilities of generators, as well as the voltage 
dependency of loads, have significant impact on the results. The uncertainties in the 
approximation of sufficient rejected production, as well as the system impact by the 
rejected machines, may constitute a challenge during SIPS design in this context. SIME 
based approaches solve this difficulty by assuming that measurements of electrical and 
mechanical power, speed, acceleration, etc. are made available for all machines. The 
equivalent accelerating power of the OMIB is then calculated in the SIME, based on the 
machine inertia together with machine angles, electrical and mechanical powers 
measured at all generators in the system. One limitation to such approach is that it is 
unlikely that all measurements are available from all machines in a large power system.  
Utilising this SIPS design concept, based on the EAC on PTC concept, it is possible to 
identify sufficient SIPS actions to prevent instability. This concept has the benefit of 
direct identification of the secure power transfer capacity, from the transient stability 
margins of the system including SIPS action.  
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SIPSA2 
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FIGURE 36: RESULTS FROM SIPS SOLUTIONS A2, B1 & B2,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012)  
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SIPSB3 
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FIGURE 37: RESULTS FROM SIPS SOLUTIONS B3, C1 & C2,  
FROM (HILLBERG AND TOFTEVAAG 2012) 
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4.4 Summary  
Power system initiated extraordinary events may be prevented by various means, and 
the most obvious solution is over-dimensioning. More economically viable solutions are 
often related to the operation and control of the power system, focusing on areas such as 
enhanced monitoring and protection. In this thesis, solutions related to improved 
situational awareness have been in focus since insufficient situational awareness makes 
the system increasingly vulnerable to extraordinary events.  
Through the methodology for analysing extraordinary events, the kmin vulnerability 
indicator and the N – k secure operating region are proposed to provide the operator 
with information related to multiple contingencies for specific operating scenarios. 
These vulnerability indicators provide information on the distance to instability, and this 
chapter presents suggestions on how they could be utilised during operation and in the 
day-ahead planning. The main value of these indicators is to increase the awareness of 
vulnerabilities related to the actual and to the predicted future operating states. 
The results from the case studies presented in this chapter highlight the value of 
dynamic analyses, and illustrate that analyses based on steady-state tools may 
overestimate the security of the system as they do not reveal vulnerabilities related to 
the dynamic response of the system. The results also illustrate the value of analysing 
multi-level contingencies to identify changes in system response and to raise the 
awareness of vulnerabilities to extraordinary events. 
As analyses of extraordinary events require transient dynamic studies, solutions related 
to the awareness of transient stability limits have been studied. Novel concepts are 
presented in relation to the transient stability equal-area criterion: the utilisation of the 
EAC on power transfer corridors. The EAC on PTC concept, utilised to assess secure 
power transfer capacities and to design SIPS to prevent instability, represents an 
improved defence against extraordinary events and is referred to as scientific 
contribution C1.  
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5.1 Paper I 
Extraordinary events: understanding sequence, causes, and 
remedies 
Emil Johansson, Kjetil Uhlen, Agnes Nybø, Gerd Kjølle, & Oddbjørn Gjerde  
European Safety & Reliability Conference, Rhodes, Greece 
(Johansson et al. 2010) 
This paper was written mainly by the author. Co-authors have actively contributed with 
comments, restructuring, text improvements and rephrasing.  
This paper is based on a literature study of extraordinary events, including a generalised 
sequence of events which has been further revised by the author as presented in Chapter 
2. The identification of situational awareness as a root cause in many events has been an 
important factor during the work, focusing on possibilities to improve the operators’ 
awareness to decrease the vulnerability to extraordinary events in the power system. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Increased understanding of extraordinary events in the electric power system is vital in 
order to develop and assign appropriate remedies to limit the presence and 
consequences of such events in the future. In this paper, extraordinary events are 
analysed in order to identify general patterns in the sequence of event, causes, and 
potential remedies. The generalised discussion is supported by a case study of historical 
events from the U.S.-Canadian and continental European power systems. Results show 
that there are correlating factors between the proposed generalised structure of events 
and the events analysed in the case study, supporting the generalisation of extraordinary 
events. Improvements of monitoring systems and controlled islanding schemes are 
remedial actions identified to have considerable potential for decreasing the 
vulnerability of extraordinary events. Such actions may lead to increased situational 
awareness and limitation of disturbance propagation and the consequences of 
extraordinary events.  
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5.2 Paper II  
Reliability evaluation of wide area monitoring applications and 
extreme contingencies 
Emil Johansson, Kjetil Uhlen, Gerd Kjølle & Trond Toftevaag  
Power Systems Computation Conference, Stockholm, Sweden 
(Johansson et al. 2011b) 
This paper was written mainly by the author. Co-authors contributed with the 
development of the final model, as well as with comments, text improvements and 
rephrasing.  
This paper describes the importance of the dynamic model when assessing the reliability 
of a power system, and includes a proposed improvement of the dynamic model of the 
reliability test model IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. The developed dynamic 
models have been utilised in the studies described in Paper III (Hillberg et al. 2012c) 
and Paper V (Hillberg and Toftevaag 2012). 
ABSTRACT 
In order to perform reliability assessment studies involving the influence of WAMS 
with regard to extreme contingencies, it is essential to have a good representation of the 
dynamic behaviour of the system. This paper describes a proposed improvement of the 
benchmark model IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. The dynamic behaviour of the 
proposed model is illustrated with results from dynamic simulations.  
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5.3 Paper III  
System integrity protection schemes – increasing operational 
security and system capacity, 
Emil Hillberg, Frode Trengereid, Øyvind Breidablik, Kjetil Uhlen, Gerd Kjølle,  
Stig Løvlund & Jan Ove Gjerde  
CIGRE Session 44, Paris, France 
(Hillberg et al. 2012c) 
This paper was written mainly by the author. Frode Trengereid has contributed to the 
overview and statistics regarding the Norwegian SIPS installations. Further text 
improvements were based on input from the co-authors and the Norwegian CIGRE 
reviewing committee.  
The importance of transient stability is described in this paper, suggesting the 
incorporation of dynamic simulations in security assessment studies. An N − k secure 
operating region is suggested to be used as a visualising aid to improve the operators’ 
awareness of the vulnerability of the system to extraordinary events. The paper includes 
a case study of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, utilising the dynamic models 
developed in Paper II (Johansson et al. 2011b).  
 
ABSTRACT 
System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) are increasingly utilised in power systems 
worldwide to provide additional power transfer capacity and enhanced operational 
security. The implementation of Phasor Monitoring Units (PMU) and Wide Area 
Monitoring Systems (WAMS) provide opportunities to improve the conventional 
system integrity protection. These improvements can increase the awareness of the 
protection schemes to the system state, providing robustness towards unforeseen 
disturbances and enhanced operational security with regard to extraordinary events. 
This paper describes a technique of how to assess the security to extraordinary events, 
where the concept of a secure operating region is extended to involve multiple 
contingencies, referred to as the N − k secure operating region. This paper also includes 
an overview of the SIPS in the Norwegian power system, and a security assessment 
study performed using the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. The study includes 
conventional and WAMS- based SIPS solutions, and demonstrates the importance of 
incorporating dynamic contingency analysis when assessing the security of a power 
system.  
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5.4 Paper IV  
Revealing stability limitations in power system vulnerability 
analysis 
Emil Hillberg, Jarno Lamponen, Liisa Haarla & Ritva Hirvonen  
Mediterranean Conference on Power Generation, Transmission, Distribution and 
Energy Conversion, Cagliari, Italy  
(Hillberg et al. 2012b) 
This paper was written in cooperation with Jarno Lamponen, PhD candidate, and 
Professor Liisa Haarla, both with the Aalto University School of Electrical Engineering, 
Espoo, Finland, and Dr Ritva Hirvonen with Fingrid Oyj, Helsinki, Finland. There has 
been a very close cooperation during the whole process of writing the paper, where the 
three first authors have actively contributed to most parts of the paper. Dr. Hirvonen has 
actively contributed with comments, text improvements and rephrasing.  
The development of the N − k vulnerability concept, the kmin-index, and the definition of 
the blackout process are the result of joint work by Emil Hillberg and Jarno Lamponen.  
In this paper, the correlation between instability and blackout is analysed, concluding 
that all extraordinary events occur as the result of loss of stability. This leads to the 
development of the N − k vulnerability concept and the k-index, which defines the 
closeness of the system to instability as a function of consecutive outages. This has 
further influenced the development of the N − k secure operating region used in Paper 
III (Hillberg et al. 2012c) as well as the visualisation of the N − k secure operating 
domain.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Creating defence plans against extreme contingencies requires knowledge of the 
principal vulnerabilities of power systems. This paper describes the blackout 
phenomenon as a process with separate phases and distinctive transitions. The paper 
proposes two indicators that can help to identify vulnerabilities in a specific operating 
scenario and recommends that the dynamic behaviour of a power system after 
successive faults should be analysed. This analysis would reveal vulnerabilities 
connected to high impact low probability contingencies where the system response can 
change after several successive contingencies. These vulnerabilities cannot be captured 
by steady state analyses. Analyses of some recent large European blackouts, presented 
in the paper, indicate that a power system may collapse after only a limited number of 
contingencies, implying that these power systems are more vulnerable to multiple 
contingencies than the system operators may be aware of.   
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5.5 Paper V  
Equal-area criterion utilised in system integrity protection 
scheme design 
Emil Hillberg & Trond Toftevaag 
IASTED Asian Conference on Power and Energy Systems, Phuket, Thailand 
(Hillberg and Toftevaag 2012) 
This paper was written mainly by the author. Trond Toftevaag contributed to the 
development of concepts, as well as with comments, text improvements and rephrasing 
The concept of applying the equal-area criterion on a critical PTC is described in this 
paper, providing a novel measure to assess the secure power transfer of critical power 
transfer corridors. The concept is tested and applied in the design procedure of a SIPS, 
using the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 with the dynamic models developed in 
Paper II (Johansson et al. 2011b).  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a novel adaptation of the equal-area criterion. The adapted criterion 
provides a new possibility to study the stability criteria of critical power transfer 
corridors, supporting the specification of the secure power transfer capacity of the 
interconnected power system.  
Furthermore, the authors describe how the adapted equal-area criterion can be employed 
in the design of System Integrity Protection Schemes to prevent instability and mitigate 
consequences of extraordinary events. The concept is tested on the benchmark model: 
IEEE Reliability Test System 1996.   
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5.6 Paper VI  
The change of power system response after successive faults 
Jarno Lamponen, Emil Hillberg, Liisa Haarla & Ritva Hirvonen  
Power Systems Computation Conference, Wroclaw, Poland 
(Lamponen et al. 2014) 
This paper was written in cooperation with Jarno Lamponen, PhD candidate, and 
Professor Liisa Haarla, both with the Aalto University School of Electrical Engineering, 
Espoo, Finland, and Dr Ritva Hirvonen with Fingrid Oyj, Helsinki, Finland. There has 
been a very close cooperation during the whole process of writing the paper, where the 
three first authors have actively contributed to most parts of the paper. Dr. Hirvonen has 
actively contributed with comments, text improvements and rephrasing.  
The methodology development and case study are the result of joint work by Emil 
Hillberg and Jarno Lamponen.  
This paper is a continuation of the work presented in (Hillberg et al. 2012b), where the 
kmin vulnerability indicator is presented as a mean to quantify vulnerabilities to large 
disturbances. In (Hillberg et al. 2012b), this indicator is utilized in an analysis of large 
European blackouts. In this paper, the kmin vulnerability indicator is utilized for a case 
study of the IEEE Three Area Reliability Test System 1996 to quantify vulnerabilities 
related to dynamic instability. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper illustrates the usefulness of visualizing the secure operating domains and the 
value of dynamic analyses when considering the vulnerability of a power system. The 
paper includes studies of the secure power transfer limits and vulnerabilities of the IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996. The limits and vulnerabilities are determined by 
simulating the dynamic response of single and multiple faults. The results are presented 
by visualizing the secure transfer domains as a function of the power flow on critical 
transfer corridors. The paper also provides an estimate for the frequency of blackouts 
related to the different operating domains. The results show how the vulnerability of the 
power system increases in steps as the amount of power transfer over a corridor 
increases.  
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6.1 Conclusions & discussion  
The objective of this PhD project has been to develop models and methods to analyse 
the risk of extraordinary events, limited to study only extraordinary events which are 
initiated by power system related factors. 
This work has been focusing on the analysis of extraordinary events from an operational 
point of view, and not from a planning perspective.  
Conventional risk and reliability assessment techniques are insufficient when it comes 
to analysing extraordinary events online. With extraordinary events being the result of 
dependent or multiple failures leading to an unstable operation, conventional techniques 
are unable to identify and quantify their risk. Thus, novel and unconventional 
techniques are required to analyse and quantify the risk related to extraordinary events.  
This thesis describes advances regarding perception, prediction, and prevention of 
extraordinary events.  
6.1.1 Perception of extraordinary events 
In order to address the risk of extraordinary events, the events themselves need to be 
understood. Therefore, this part of the project has been focusing on answering the 
research question: 
 What are the critical characteristics of extraordinary events?  
As any extraordinary event is unique, there is no simple answer to this question. 
Furthermore, the perspective and objective of the perceiver all influence how critical 
characteristics are interpreted. This PhD work has been studying extraordinary events 
from the perspective of the system operator, with the objective to improve the security 
and the capacity of the power system. Therefore, the characteristics of extraordinary 
events having critical impact on the operation and control of the power system have 
been in focus here. 
Perception of extraordinary events is described in Chapter 2, including a description of a 
generic sequence of event. The transition to unstable operation is a part of this sequence, 
and is identified as a point in the event sequence after which the response of the system 
completely changes. From the system operator’s perspective, the most important 
objective during operation is to prevent instability in order to maintain a steady-state 
operation of the power system. Therefore, in this thesis: 
 The transition from stable to unstable operation is defined as a 
fundamental and critical characteristic of extraordinary event. 
This implies that it is imperative to identify events leading to instability in order to 
assess how vulnerable the actual operation is to extraordinary events. Investigating 
extraordinary events from other perspectives, different characteristics are likely to be 
Chapter 6 
 
Summary of the Thesis 
 
99 
considered as critical – where timely and adequate preventive maintenance may be 
considered a critical aspect from a long-term planning perspective. Such investigations 
have however not been part of the scope of this work.  
6.1.2 Prediction of extraordinary events 
In order to predict extraordinary events, the critical characteristics of the events must be 
studied. Therefore this part of the project has been focusing on answering the research 
question: 
 How can the risk of critical characteristics of extraordinary events be 
addressed?  
From the working perspective of this thesis, this question is rephrased to:  
 How can the risk of transition to an unstable operation be addressed?  
Implying the need to assess events leading to instability. In the case where the power 
system is operated according to the N – 1 reliability criterion, this question relates to the 
systems reliability with regard to multiple contingencies. It is obvious that this question 
relates to a connection between the three expressions: risk, reliability, and stability. 
With risk being an all-embracing expression, this thesis only addresses risk from a 
highly limited viewpoint: first of all, only risk related to extraordinary events from an 
operational perspective is considered; secondly, due to the significant uncertainties 
related to the terms probability and consequence of extraordinary events, risk is only 
addressed through vulnerability indicators.  
The question also opens the discussion regarding the risk that the actual operating state 
of the system is unknown to the operator. It is likely that there are limitations to the 
situational awareness of the operator. The extent of such limitations impact the level of 
unknown vulnerabilities that the system is in fact exposed to. This is a factor that largely 
impacts the possibilities for the operator to implement appropriate actions to prevent a 
large disturbance. Sufficient situational awareness is thus a basic requirement to be able 
to predict and prevent extraordinary events.  
In Chapter 3, the interrelation between risk, reliability, and stability is presented, 
identifying requirements related to the analysis of extraordinary events. One of the main 
conclusions from these requirements is that: Relying only on steady-state power flow 
calculations inherently underestimates the vulnerability of the system. The framework 
that these requirements form, with regard to extraordinary events, specify that: 
 In order to address the risk of transition to an unstable operation, it is 
required to perform transient dynamic multi-level contingency analyses.  
Based on this requirement, the risk of transition to an unstable operation may be 
addressed through the two proposed vulnerability indicators: the kmin-index and the 
visualising of the N – k secure operating region. These indicators should not be 
regarded as operating criteria (such as the N – 1 criterion), but as indicators of how 
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vulnerable the system is to extraordinary events. Utilising these indicators, system 
vulnerabilities may be identified thus predicting extraordinary events during operation.  
Implementing the proposed indices require tools that are able to perform multilevel 
transient dynamic contingency analyses on-line, which is highly complex and computer 
intense. There are to this date no commercial tools available to perform such task.  
6.1.3 Prevention of extraordinary events 
The focus of this part of the project has been on answering the research question: 
 How can critical characteristics of extraordinary events be averted?  
Averting extraordinary events may be done by various means, where the most obvious 
solution may be over-dimensioning. More economically viable solutions are often 
related to the operation and control of the power system, focusing on areas such as 
enhanced monitoring and protection. Situational awareness is identified as a basic 
requirement to be able to prevent extraordinary events, thus improved situational 
awareness may provide possibilities to prevent extraordinary events.  
As described by the sequence of extraordinary events presented in Chapter 2, manual 
prevention techniques are possible to implement if the operator is aware of the 
vulnerability of the situation in a timely manner. Studies of historical events show that 
after the triggering failure there is often sufficient time to implement manual actions to 
prevent the system from further deterioration. However, due to insufficient situational 
awareness the system may continue to operate in a state where the system is highly 
vulnerable and further failures may result in large disturbances.  
After the system has passed from stable to an unstable operation, manual actions are no 
longer possible to prevent an extraordinary event. This is due to the change in system 
response, where the state of an unstable system changes too fast for the operator to 
manually identify the actions which would be able to take the system back to another 
steady state. Therefore, at this stage remedial actions are only possible through 
predesigned automatic control and protection systems, i.e. SIPS. Such remedial actions 
are difficult to design and increase the complexity of the power system. However, with 
insufficient remedial actions the instability of the system will lead to the triggering of 
multiple component protections, resulting in a large and uncontrolled disturbance which 
may affect a widespread region.  
The methodology presented in Chapter 3 provides possibilities to enhance the 
situational awareness related to extraordinary events. Here, the kmin and the N – k secure 
operating region are suggested to indicate the vulnerabilities of the situation. It is also 
possible to utilise kmin as an on-line predictor, i.e. a leading vulnerability indicator, to 
provide information on how the vulnerability may develop for future states. Other 
vulnerability indicators may be identified, but to provide information on the 
vulnerability of the operating state with regard to extraordinary events, it is required to 
study the systems dynamic response to multi-level contingencies during operation.  
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The equal-area criterion may be utilised to define transfer capacities of critical power 
transfer corridors, as presented in Chapter 4. This EAC on PTC concept is suggested to 
be utilised to improve the design of SIPS to prevent instability in the cases where 
critical contingencies may result in the separation of a system. However, it is necessary 
to further refine this method to be able to implement it in a real system – specifically 
regarding assessment of the equivalent mechanical power which has a large impact on 
the method. Many similar approaches have been developed previously, based on e.g. the 
SIME method. The main difference between the EAC on PTC approach and other EAC 
based methods is the direct utilisation of actual power flow and angle differences over a 
set of transmission lines, instead of the assessing power and angles between equivalent 
models. Even though not explicitly studied here, it may be assumed that the EAC on 
PTC concept is valid in cases where out-of-step relays are designed to act in order to 
actively sectionise a system which is subject to a disturbance resulting in the loss of 
synchronism within the system. This kind of relays is implemented in many power 
systems, and the EAC on PTC concept would in many cases be able to provide another 
solution than system separation to prevent the loss of synchronism thus preventing large 
disturbances.  
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6.2 Suggestions for future work 
Perception, prediction, and prevention of extraordinary events are broad research areas 
where many challenges and opportunities are still to be found. Conventional risk and 
reliability assessment techniques provide limited value in the analysis of extraordinary 
events from an operational perspective, thus the development and implementation of 
novel and unconventional methods and techniques are of paramount importance in order 
to predict and prevent future extraordinary events. In this section, some thoughts are 
gathered concerning valuable areas for further research and development.  
The predictive and preventive measures presented in this thesis describe conceptual 
solutions for decreasing the risk of extraordinary events. These measures depend on 
further development of tools and techniques in order to be integrated in, and supportive 
for, the existing tools used in operation of the power system.  
 
 With instability being a critical characteristic of extraordinary events, it 
is important to carry out online stability analyses to provide information 
on the distance to instability after sudden changes in the power system. 
To be able to perform multi-level dynamic contingency analyses during 
operation, increased requirements are placed on component modelling, 
simulation tools, as well as on state estimation. 
 Due to the complexity of performing dynamic simulations, it is needed 
to further explore solutions for limiting the number of simulations 
required to identify critical contingencies. 
 PMU and WAMS are identified as enabling technologies, and their 
implementation in the power system is a necessity for measures to 
improve the situational awareness as well as for the future development 
of the power system.  
 The utilisation and dependency of SIPS in the operation of the power 
system involve additional risk aspects and may add complexity to the 
everyday work of the system operator. Identifying and assessing these 
risks, as well as identifying the pros and cons of specific SIPS, are 
important tasks to perform before deciding on implementation of new 
protection systems.  
 The limitations of relying on the N – 1 criterion to limit the risk of 
extraordinary events opens up the discussion on the value of developing 
other operating criteria, based for example on stability and reliability 
aspects. 
 If consequence analysis is to be considered in the analysis of 
extraordinary events, the consequences of system instability needs to be 
studied. This places considerable requirements on the modelling of 
component protections as well as other automatic actions of the power 
system. 
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 Analysing actual or realistic event sequences, to study and identify 
system criticalities, is an important topic which forms a formidable task. 
The timing of actual faults and protective actions is highly complex 
where, for example, faults occurring due to excessive sagging of 
overloaded lines depend on the actual distance to the ground and the 
thermal heating of the line, which depends on the loading of the line and 
the wind speed among many other parameters.  
The need to perform dynamic contingency analysis on-line is not only a requirement to 
assess the risk of extraordinary events, but it will become a necessity when operating 
the power systems closer to their limits. In these cases, relying on safety margins based 
on steady state simulations becomes increasingly risky and blackouts may no longer be 
so extraordinary.  
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The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is used in several studies during this PhD work, 
presented in (Johansson et al. 2011a; Johansson et al. 2011b; Hillberg et al. 2012b; 
Hillberg and Toftevaag 2012; Hillberg et al. 2012c; Storvann et al. 2012; Lamponen et 
al. 2014). The dynamic models and parameterisation used are provided in this appendix. 
Further improvements of the dynamic models, specifically related to load recovery 
dynamics and excitation system limiters, can be found in (Storvann 2012). 
The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, defined in (IEEE 1999), consists of 73 buses in 
three sub-systems, area A, B, and C, as shown in Figure A-1. Each area has 
approximately 3.4 GW of installed production and a peak load of 2.8 GW. The areas are 
interconnected by five tie-lines and one optional DC-link (which has been excluded in 
these studies).  
Several different operating scenarios have been studied, with various levels of total 
system demand and inter-area power transfer. Detailed case studies have been 
performed on two of these cases. In these two cases, the system is operated at low load, 
corresponding to a total system demand of approximately 50 % of the peak demand. 
This low load scenario belongs to the lower 25 percentile of the annual demand, as 
described by the probability distribution of the annual demand duration shown in 
Figure A-2. The inter-area power transfer of these cases is listed in Table A-I. In both 
cases, area A is a region with a low level of power interchange, while areas B and C are 
import and export regions, respectively. 
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FIGURE A-1: SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM OF THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996 
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FIGURE A-2: ANNUAL DEMAND DURATION OF THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996,  
BASED ON (IEEE 1999) 
 
TABLE A-I. INTER-AREA POWER EXCHANGE FOR STUDY CASES 1 & 2 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Power flow from area A to B(MW)  220 255 
Power flow from area A to C (MW)  -240 -150 
Power flow from area B to C (MW)  -420 -365 
Area A Power export (MW) 15 -105 
Area B Power export (MW) -640 -620 
Area C Power export (MW) 655 515 
 
The loads in the system are represented by steady-state and dynamic load models, based 
on a composite of constant power, constant current and constant admittance, as defined 
by equations (3)-(6): 
଴ܲ ൌ ேܲ ቀܷ଴ ܷேൗ ቁ
ଶ
 (3) 
ௗܲ ൌ ଴ܲ ܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቀͲǤͶ ൅ ͲǤ͸
ܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቁ (4) 
ܳ଴ ൌ ܳே (5) 
ܳௗ ൌ ܳ଴ ቀܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቁ
ଶ
 (6) 
where the sub-indices N, 0, and d represent nominal, steady-state, and dynamic values, 
respectively. P and Q refer to the active and reactive power of the load, with U as the 
bus voltage. 
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Synchronous condensers are represented as SVCs, and the machine parameters and 
dynamic models and parameterisation used in the studies of this PhD work are 
presented in the tables and figures below.  
 
TABLE A-II. MACHINE DATA, FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 Unit Type Thermal Hydro 
Parameter  Oil Coal Nuclear 
 Model Type9 2.2 2.1 
 H [s] 10 2.8 3 5 3.5 
 Td0' [s] 8 8 8 6 
 Td0'' [s] 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
 Tq0' [s] 1 1 1 - 
 Tq0'' [s] 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 Ta [s] 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 Xd [pu] 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.1 
 Xd' [pu] 10 0.32 0.3 0.4 0.28 
 Xd'' [pu] 0.2 0.18 0.23 0.19 
 Xq [pu] 1.8 1.7 2.0 0.7 
 Xq' [pu] 0.55 0.52 0.65 - 
 Xq'' [pu] 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.22 
 Xl [pu] 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.11 
 
 
  
                                                 
9 Model type classification as in the Guide for Synchronous Generator Modeling Practices in Stability 
Analyses, (IEEE 1991). 
10 Data as given in The IEEE reliability test system - 1996, (IEEE 1999) 
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TABLE A-III. EXCITATION SYSTEM MODEL PARAMETERS,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 Unit Type All generator types 
Parameter  
 Model Type11 AC4A 
 TA [s] 0.1 
 TB [s] 10 
 TC [s] 1 
 KA 10012 
 VRMAX [pu] 3 
 VRMIN [pu] 0 
 
 
 
FIGURE A-3: BLOCK DIAGRAM OF EXCITATION SYSTEM MODEL,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 
  
                                                 
11 Model type classification as in the Recommended Practice for Excitation System Models for Power 
System Stability Studies, (IEEE 2005). 
12 This value is corrected from (Johansson et al. 2011b), where KA is erroneously listed as 400. 
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TABLE A-IV. STEAM TURBINE-GOVERNOR SYSTEM MODEL PARAMETERS,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 Unit Type Thermal 
Parameter  
 T1 [s] 0.5 
 R 0.05 
 PMAX [pu] 1 
 PMIN [pu] 0.3 
 
 
 
FIGURE A-4: BLOCK DIAGRAM OF STEAM TURBINE-GOVERNOR SYSTEM MODEL,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
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TABLE A-V. HYDRO TURBINE SYSTEM MODEL PARAMETERS,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 Unit Type Hydro 
Parameter  
 D  0.5 
 TW [s] 1.3 
 At 1.1 
 qnL 0.08 
 
 
 
FIGURE A-5: BLOCK DIAGRAM OF HYDRO TURBINE SYSTEM MODEL,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
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TABLE A-VI. HYDRO GOVERNOR SYSTEM MODEL PARAMETERS,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
 Unit Type Hydro 
Parameter  
 R  0.05 
 r  0.3 
 TF [s] 0.05 
 TR [s] 5.2 
 TG [s] 0.5 
 VELMAX [pu] 0.2 
 GMAX [pu] 1 
 GMIN [pu] 0 
 
 
 
FIGURE A-6: BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE HYDRO GOVERNOR SYSTEM MODEL,  
FROM (JOHANSSON ET AL. 2011B) 
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APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
 
 
The consequences of several historical extraordinary events are illustrated in the 
consequence diagram shown in Figure 2, and repeated below in Figure B-1. The outage 
data are based on information provided by several studies, where the approximated 
average duration, disconnected load, and energy not supplied is gathered in the tables in 
this appendix. 
 
 
FIGURE B-1: HISTORICAL EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS,  
CATEGORISED AS NATURAL HAZARD EVENTS OR POWER SYSTEM INITIATED EVENTS, 
MARKED BY A CIRCLE OR TRIANGLE, RESPECTIVELY 
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TABLE B-I. LIST OF HISTORICAL NATURAL HAZARD EVENTS 
Event 
name in 
Figure 2 
and 
Figure B-1 
Approx. 
average 
duration 
[hours] 
Approx. 
disc. load 
[MW] 
Approx. 
energy not 
supplied 
[MWh] 
Affected 
Country Year References 
BR 1985 1.2 7800 9620 Brazil 1985 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 2009 3.7 24400 90000 Brazil 2009 (Filho 2010) 
CA 1998 125 8000 1000000 Canada 1998 (Kjølle et al. 2006b) 
FR 1999 100 4000 400000 France 1999 (Kjølle et al. 2006b) 
NO 1992 45.5 330 15000 Norway 1992 (Kjølle et al. 2006a) 
NO 2005 5.1 228 1165 Norway 2005 (Kjølle et al. 2006a) 
NO 2007 85.7 7 600 Norway 2007 (Kjølle et al. 2007) 
SE 2005 79.3 1400 111000 Sweden 2005 (Kjølle et al. 2006b) 
US 1977 13 6000 78000 USA 1977 (TaskForce 2004) 
US 1998 9.5 950 9025 USA 1998 (TaskForce 2004) 
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TABLE B-II. LIST OF HISTORICAL POWER SYSTEM INITIATED EVENTS 
Event 
name in 
Figure 2 
and 
Figure B-1 
Approx. 
average 
duration 
[hours] 
Approx. 
disc. load 
[MW] 
Approx. 
energy not 
supplied 
[MWh] 
Affected 
Country Year References 
AU 2004 0.3 3000 750 Australia 2004 (Cooke 2005) 
BE 1982 6 2400 14400 Belgium 1982 (Barkans and Zalostiba 2009) 
BR 1984 2.7 15700 42000 Brazil 1984 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 1994 1.3 8600 10750 Brazil 1994 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 1996 1.7 5800 9667 Brazil 1996 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 1999 4.3 25000 108000 Brazil 1999 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 1999 1.7 2000 3300 Brazil 1999 (Gomes 2004) 
BR 2002 4.2 23700 98750 Brazil 2002 (Gomes 2004) 
CL 1997 0.5 2400 1200 Chile 1997 (IEEE 2007) 
DK 2002 2.75 800 2200 Denmark 2002 (EURELECTRIC 2004a) 
ES 2001 0.6 500 300 Spain 2001 (EURELECTRIC 2004a) 
EU 2006 2 17000 34000 EU 2006 (IEEE 2007) 
FI 2003 0.5 500 250 Finland 2003 (IEEE 2007) 
FR 1978 4.1 29000 120000 France 1978 (IEEE 2007) 
GR 2004 2.5 4500 11250 Greece 2004 (Vournas et al. 2006) 
IT 2003 6.7 27000 180000 Italy 2003 (IEEE 2007) 
JP 1987 3.4 8000 26800 Japan 1987 (IEEE 2007) 
MY 1998 1.0 2000 2000 Malaysia 1998 (IEEE 2007) 
MY 2005 3.0 6000 18000 Malaysia 2005 (IEEE 2007) 
NO 2004 0.5 2400 1200 Norway 2004 (IEEE 2007) 
RU 2005 24 3500 84000 Russia 2005 (Barkans and Zalostiba 2009) 
SE 1983 2.1 11920 25000 Sweden 1983 (IEEE 2007) 
SE 2003 2.7 6600 18000 Sweden 2003 (Elkraft 2003; SvK 2003) 
UK 2003 0.5 870 430 UK 2003 (EURELECTRIC 2004a) 
UK 2008 1.0 290 290 UK 2008 (CIGRE 2010a) 
US 1965 6.5 20000 130000 USA 1965 (TaskForce 2004) 
US 1996 1.5 11800 17700 USA 1996 (TaskForce 2004) 
US 1996 4.5 28000 126000 USA 1996 (TaskForce 2004) 
US 2003 16 61800 988800 USA 2003 (TaskForce 2004) 
US 2008 1 2200 2200 USA 2008 (CIGRE 2010a) 
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Abstract – In order to perform reliability assessment 
studies involving the influence of WAMS and extreme 
contingencies, it is essential to have a good representation 
of the dynamic behaviour of the system. This paper 
describes a proposed improvement of the benchmark 
model IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. The dynamic 
behaviour of the proposed model is illustrated with results 
from dynamic simulations. 
Keywords: System security, Extreme contingencies, 
Wide Area Monitoring Systems, Dynamic modelling 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Power system operation and management 
requirements are escalating due to society’s increased 
dependency on electricity as well as a continued 
evolution of the power system. A reliable supply of 
electricity is recognized as vital for the society, to which 
extreme contingencies pose a severe threat. 
Reliability of the power system is traditionally 
assessed using adequacy techniques. However, when it 
comes to the reliability assessment of consequences of 
extreme contingencies as well as possible remedies 
using Wide Area Monitoring Systems, the dynamics in 
the system cannot be neglected. Hence adequacy 
techniques are inadequate in such analysis.  
The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 [1] is a 
power system model intended to be used for testing 
reliability assessment techniques. However, the models’ 
limitations are obvious when it comes to the analysis of 
dynamic phenomena.  
In this paper, an improved dynamic model of the 
IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is proposed. The 
improved dynamic model is suggested to be used for 
benchmark testing of security assessment techniques.  
In this manner, the test system can be used in studies 
involving consequences of extreme contingencies and 
the development of various remedial applications based 
on Wide Area Monitoring Systems. 
The paper is organised in the following manner:  
Section 2 gives an introduction to reliability assessment 
with regard to extreme contingencies and prospective 
applications of wide area monitoring systems. The 
proposed improvement of the dynamic model for the 
IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 is described in 
section 3, while analysis and results of a dynamic study 
are described in section 4. Discussion and further work 
is included in section 5. 
2 A SMART TRANSMISSION GRID 
Smart grid issues have mainly been focusing on 
making the distribution grid and the demand side 
smarter, examples on areas of interest are: 
 simplified system integration of distributed 
generation 
 demand side management and response 
 interaction between many/all components 
 smart metering  
However, the smart grid approach also relates to 
improvements of the transmission grid. Such 
improvements are essential in order to maintain a 
reliable power supply in a changing power system, of 
which the society is increasingly dependent. An area of 
special concern is the power systems’ robustness to 
extreme contingencies.  
2.1 Power System Reliability Assessment 
Reliability of a power system is composed by two 
aspects, adequacy and security, where adequacy relates 
to the ability of the system to satisfy the demand while 
security is related to the systems capability to withstand 
disturbances [2, 3]. A comprehensive elaboration on the 
concepts of power system adequacy and security can be 
found in [4].  
When addressing the reliability of power systems, the 
attention is often towards the steady state adequacy in 
supply and demand, rather than towards the dynamic 
robustness and contingency ride through capabilities of 
the system. One of the reasons for this might be the 
complexity involved in a proper representation of the 
dynamic behaviour of the power system. Hence, many 
reliability assessment techniques are neglecting the 
dynamic aspect of reliability and only focusing on 
steady-state security and adequacy assessment of the 
power system.  
Several security assessment techniques are available, 
with many of the online dynamic security assessment 
techniques described in [5]. There is, however, a need to 
further define security assessment indices [6]. 
Challenges are also related to the modelling 
requirements for performing adequate dynamic analysis 
and to the assessment of consequences of extreme 
contingencies from a simulation point of view. 
 2.2 Extreme Contingencies 
An extreme contingency refers to a disturbance in the 
power system with a potentially High societal Impact 
and a Low Probability to occur (also called HILP 
events), often leading to a wide-area interruption (or 
blackout).  
Due to the unpredictable nature of HILP events, 
difficulties arise to economically justify major 
reinforcements on the power systems to prevent such 
events from occurring [6]. However, with consequences 
resulting in considerable socio-economic costs, 
mitigation of extraordinary events has a high social, 
economical, and political benefit.  
Increased insight into and understanding of these 
events is an important step in order to develop and 
assign appropriate remedies to limit the consequences of 
future events. Analyses of historical extreme 
contingencies, e.g. [7-9], describe several factors 
identified as root causes to the events. Two aspects of 
special importance recognised in [10] are:  
 insufficient situational awareness  
 inadequacy of implemented schemes for 
controlled islanding  
2.3 Wide-Area Situational Awareness 
An improved situational awareness of the operating 
state of the power system on a system wide basis 
implies an improved system security by e.g. increased 
operator decision support and enhanced emergency 
control. In this way, the risk of blackouts can be 
decreased through more accurate identification of 
system vulnerabilities. Improved monitoring is one 
solution to enhance the wide-area situational awareness.  
2.4 Wide Area Monitoring Systems 
Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) is 
identified as a field where applications could be 
efficiently utilised in order to increase the system 
security to extreme contingencies without major 
economical investments. The breakthrough in wide area 
monitoring arrived with the development and 
installation of fast, reliable, and highly accurate Phasor 
Measurement Units, PMUs [11]. PMUs are utilised to 
supply a WAMS with time synchronised phasor data 
from a widely dispersed system. Typically WAMS have 
a relatively low time delay, providing almost real-time 
observability either of selected parts of the power 
system, such as vital transfer corridors, or of the entire 
power system if sufficient PMU installations are 
available.  
The enhanced information made available by a 
WAMS enables improvements in many fields, related to 
monitoring, control, and protection of the power system, 
some of them being: 
 Post-mortem analysis 
 State estimation & prediction 
 Situational awareness 
 Security assessment  
 System utilization 
 Robustness & coordination of protection and 
control 
3 DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE IEEE 
RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996 
In order to properly perform benchmark reliability 
assessment of various WAMS applications and extreme 
contingencies, the widely known IEEE Reliability Test 
System 1996 is used as a starting point. 
3.1 Background 
The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, described in 
[1], (hereinafter referred to as the test system) is 
designed with the purpose to be used for benchmark 
studies on new and existing reliability evaluation 
techniques. The test system is an extended successor of 
the original IEEE Reliability Test System 1979, see 
[12], and consists of an interconnected power system 
with three areas and six sub-areas. The test system is 
described by a generation and transmission system 
supplying loads represented at bulk load points. The 
representation of a power system by its generation and 
transmission systems, neglecting the effects of the 
distribution systems, is often referred to as hierarchical 
level 2 model, HL-II, which is a usual level of 
modelling when performing power system reliability 
assessment.  
Several studies have been made on this system, 
where e.g. [13] presents a reliability (adequacy) 
assessment of the system and compares the results with 
the predecessor from 1979, and [14] proposes a full 
three-phase description of one of the areas of the test 
system. As far as the authors are aware of, there are no 
publications available where the limitations of the 
dynamic model presented in [1] are discussed or the 
implications this might have when assessing the 
reliability, including security, of the test system.  
3.2 Dynamic modelling 
The description in [1] lacks vital information on the 
dynamical behaviour of the test system; hence the 
description is mainly useful when addressing the steady 
state adequacy of generation and transmission rather 
than the dynamic robustness of the system related to 
various contingencies. In order to utilise this system for 
security analysis, further definition of the dynamic parts 
of the test system is needed. 
Depending on the goal of a dynamic power system 
study, the modelling of the physical behaviour of 
various items is important, such as: generators, loads, 
tap-changers, and control & protection systems.  
In the following sub-section, the modelling of 
synchronous generators is discussed, and an improved 
dynamic model of the generators in the test system is 
proposed.  
3.3 Generator system dynamic models 
Several generating plants are defined in [1], where 
the dynamic generator models are grouped into four unit 
types: oil, coal, nuclear, and hydro.  
The generators are described using the so called 
classical machine model, i.e. a constant voltage behind a 
transient reactance. The generators are parameterised 
using the parameters: H (inertia constant), D (damping 
constant), and Xd' (transient reactance). The damping 
 constant D is used to represent electrical damping in the 
classical model, where the effect of damper windings is 
not included. When the damping constant is set to zero, 
the model fully neglects any electrical and mechanical 
damping of the machine.  
The dynamic generator data presented in [1] is based 
on the study described in [15], where the classical 
machine model is introduced for assessing the security 
of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1979. It should be 
noticed that the classical machine model is a highly 
simplified model, lacking much valuable information of 
the machines’ non-stationary behaviour, and when 
neglecting the damping of the machines the model may 
produce highly conservative results in a dynamic 
simulation. 
Hence, in order to more properly reproduce the 
transient and sub-transient behaviour of the generators, 
models representing the rotor circuits are proposed. 
Including the field winding together with one damper 
circuit in each of the d- and the q-axes, respectively, 
sub-transient effects and rotor related magnetic saliency 
are considered. To further increase model accuracy, it is 
common to include one additional circuit in the q-axis. 
These model types are in [16] referred to as Model 2.1 
and Model 2.2, respectively. Model 2.1 is normally 
considered sufficiently detailed to represent machines of 
salient pole type, which typically is the case with 
generator units in hydro plants. Generator units in 
thermal plants are often of round-rotor type, for which 
model 2.2 is normally considered suitable.  
The parameters needed in order to represent the 
generators in the test system with machine models 2.1 
and 2.2 are listed in Table 1. The selected data is based 
on data from [17] and [18], and is supposed to represent 
typical machine parameter values. 
 
 Unit Type Thermal Hydro 
Parameter  Oil Coal Nuclear 
 Model Type1 2.2 2.1 
 H [s] 2 2.8 3 5 3.5 
 Td0' [s] 8 8 8 6 
 Td0'' [s] 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
 Tq0' [s] 1 1 1 - 
 Tq0'' [s] 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 Ta [s] 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 Xd [pu] 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.1 
 Xd' [pu]2 0.32 0.3 0.4 0.28 
 Xd'' [pu] 0.2 0.18 0.23 0.19 
 Xq [pu] 1.8 1.7 2.0 0.7 
 Xq' [pu] 0.55 0.52 0.65 - 
 Xq'' [pu] 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.22 
 Xl [pu] 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.11 
Table 1: Proposed data for machine models 
An example of the differences in dynamic behaviour 
between the classical machine model and models 2.1 
and 2.2 is illustrated by Figure 1. In this figure, the 
                                                          
1 Model type classification as in the Guide for Synchronous 
Generator Modeling Practices in Stability Analyses, [16]. 
2 Data as given in The IEEE reliability test system - 1996, [1] 
speed deviation (from nominal speed) is shown for three 
different machine models, after a 100 ms 3-phase short-
circuit applied at bus 119. The red curve describes the 
response when all machines in the test system are 
modelled using the classical model with parameters as 
described in [1]. The blue and black curves describes 
the response when modelling the machines as suggested 
in Table 1, with the governor and excitation systems 
explicitly modelled in the system described by the black 
curve. 
It is obvious that the speed deviation in the case with 
the classical machine model oscillates in an undamped 
manner. Hence, this contingency would result in 
instability and loss of load in a study where the 
machines were modelled using this type of model 
parameterised as in [1].  
See [19] for further description on how the 
complexity of the machine model influences the 
dynamic response of the modelled power system.  
 
 
Figure 1: Rotor speed deviation of the machine at bus 118 for 
different dynamical models, when the system is exposed to a 
3-phase fault on bus 119 
3.4 Governor and Excitation system models 
A brief description of the governor and excitation 
system models is included in this sub-section. As shown 
in Figure 1, the governor and excitation systems have a 
significant impact during the transient state of a 
dynamic simulation, and it can be shown that the 
stability of the power system is greatly affected by these 
controls. In order to include the dynamic effects of 
governors and excitation systems, simplified models 
together with rather typical data are presented here.  
The excitation system model used for all generators 
is represented by a simplified version of the model 
referred to as Type AC4A described in [20]. The 
following simplifications are made: the regulator input 
filter time constant (TR) is set to zero, the under 
excitation limiter (VUEL) and the commutating reactance 
(KC) are neglected, and no limit is set on the regulator 
input (VI). This simplified model can be represented by 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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8
x 10
-3 Gen bus 118: Rotor speed deviaton [pu] 
Time [s]
 
 
Classical model
Model 2.1 & 2.2
Model 2.1 & 2.2 with GOV & EXC
 the block diagram shown in Figure 2, with suggested 
typical parameters listed in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Excitation system model 
 
 Unit Type All generator types 
Parameter  
 Model Type3 AC4A 
 TA [s] 0.1 
 TB [s] 10 
 TC [s] 1 
 KA 400 
 VRMAX [pu] 3 
 VRMIN [pu] 0 
Table 2: Excitation system model parameters 
The turbine and governor system model used for the 
thermal units is a very simple model, only describing 
the droop and governor time constant. The model can be 
represented by the block diagram shown in Figure 3. 
The parameters suggested for this model are listed in 
Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Steam turbine-governor system model 
 
 Unit Type Thermal 
Parameter  
 T1 [s] 0.5 
 R 0.05 
 PMAX [pu] 1 
 PMIN [pu] 0.3 
Table 3: Steam turbine-governor system model parameters 
For the hydro units, a more elaborate turbine and 
governor system model is used. The turbine is modelled 
as a non-linear model with a non-elastic water column, 
as described in [21], with the simplification that the 
penstock head losses (fP) are ignored. The simplified 
model can be represented by the block diagram shown 
in Figure 4. 
The governor system includes temporary and 
permanent droop, filter-, governor-, and servo- time 
constants, together with gate velocity and position 
limiters. The governor system can be represented by the 
block diagram shown in Figure 5. The parameters of the 
hydro turbine and governor systems used in the study 
are listed in Table 4 and Table 5.  
 
                                                          
3 Model type classification as in the Recommended Practice for 
Excitation System Models for Power System Stability Studies, [20]. 
 
Figure 4: Hydro turbine system model 
 
 Unit Type Hydro 
Parameter  
 D  0.5 
 TW [s] 1.3 
 At 1.1 
 qnL 0.08 
Table 4: Hydro turbine system model parameters 
 
Figure 5: Hydro governor system model 
 
 Unit Type Hydro 
Parameter  
 R  0.05 
 r  0.3 
 TF [s] 0.05 
 TR [s] 5.2 
 TG [s] 0.5 
 VELMAX [pu] 0.2 
 GMAX [pu] 1 
 GMIN [pu] 0 
Table 5: Hydro governor system model parameters 
4 ANALYSIS & RESULTS  
In this section, the dynamic response of the test system 
is discussed. The studied scenario corresponds to a high 
transfer scenario, with load and production distributed 
as described in Figure 6. The system load is 
approximately 75 % of the peak load scenario described 
in [1], with implemented dynamic models as proposed 
in the previous section. All other data and information 
regarding the test system are found in [1]. 
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Figure 6: Overview of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 
showing distribution of load and generation in the studied 
operating scenario  
Important dynamic aspects are studied by linearising 
the test system. The eigenvalues related to the electro-
mechanical oscillatory modes of the linearised system 
are displayed in Figure 7, where the most influencing 
modes are seen to be in the range of 0.8–1.5 Hz with 
damping ratio of around 5 %. Table 6 lists further 
information on the five lowest damped modes, together 
with the equipment having the highest participation 
factor of each mode.  
 
 
Figure 7: Electro-mechanical modes 
 
no f [Hz] Damping [%] Participation Factor 
1 0.87 5.1 Gen1, bus 321 
2 0.96 5.6 Gen1, bus 118 
3 1.41 6.1 Gen3 & 4, bus 202 
4 1.42 6.4 Gen3 & 4, bus 302 
5 1.35 7.3 Gen1, bus 218 
Table 6: Low damped oscillatory modes 
A mode shape plot, describing the observability level 
using bus voltage angles for the 0.96 Hz mode is 
displayed in Figure 8. This mode is identified as an 
interarea mode, where mainly generators in Area A and 
B are swinging against each other. The 0.87 Hz mode is 
mainly observable as generators in Area C are swinging 
against the rest of the system. 
Utilising the observability information, it is possible 
to identify optimal monitoring quantities and locations 
in order to best observe the level of oscillations in the 
system. With voltage angles as monitoring unit, the 
optimal measurements to observe the 0.87 Hz mode is 
identified as the angle difference between buses 222 
(Area B) and 322 (Area C), while the 0.96 Hz mode is 
best observed as the angle difference between buses 118 
(Area A) and 222 (Area B). Such information could be 
used in a wide area monitoring system to keep track on 
power oscillations in the system, with possibilities to 
monitor damping levels of different modes. 
 
 
Figure 8: Mode shape plot of bus voltage angles for 0.93 Hz 
oscillatory mode 
The low damped modes are easily triggered, and in 
Figure 9 the voltage angle difference between buses 222 
and 322 is displayed in the wake of a small disturbance, 
where the oscillatory frequency can be approximated to 
0.9 Hz, with damping of around 7 %.  
For the same disturbance, Figure 10 depicts the speed 
deviation of the generators in the system. After a couple 
of seconds, the 0.87 Hz mode is the most significant 
mode in the oscillation, with most participation from the 
generators in Area C, which are distinctly swinging in 
opposite phase to the generators in Area A and B. 
It should be noticed that the damping of the low 
damped modes could be improved by the 
implementation of properly tuned power system 
stabilisers at the generators in the system.  
 
 
Figure 9: Voltage angle difference between bus 222 and 322 
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Figure 10: Generator speed deviation (showing inter-area 
oscillations identifying three groups of generators) 
The proximity to voltage collapse can be studied 
using various indices and calculation techniques. In [22] 
and [23], it is described how local measurement can be 
used to estimate the stability margin. At any given bus 
in the system, the Thevenin equivalent impedance of the 
network (ZNET) is estimated using phasor measurements 
and compared to the apparent load impedance of the bus 
(ZAPP). Maximum power transfer to the bus occurs when 
ZNET = ZAPP, hence the proximity to voltage collapse can 
be estimated by studying these two impedances.  
Figure 11 displays the impedance ratio ZAPP / ZNET 
(equal to the ratio of short-circuit apparent power and 
load apparent power) at bus 109. As the system load 
increases, the voltage stability margin is decreasing. 
Although the system is far from voltage collapse, the 
outage of the two transformers connecting bus 109 with 
buses 111 & 112, respectively, moves the system 
towards voltage collapse, showing a significant effect 
on the impedance ratio of the bus.  
In this case the apparent load impedance at bus 109 is 
equal to the local bulk load impedance. However also 
other impedances could be monitored for example the 
equivalent impedance of the sub-systems on each side 
of a tie line.  
 
 
Figure 11: Impedance ratio between load and system at bus 
109 during outage of transformers 109-111 & 109-112 
This technique is useful in order to improve voltage 
collapse proximity estimation of a widely distributed 
system. Using a wide area monitoring system, this 
information could also be made available on an operator 
level, where key buses in the system could be 
specifically monitored as described in [24].  
5 DISCUSSION 
Development of a wide area monitoring, protection, 
and control system is a topic of high interest. However, 
the R&D community need good power system models 
to develop relevant applications. The main contribution 
in this paper is the development of a test system for 
dynamic system analysis based on the well-known IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996. 
 
Further work includes specification of improved 
models, describing: dynamic behaviour of loads, 
reactive power compensation, power system stabilisers, 
tap-changer control, and equipment protection.  
Planned studies involve security assessment analysis 
of the impact of WAMS applications as well as HVDC 
interconnections between the areas of the test system.  
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SUMMARY 
 
System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) are increasingly utilised in power systems 
worldwide to provide additional power transfer capacity and enhanced operational security. 
The implementation of Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and Wide Area Monitoring 
Systems (WAMS) provide opportunities to improve the conventional system integrity 
protections. These improvements can increase the protection schemes’ awareness of the 
system state, providing robustness towards unforeseen disturbances and enhanced operational 
security to extraordinary events.  
 
In this paper, a technique of how to assess the security to extraordinary events is described, 
where the concept of a secure operating region is extended to involve multiple contingencies, 
referred to as the N  k secure operating region. This paper also includes an overview of the 
SIPS in the Norwegian power system, and a security assessment study performed on the IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996. The study includes conventional and WAMS based SIPS 
solutions, and demonstrates the importance of incorporating dynamic contingency analysis 
when assessing the security of a power system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Power transfer capacity limits are set in order to maintain a reliable operation of the power 
system. Typically, power transfer capacities between areas, or sub-systems of an 
interconnected power system, are defined by limitations on one or several power transfer 
corridors (PTC). A PTC can be identified as a set of transmission circuits that form an 
interface in a power system, which may impose a bottleneck in the system during a specific 
operating scenario. Limitations are often related to the thermal capacities of transmission lines 
and other equipment; however, the stability of the power system may as well constitute 
limiting factors. In the Continental European power system, main limitations are typically on 
thermal capacities, while stability limiting factors are of high concern in the less densely 
interconnected Nordic power system, [1, 2].  
 
Maintaining a reliable operation of the power system implies that the system should be both 
adequate and secure. The adequacy of the power system can be defined as the existence of 
sufficient facilities in the system to satisfy its demand [3], referring mainly to the level of 
available generation and transmission capacity. Power system security reflects a systems 
ability to withstand disturbances, [3], where a contingency during insecure operation could 
result in instability. Extraordinary events (large disturbances or blackouts) are often caused by 
system instability, where the degraded system collapses after stability limits are violated, [4]. 
Since many power systems are operated according to the N  1 security criterion, stability 
limits are rarely violated by a single contingency. This further implies that the security to 
extraordinary events can be expressed as the security to multiple contingencies, i.e. N  k 
security. 
 
System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) are implemented in many power systems 
worldwide. According to [5], approximately half of the globally installed SIPS can be 
classified as applications related to increasing the transfer capacity, while the other half is 
classified as increasing the operational security. SIPS are, in contrast to common component 
protection, designed to preserve the power system integrity during abnormal conditions. 
Another possible classification of SIPS is on the type of activation signal, which can be either 
event-based (detecting of predefined events, such as breaker tripping signals) or response-
based (measuring electrical parameters, e.g. frequency or voltage), [6]. Most SIPS tend to be 
of the event-based type, [5], and are characterised by taking predefined actions to predefined 
events. Event-based SIPS are fast acting and designed to improve transient rotor angle 
stability and short-term voltage stability, they are, however, without protection against 
unforeseen events and consequence of SIPS action might be hard to anticipate for all 
operating scenarios. An example of commonly used response-based SIPS is the under-
frequency load-shedding scheme (UFLS), which often is implemented on a system wide basis 
in order to prevent the collapse of a system due to frequency instability. Approximately 75% 
of all SIPS are intended to prevent instability, and corrective actions are in more than 50% of 
the cases related to load shedding or generation tripping, [5]. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: 
Section 2 holds a description of SIPS in the Norwegian power system. Section 3 describes a 
technique for assessing the security to extraordinary events, and a security assessment 
analysis is included in section 4. Discussion and conclusions are provided in section 5. 
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2. SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROTECTION SCHEMES IN NORWAY 
2.1 Background 
The Norwegian transmission system is normally operated according to the N – 1 security 
criterion. However, this criterion cannot always be fulfilled and Statnett (the Norwegian TSO) 
has therefore defined a minimum acceptable operational security level, where: a contingency 
should not have consequences beyond the disconnection of 200 MW load with duration up to 
1 hour during normal operation, or 500 MW up to 2 hours during maintenance, [7]. In such 
cases, the sub-system is referred to as being N  0 or N  ½ secure, depending on the 
consequences of a probable contingency:  
 N – 0 secure operation refers to cases where a single outage leads to uncontrolled loss 
of load, e.g. in the case of radial operation in the transmission network 
 N – ½ secure operation reflects the mitigating impact by armed SIPS. In this way, the 
consequences of an event can be limited to a controlled load shedding, as described by 
[8]. This does, however, not automatically imply that an islanded system will be able to 
continue in stable operation, even though local load and generation are in balance after 
the SIPS action.  
 
There are around twenty different SIPS installed in the Norwegian power system, affecting 
over 6 GW of production (approximately 20% of the total installed production) and more than 
1.3 GW of load (this is event-based and amounts to approximately 5% of the maximum peak 
load). On top of this, there is a response-based under-frequency load shedding scheme 
implemented in the Nordic system, which in Norway is activated for frequencies below 
48.7 Hz, where load is disconnected in steps summing up to a total of 7 GW.  
 
The SIPS are utilised to increase transfer capacities of almost 20 different PTCs during 
normal operation and to improve the operational security during strained situations. In this 
section, the functionality and experience of some of these schemes are described.  
2.2 Classification, objective & functionality 
The installed SIPS in the Norwegian power system can, based on the nature of their corrective 
actions, be structured into four categories: generation tripping, load shedding, system 
separation, and HVDC emergency power. Both event-based and response-based activation 
signals are used, varying from local measurements of frequency, voltage, or power oscillation, 
to trip signals from remote breaker protection and over-current relays.  
 
In many cases, SIPS are utilised to increase power transfer capacities, either to enhance 
system utilisation during normal operation or in scenarios with high load or insufficient local 
production. SIPS are also used to increase the security in situations with strained operation, 
e.g. during maintenance of an important transmission line, with the purpose to limit 
consequences of contingencies while sustaining a sufficient transmission capacity. All of the 
SIPS are manually armed by the transmission system operator (TSO), with the decision based 
on analysis made during the operation planning phase. Actual outcome of mitigating actions 
of armed SIPS is continuously updated in the control centre, based on state estimator data. 
2.3 Operation experience & future trends 
Since the 1980s, the Norwegian TSO has employed an increased number of SIPS, implying a 
more demanding operation of the power system in terms of both utilisation and complexity.  
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Statistics collected from the national control centre, describing the initiation of SIPS in 
Norway, limited to generation tripping schemes, are displayed in the figures below. Figure 1 
shows the annual number of SIPS initiations together with the amount of disconnected 
generation. The number of affected units, together with the cost (including both annual unit 
participation fees as well as activation fees), are shown in Figure 2 . The economical gain 
from utilisation of SIPS has not been included here, due to the difficulty in acquiring 
quantifiable data such as: earnings from increased energy exchange, savings from mitigated 
cost of energy not supplied, value of delayed investments, etc. 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual number of SIPS initiations and resulting disconnected generation in 
Norway. 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual cost and number of disconnected units by SIPS initiation in Norway. 
 
There are some negative operational experiences reported, and an example is described in [9]. 
The report describes an event where the delayed operation of one SIPS initiated a system 
separation, leading to approximately 2 GW of production deficit in the main Nordic system. 
Automatic production increase led to overload and the triggering of another SIPS, which, 
however, failed to operate. The missed operation actually prevented a production 
disconnection, which likely would have led to an unstable scenario. This example shows the 
high complexity of SIPS control and operation, as well as the difficulty in designing 
protections against unforeseen event. It is therefore important to consider the risks involved 
when the operating scenarios largely rely on the performance of a number of SIPS.  
 
According to [7], no further load shedding schemes1 will be employed, stating that 
investments in new transmission capacity are imperative to increase future transfer capacity 
while maintaining a satisfactory level of operational security.  
 
  
                                                 
1 Several other schemes (generation tripping and HVDC emergency power) are, however, planned to be 
installed in the near future. 
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3. SECURITY TO EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS 
3.1 Background 
Many historical blackouts have been the result of the progression of cascaded events, 
followed by system separation and instability, [4]. The system operators’ lack of situational 
awareness has been identified as one of the root causes, as well as the system’s insufficiency 
to regain stable operation in the post-contingency state, [10, 11]. In this section, improved 
security to extraordinary events is proposed through enhanced awareness by means of 
visualisation of the secure operating region related to single and multiple contingencies as 
well as the arming of SIPS.  
3.2 N – 1 secure operating region 
The N  1 secure operation, limited by aspects described in the introduction, can be assessed 
through contingency analysis. In some power systems it is possible to identify power transfer 
corridors with critical influence on the available secure transfer capacity. Such PTC could be 
utilised to visualise a region defining the secure operation, as suggested by [3, 12] and 
exemplified in Figure 3-I. Since a secure operation is of a multi dimensional nature, it is 
important to identify relevant quantities when visualising the secure region. In a power system 
with several critical PTCs, it might be reasonable to visualise several regions defined by 
different PTCs. In Figure 3-I, the secure operating region is visualised, together with the 
actual operating point, using the N  1 secure power transfer capacity of PTCI relative to the 
capacity of PTCII. The size and shape of the secure region will vary for different operating 
scenarios, since modifications of the network topology and other aspects influence the 
security of the power system.  
3.3 N – k secure operating region  
Similarly as suggested in the previous sub-section, the secure operating region related to 
multiple contingencies can be visualised as exemplified in Figure 3-II. Assessing the N  1 to 
N  k secure operating region can be done by contingency analysis to the kth subsequent 
contingency level. Such contingency analysis can be very tedious, and screening techniques 
might be necessary to identify contingencies which affect the critical PTC. Representation of 
a multiple contingency security region can be beneficial to assess the operating scenarios’ 
vulnerability to extraordinary events. This may be further improved by explicit monitoring of 
vulnerability indices, where an example is the kmin-index. This index describes a distance to 
the stability limits of a system, determined by the minimum number of subsequent 
contingencies that lead to instability. A continuously updated estimation of the kmin-index, 
quantifying the vulnerability of the actual operating scenario, can improve the situational 
awareness of the operator when considered in relation with a historical perspective.  
3.4 SIPS security enhanced operating region 
The effects of arming a specific SIPS can be visualised as exemplified in Figure 3-III. The 
figure shows how arming of a SIPS enhances the security around the actual operating point. 
In cases where the desired operating point is outside the N  1 secure region, the SIPS can be 
used to provide an acceptable level of security. Utilising the secure operating region related to 
multiple contingencies, the efficiency of specific SIPS can be assessed regarding the 
improvement of the system’s resilience to extraordinary events.  
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Showing the full region of secure operation, i.e. not limiting to the first quadrant as in 
Figure 3, will display both positive and negative effects of armed SIPS. In this way, the 
decision procedures may be influenced to reduce the number of simultaneously armed SIPS. 
Such reduction may also decrease the risk of adverse effects in case of events unforeseen 
when designing the SIPS. 
 
I) II) III) 
Figure 3: Visualising actual operating point and the secure region of operation2 for a specific 
operating scenario, using the power flow on PTCI relative to the flow on PTCII: I) N  1 
secure operation, II) N  1 to N  k secure operation, II) SIPS security enhancement 
 
4. SECURITY ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS 
This section describes a security assessment of the transmission capacity across specific 
interfaces of a power system. The study is performed on the IEEE Reliability Test System 
1996, which is a benchmark model for reliability assessment studies.  
4.1 Study model 
 
Figure 4: Single line diagram describing the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, the 
dimensions does not reflect the line lengths. The markings STAGES and SIPS relate to the 
studies described in subsections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.  
The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, defined in [13], consists of 73 buses in three equally 
designed areas, as shown in Figure 4. Each area has approximately 3.4 GW of installed 
                                                 
2 In order to simplify the interpretation of the figures, the complexity is reduced with respect to the shapes in 
Figure 3; the more realistic shapes of a secure operating region is highly irregular. 
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production and a peak load of 2.8 GW. The areas are interconnected by five tie-lines, here 
referred to as the A-B, A-C, and B-C tie-lines, forming the inter-area power transfer corridors: 
PTCAB, PTCAC, and PTCBC, respectively. In the analysed model, the optional DC-link is 
excluded, synchronous condensers are exchanged to SVCs, and the dynamic models 
suggested in [14] are used to represent the synchronous generators.  
The studied operating scenario is a low load scenario, corresponding to a total system demand 
of approximately 50 % of the peak demand. Two cases of power exchange are studied, with 
power transfer between areas listed in Table I. In both cases, area A is a region with a low 
level of power interchange, while areas B and C are import and export regions, respectively. 
 
Table I: Inter-area power exchange of the studied operating scenarios 
 Case 1 Case 2 
PTCAB Power flow(MW) (rating: 175 + 2×500 MVA3) 220 255 
PTCAC (MW) (rating: 500 MVA3) 240 150 
PTCBC (MW) (rating: 500 MVA3) 420 365 
Area A Power export (MW) 15 -105 
Area B Power export (MW) -640 -620 
Area C Power export (MW) 655 515 
 
4.2 N – 1 security assessment 
The N  1 security of both cases is assessed through dynamic contingency analysis, studying 
faults on transmission lines, transformers, and generators, where a 3-phase short-circuit is 
applied for 100 ms  followed by disconnection of the affected unit.  
 
Case 1 is identified to be insecure for the following contingencies: fault and trip of either of 
the A-C and B-C tie-lines (PTCAC, PTCBC). Since the desired power export from area C 
(655 MW) is well above the short term N – 1 thermal rating of the tie-lines to area C, tripping 
one of these lines would result in an excessive overload of the remaining line. The dynamic 
analyses indicate that tripping PTCAC results in rotor angle instability, which might lead to a 
large disturbance4. Hence, Case 1 can not be considered secure, from an N  1 perspective. 
Some of the results from the N  1 contingency analysis are shown in Figure 5. Parts I and IV 
describe the power flow on PTCBC and PTCAC: PBC and PAC, for all stable contingencies. 
Parts II-III and V-VI include the voltage angle and frequency difference over the same PTCs: 
'GBC, 'fBC and 'GAC, 'fAC, for all studied contingencies (except when the PTC itself is 
tripped). The analysis includes contingencies with the short-circuit applied on either end of a 
line, hence two cases where A-C and B-C tie-line trips can be seen in the figure. The dashed 
red curves represent contingencies where the short-circuit is on the C-side of the line. These 
contingencies have a significantly higher impact on the system than contingencies where the 
short-circuit is on the other side of the line, as can be seen in parts II and III of the figure.  
 
                                                 
3 The thermal overload capabilities of all lines are 120 % for 24 hours and 125 % for 15 minutes. 
4 It should be noted that in a power flow simulation, the disconnection of PTCAC resulted in a stable solution, 
although with approximately 135 % overload of PTCBC. Assuming the PTCBC would trip, the system separates 
into two islands which could remain in stable operation depending on islanding control and the level of reserves 
available in each island. These results demonstrate an important difference between dynamic and power flow 
simulations, where the latter disregards the transient phenomena and therefore may not be able to identify the 
criticality of the contingency. 
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I) II) III) 
   
   
IV) V) VI) 
   
Figure 5: Results from the N  1 contingency analysis of Case 1, showing power flow, angle 
difference and frequency difference of PTCBC (I-III) and PTCAC (IV-VI) 
Case 2 has been found secure for all the analysed contingencies, even though the desired 
power export from area C (520 MW) is above the continuous N  1 thermal rating of the tie-
lines from area C, it is well below their long term overload capability. 
4.3 N – k security assessment 
The N  k security of Case 2 has been assessed through both an N  k contingency analysis 
and an analysis of common cause failures.  
 
The N  k contingency analysis is performed with consecutive contingencies, where the 
subsequent contingency occurs after the system has reached a steady state, but before any 
generation re-dispatch has taken place. A set of contingencies including the largest generation 
unit in area B (located on bus 221, see Figure 4) and PTCBC is identified to cause instability. 
Independently of which contingency is occurring first, the system cannot regain stable 
operation after the second contingency. This suggests that Case 2 can be considered N  1 
secure, but N  2 insecure5.  
 
Common cause failures, where the failure of a single item leads to the disconnection of 
several components, are not always a part of an ordinary N  1 contingency analysis. The 
consequences of such failure may have high impact on the system, and an example of this is 
described here.  
The breaker-and-a-half configuration shown in Figure 6, describes the layout of substation 
216, where a failure of the midsection breaker results in the disconnection of the outgoing 
lines to buses 214 and 219. 
                                                 
5 Other contingency sets leading to instability can be identified through a more extensive N  k contingency 
analysis, however, the number of subsequent contingencies will be minimum two.  
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Figure 6: Single line diagram describing substation 216, with breaker-and-a-half 
configuration feeding lines to buses 214 and 219, according to [13].  
In both Case 1 and 2, such failure leads to thermal overload of lines, followed by a thermal 
cascade, resulting in instability. The first part of the event can be separated in three stages, as 
marked in Figure 4: 
 Stage 1 includes the failure at bus 216 and the trip of lines 216-214 and 216-219 
 Stage 2 represents the overload and trip of line 203-209 
 Stage 3 represents the overload and trip of line 203-201. 
The thermal capacity of each of the lines in stages 2 and 3 is 175 MVA6.  
 
In Case 2, the overload in Stage 2 (124%) is just below the short-term emergency rating of the 
line, implying that there might be time to implement manual remedial actions before any 
protection disconnects the line. If such actions are not taken, or if the actions are insufficient, 
the line is likely tripped. In Stage 3, the line load (153 %) is far beyond its short-term 
emergency rating, which might lead to a fast protective disconnection of this line. If the line is 
tripped, the main part of area B is fed only through PTCBC, and the system experiences 
instability. Case 2 can thus be considered N  1 secure, but N  1 inadequate when 
considering common cause failures.  
 
This study reveals both the importance in identifying failures to include in the contingency 
analysis of a security assessment study, and that insufficient remedial actions, to mitigate the 
overload of a line which might seem to be of minor importance to the system state, may cause 
instability. 
4.4 SIPS security enhancement 
It is possible to design System Integrity Protection Schemes to improve the security of the 
analysed cases. Here, a study is made of a generator tripping scheme in area C and its 
influence on the N  1 security of Case 1. The efficiency of three different types of arming 
and activation/triggering signals is assessed:  
I. Event-based, monitoring the trip signal of circuit breakers in PTCAC: SIPSCB 
II. Response-based, monitoring the voltage angle differences over PTCBC: SIPSG  
III. Response-based, monitoring the bus frequency at both sides of PTCBC: SIPSf 
 
A manual (or automatic) arming is assumed to limit the operating scenarios where the SIPS 
can be triggered, and that, e.g., the level of inter-area power transfer is used to identify an 
appropriate level of generation tripping in each scenario. The mitigating action studied here, 
is acting on sources in the production dense 230 kV region of area C, as marked in Figure 4.  
A thorough assessment of the arming procedures and activation signals is necessary to limit 
the risk of inappropriate SIPS actions. Arming procedures can be designed through 
identification of the operating criteria that defines the secure operating area, while an 
                                                 
6 The thermal overload capabilities of all lines are 120 % for 24 hours and 125 % for 15 minutes. 
 
(Part of )Substation 216
Line to Bus 214 Line to Bus 219
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extensive dynamic analysis is needed to identify appropriate activation signals and their 
magnitude. Here, the analysis is limited to the cases and contingencies described previously.  
From Figure 5, the unstable contingencies are easily distinguishable in both 'GBC and 'fBC, 
supporting their potential as SIPS activation signals. It is suggested that an internal arming is 
used together with a time delay, to prevent unwanted SIPS action during switching events. 
Based on the results of the dynamic contingency analysis, the suggested arming and activation 
signal magnitudes, as marked in Figure 5, are:  
'GBC - arming: 40° for 200ms, activation: 50° 
'fBC - arming: 0.2Hz for 200ms, activation: 0.25Hz 
G and f measurements are considered to be available, from e.g. a WAMS, and the total delay 
between measurement and the implementation of mitigating action is assumed to be no longer 
than 100 ms.  
 
Figure 7 describes the response, after the trip of PTCAC, with and without the suggested SIPS, 
including the power flow, angle, and frequency difference over PTCBC. The dashed curves in 
part II represent the fault with the short-circuit occurring at the C-side of the line. The system 
response of this contingency is too rapid for the SIPSG and SIPSf solutions to act before the 
system becomes unstable, and only SIPSCB results in a stable solution. All other curves in the 
figure represent the fault with the short-circuit occurring at the A-side of the line. For this 
fault, all the studied SIPS solutions results in a stable post-fault system, however, the event-
based SIPSCB scheme shows lower levels of oscillations due to the more rapid activation than 
the response-based schemes.  
 
I) II) III) 
   
Figure 7: Results for different SIPS activation signals after trip of PTCAC, in Case 1: I) PBC, 
II) 'GBC, III) 'fBC 
In Figure 8, the characteristics of PTCBC are included in the form of the power-voltage, the 
power-angle, and the rotor motion curves. According to the equal-area criterion, passing the 
unstable equilibrium point, here approximated by (PS, 'GU), would result in instability since 
the decelerating torque was not able to sufficiently decelerate the machine before it starts to 
accelerate out of synchronism. This behaviour is seen in the scenario without SIPS, where the 
angle increases beyond 'GU. For the scenarios with SIPS, the maximum angles ('GCBmax and 
'GG,fmax) are lower than 'GU and the system stabilises at a post-contingency stable equilibrium 
point (represented by VS, PS, and 'GS). It is, however, complex to identify the actual unstable 
equilibrium point, since: the mechanical power is not constant but depending on the response 
of the governor controller, and the voltage dependency of loads will affect the electrical 
power flow. Through simulations with increased delay in SIPS mitigating actions, the actual 
'GU is approximated to 110degrees for the studied scenario.  
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I) II) III) 
   
Figure 8: Results for different SIPS activation signals after trip of PTCAC, in Case 1: 
I) Power-voltage (nose) curve, II) Power-angle characteristics, III) Rotor motion trajectory  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study gives examples of SIPS solutions utilising monitoring parameters provided by a 
WAMS. The studied SIPS solutions are, however, not the most optimal ones, and other 
schemes can further improve the N  1 security of the studied cases. Response-based 
solutions, as the suggested SIPSG and SIPSf will not be as fast as event-based SIPS, but they 
will be able to provide increased protection against multiple or unforeseen contingencies that 
event-based protections can not. Improvements in SIPS activation can be done using adaptive 
response, providing optimal protection in each operating scenario. The sufficient amount of 
mitigating actions depends on the required actions for the system to remain stable. In the case 
of generation tripping, factors such as the level of spinning reserves and reactive power 
capabilities available after the SIPS action are needed to be considered. It is also possible to 
select the mitigating actions through a sensitivity analysis, assessing the stabilising effects of 
each component.  
 
This study also demonstrates that thermal overloading of a line, which seems to be of minor 
importance to the system state, can cause instability if mitigated actions are not implemented. 
Furthermore, it is shown that power flow simulations might not be able to identify critical 
contingencies, since transient phenomena are disregarded. These findings underline the 
importance of performing dynamic contingency analysis during a security assessment study, 
also in power systems where thermal capacities is the normal limitation on the power transfer 
capacity.  
 
The described visualisation of an N  k secure operating region, together with a continuous 
monitoring of the k-index, could provide improved awareness of the power system’s 
vulnerability to extraordinary events. This does however imply the need of continuously 
performed N  k contingency analysis to properly identify the vulnerabilities as the operating 
scenario of the system changes. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a novel adaptation of the equal-area 
criterion. The adapted criterion provides a new possibility 
to study the stability criteria of critical power transfer 
corridors, supporting the specification of the secure power 
transfer capacity of the interconnected power system. 
Furthermore, the authors describe how the adapted 
equal-area criterion can be employed in the design of 
System Integrity Protection Schemes to prevent instability 
and mitigate consequences of extraordinary events. The 
concept is tested on the benchmark model IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Extraordinary events in the electrical power system refer 
to disturbances with potentially high societal impact and 
low probability to occur. As both probability and 
consequences of extraordinary events are highly 
unpredictable, there are difficulties to economically 
justify major power system reinforcements based on their 
prevention, [1]. 
Extraordinary events are often characterised by 
instability phenomena, [2], leading to the triggering of 
component protections, resulting in a wide-spread 
interruption or blackout,where the affected region is 
difficult to anticipate. As the system becomes unstable, 
only pre-designed automatic remedies, such as System 
Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS), are able to prevent 
the un-controlled disconnection of power system 
components and splitting of the system.  
SIPS are increasingly utilized in power systems 
worldwide, providing both increased transfer capacity and 
security [3]. The improved situational awareness provided 
by Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and Wide Area 
Monitoring Systems (WAMS) opens for further 
improvements of conventional SIPS, providing robustness 
against unforeseen disturbances. The main purpose of 
SIPS is to prevent instability and to maintain an 
interconnected operation of the power system.  
Stability phenomena related to extraordinary events are 
mainly large-disturbance voltage and rotor angle stability, 
where the latter is often referred to as transient (rotor 
angle) stability [4]. Frequency instability may also be an 
issue, typically related to the shortage of spinning reserves 
in island operation. Although the different stability 
phenomena are interrelated, the concerns of this paper are 
limited to aspects of transient rotor angle stability only.  
Transient rotor angle stability is often analysed using 
simplifications, such as single-machine infinite-bus 
equivalent models, where stability margins are determined 
using the renowned equal-area criterion of a synchronous 
machine.  
Since stability stipulates that every machine needs to 
fulfil the equal-area criterion, several studies focus on the 
identification of critical machines which are likely to 
loose synchronism with the remaining system [5-13]. In 
the case with multiple critical machines, it is possible to 
cluster these into an equivalent one-machine-infinite-bus 
(OMIB) system, as described in [5]. An extension of the 
traditional equal-area criterion is suggested in [6, 7], 
where the transient stability margin and critical clearing 
time of critical machines are assessed without equivalent 
models. Techniques for preventive and emergency 
transient stability control are described in [8-10]. Here, 
the single-machine-equivalent (SIME) method is utilised, 
and the emergency control actions are defined on the basis 
of identifying critical machines, which are tripped in an 
iteratively manner until the system reaches stable 
operation. Emergency controls based on online 
measurements provided by PMUs are suggested in [11-
13]. Here, the equal-area criterion is used to identify 
critical machines and assess the adequacy of emergency 
control actions.  
This paper presents a novel adaptation of the equal-area 
criterion, providing new possibilities to study the stability 
criteria of critical power transfer corridors (PTC) and 
specifying the secure power transfer capacity of the 
interconnected power system. The authors describe how 
the adapted equal-area criterion can be employed in the 
design of adequate mitigating actions of SIPS, to limit the 
consequences of extraordinary events.  
The paper is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 holds the theoretical background of the equal-
area criterion, including a description of the concept to 
apply the criterion on a PTC. The utilization of the 
adapted equal-area criterion in SIPS design is described in 
chapter 3. Chapter 4 holds a case study made on the IEEE 
Reliability Test System 1996. Discussion and conclusions 
are included in chapter 5. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Equal-Area Criterion of a single machine 
 
The equal-area criterion of a single synchronous machine, 
in a multi-machine system exposed to a disturbance, can 
be formulated as:  
ܣ௔௖௖ െ ܣௗ௘௖ ൑ Ͳ (1)
where Aacc and Adec are the accelerating and decelerating 
areas as depicted in the synchronous machine power-
angle characteristics illustrated in Fig 1. Equality occurs if 
the maximum rotor angle, GM, coincides with the post-
fault unstable equilibrium angle, GU, i.e. for the machine 
to remain stable, the following criteria needs to be 
fulfilled:  
ߜெ ൑ ߜ௎ (2)
From in Fig 1, it is clear that the accelerating and 
decelerating areas can be calculated as:  
ܣ௔௖௖ ൌ න ቀ ெܲ െ ௙ܲሺɁሻቁ
ఋ಴೅
ఋೄ
Ɂ (3)
 
ܣௗ௘௖ ൌ න ሺ ாܲሺɁሻ െ ெܲሻ
ఋಾ
ఋ಴೅
Ɂ (4)
where GS and GCT are the rotor angles at the pre-fault 
steady-state equilibrium and at the time of fault clearing, 
respectively. PM is the mechanical power of the turbine 
(assumed constant), and Pf(G) and PE(G) are the under-
fault and post-fault electrical power of the machine, 
respectively.  
 
 
Fig 1. Simplified power-angle characteristics of a synchronous machine, 
during and after a temporary fault.  
 
The rotor angle G needs to be related to a reference, and 
often a centre of angle reference is used, [5], but 
theoretically any angle reference can be used.  
 
 
2.2 Equal-Area Criterion of a Power Transfer 
Corridor 
 
Fig 2 shows a power system, consisting of a sub-system 
and a main system, interconnected via a single power 
transfer corridor (PTC). In this system, it is possible that 
all synchronous machines inside the sub-system can be 
identified as critical for certain contingencies. This is 
exemplified by Fig 3, where all generators in the sub-
system accelerate relative the main system after a critical 
contingency.  
 
 
Fig 2. A power system where one sub-system is connected to the rest of 
the system through a single power transfer corridor.  
 
Clustering all critical machines into an equivalent 
model, as described in [5], the entire sub-system can be 
assessed against the main system. This implies that, at 
steady state, the equivalent mechanical power of the sub-
system equals the power flow of the PTC. Together with 
the angle difference between the equivalents of the sub- 
and main systems, the equal-area criterion of the PTC can 
be assessed.  
 
 
Fig 3. Generator terminal voltage angles, where all generators in a sub-
system accelerate (relative the rest of the system) after a critical 
contingency.  
 
If the PTC consists of only a single tie-line, the rotor 
angle reference can be selected so that G corresponds to 
the voltage angle difference over the PTC. Thus, the 
power-angle characteristics of the sub-system and main 
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system equivalents correspond to the power flow and 
angle over the PTC. The equal-area criterion of the PTC 
can then be described by equations (1)-(4).  
The loss of a line or generator in close vicinity of a 
PTC may prove to be especially critical: significantly 
decreasing the power-angle characteristics of the PTC, 
resulting in an equivalent mechanical power which 
exceeds the critical loading level of the post-fault system. 
This scenario is exemplified by Fig 4, where a SIPS is 
suggested to decrease the equivalent mechanical power of 
the post-fault system to a new stable operation point.  
 
 
Fig 4. Simplified power-angle characteristics of a PTC, describing pre-
fault, P0E(G), under-fault, Pf(G), and post-fault, P1E(G), characteristics. 
P0M and G0S represent the pre-fault steady-state operating point. GSIPS 
represent the angle difference at the instant when the SIPS is activated, 
with P1M and G1S as the post-SIPS stable equilibrium point and GU as the 
corresponding unstable equilibrium.  
 
At the pre-fault state, the steady-state operation point is 
characterized by the PTC power flow, P0E(G), the PTC 
equivalent mechanical power of the sub-system, P0M, and 
the voltage angle between the equivalents of the sub- and 
main systems, G0S. A critical contingency moves the 
system to an unstable state, since the pre-fault mechanical 
power is higher than the critical level of the post-fault 
power-angle characteristics, max{P1E(G)}. At G = GSIPS, the 
mitigating action of a SIPS system is assumed to decrease 
the mechanical power to a potentially stable post-fault 
level, P1M.  
In the scenario described by Fig 4, equations (3) and (4) 
require the following modifications:  
ܣ௔௖௖ ൌ න ቀ ଴ܲெ െ ௙ܲሺɁሻቁ
ఋ಴೅
ఋͲೄ
Ɂ
൅ න ൫ ଴ܲெ െ ଵܲாሺɁሻ൯
ఋೄ಺ುೄ
ఋ಴೅
Ɂ 
(5) 
 
ܣௗ௘௖ ൌ න ሺ ଵܲாሺɁሻ െ ଵܲெሻ
ఋಾ
ఋೄ಺ುೄ
Ɂ (6)
The equal-area criterion of a PTC can thus be further 
utilised in contingency analysis, where assessing the 
stability margins of a critical PTC can provide an 
improved overview of the system operation. In the case 
when assessing the system response after multiple sub-
sequent contingencies, the PTC stability margins can be 
used to identify the systems vulnerability of extraordinary 
events. 
 
3.  EQUAL-AREA CRITERION APPLIED ON 
SIPS DESIGN  
 
The main purpose of the SIPS is to regain a stable steady-
state operation of the power system. A sufficient level of 
mitigating action is needed in order for the system to 
maintain in stable operation in accordance with the equal-
area criterion. The SIPS system introduced in the previous 
section could be based on for example load-shedding or 
generation-rejection. In the following, the suggested 
design procedure of a generation-rejection scheme is 
described. 
The SIPS design, having the goal to identify suitable 
generators to achieve sufficient stabilizing performance, is 
proposed to be done by:  
1.  Identification of critical contingencies  
2.  Equal-area criterion assessment of critical 
contingencies  
3.  Selection of suitable generators to participate 
in SIPS action  
This procedure is described in the following sub-
sections and tested in the power system analysis described 
in chapter 4.  
 
3.1 Identification of critical contingencies 
 
The critical contingencies referred to here, are the 
contingencies leading to rotor-angle instability in the 
sense that all machines within a specific sub-system are 
identified as critical.  
Critical contingencies can be identified through a 
standard contingency analysis, assessing the 
consequences of e.g. all N  1 contingencies. The 
contingency analysis should be based on dynamic 
simulations, rather than steady-state power flow 
calculations, since the transient stability of the system is 
to be assessed. 
 
3.2 PTC equal-area assessment of critical 
contingencies 
 
For each identified critical contingency, the SIPS 
activation instant and corresponding angle needs to be 
assessed. In this way, the size of the accelerating area of 
can be calculated, which defines the minimum size of the 
decelerating area that fulfils the equal-area criterion. 
Thus, the minimum level of mitigating actions necessary 
to maintain stable operation can be identified.  
3.3 Selection of suitable generators to participate in 
SIPS action 
 
There are two criteria in the selection procedure of 
generators that have to be addressed: firstly, the 
generators should have a power production level 
corresponding at least to the minimum level of mitigating 
actions, secondly, the impact on the sub-system and on 
the PTC characteristics should be limited in order for the 
equal-area criterion to be utilised.  
A suitable set of generators needs to be selected among 
the critical machines as a basis to perform desired SIPS 
actions, in order to assess the reliability of the new steady-
state scenario.  
 
4.  CASE STUDY 
 
4.1 System model 
 
The study is performed on the IEEE Reliability Test 
System 1996, which is a benchmark model for reliability 
assessment studies.  
The IEEE Reliability Test System 1996, defined in 
[14], consists of 73 buses in three sub-systems, area A, B, 
and C, as shown in Fig 5. Each area has approximately 
3.4GW of installed production and a peak load of 2.8GW. 
The areas are interconnected by five tie-lines, where the 
A-C and B-C tie-lines form a power transfer corridor 
between area C and the rest of the system, referred to as 
PTCC.  
The studied scenario is a low load scenario, with total 
demand approximately 50% of the system peak demand. 
The power exchange between areas is listed in Table I, 
with area A as a transit region, and areas B and C as 
import and export regions, respectively. 
The loads in the system are represented by steady-state 
and dynamic load models, based on a composite of 
constant power, constant current and constant admittance, 
as defined by equations (7)-(10): 
଴ܲ ൌ ேܲ ቀܷ଴ ܷேൗ ቁ
ଶ
 (7) 
 
ௗܲ ൌ ଴ܲ ܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቀͲǤͶ ൅ ͲǤ͸
ܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቁ (8) 
 
ܳ଴ ൌ ܳே (9) 
 
ܳௗ ൌ ܳ଴ ቀܷௗ ܷ଴ൗ ቁ
ଶ
 (10) 
where the sub-indices N, 0, and d represent nominal, 
steady-state, and dynamic values, respectively. P and Q 
refer to the active and reactive power of the load, with U 
as the bus voltage. 
In this study, the optional DC-link is excluded, 
synchronous condensers are exchanged with SVCs, and 
the dynamic models suggested in [15] are used to 
represent the synchronous generator and turbine systems.  
 
TABLE I 
INTER-AREA POWER EXCHANGE OF THE STUDIED OPERATING SCENARIO 
Area AoB Power flow(MW)  220 
Area CoA Power flow (MW) 240 
Area CoB Power flow (MW) 420 
Area A Power exchange (MW) 15 
Area B Power exchange (MW) -640 
Area C Power exchange (MW) 655 
 
4.2 Identification of critical contingencies 
 
Critical contingencies are identified through an N  1 
contingency analysis, including 3-phase short-circuit 
faults on transmission lines, transformers, and generators, 
 
Fig 5. Single-line diagram describing the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. The dimensions do not reflect the line lengths. 
with 100ms duration, followed by the disconnection of the 
affected unit. The results show that the trip of the A-C tie-
line leads to instability, as shown in Fig 6.  
 
  
Fig 6. Results of the N  1 contingency analysis, showing angle 
difference over PTCC, GBC. Trip of the A-C tie-line results in an 
increasing angle difference.  
 
Further analysis of the critical contingency, shows that 
all machines in area C accelerate out of synchronism 
relative the rest of the system, as described by the 
generator terminal voltage angles shown in Fig 3. Hence, 
for this contingency, the machines in area C are 
considered critical and can be clustered into a single-
machine equivalent to analyze the transient stability of the 
system.  
 
4.3 PTC equal-area assessment of critical 
contingencies 
 
The equal-area assessment of the PTC for the identified 
critical contingency is done in three steps:  
1.  Identifying the instant of SIPS activation 
2.  Assessing the accelerating area of the PTC 
before SIPS activation 
3.  Assessing the minimum necessary level of 
rejected generation to fulfil the equal-area 
criterion 
4.3.1 Identifying the instant of SIPS activation 
 
A generation-rejection SIPS is considered to be utilized to 
prevent instability if the A-C tie-line is tripped. 
Measurement data from a WAMS are used as input to the 
SIPS, where GBC, the voltage angle difference over PTCC 
shown in Fig 6, is utilised as activation signal.  
The total inherent time delay of the SIPS, from PMU 
measurement to execution of mitigating action, is 
assumed to be no longer than 100ms. This seams 
realistically achievable, based on actual measurements of 
a PMU based Wide Area Power Oscillation Controller as 
well as the delays of a Wide Area Monitoring and Control 
System presented in [16]. 
By studying the results of the N  1 contingency 
analysis, presented in Fig 6, appropriate trigger levels for 
arming and activation of the SIPS are identified: 
Garming: GBC  ≥ 40°  
 
Gactivation: GBC ≥ 50°  
To prevent unwanted SIPS action during switching 
events, the internal time delay between arming and 
earliest activation is set to 200ms.  
The specified SIPS trigger levels and delays are 
displayed in Fig 6, together with the resulting activation 
angle of the SIPS and corresponding instant:  
GSIPS: GBC ≤ 67° 
 
tSIPS: t0 + 1.0s  
where t0 is the instant of the occurrence of the fault. 
 
4.3.2 Assessing the accelerating area of the PTC before 
SIPS activation 
 
The power-angle characteristics of the PTC is shown in 
Fig 8, together with the identified SIPS activation angle, 
GSIPS, for the critical contingency (the trip of the A-C tie-
line).  
Assuming a constant mechanical power of the system, 
the accelerating area before the SIPS activation, as shown 
in Fig 8-I, is then approximated to:  
ܣ௔௖௖ȁ ଴ܲெ ൌ 5000MW 
The mechanical power of the turbines is, however, not 
constant but depending on the response of the governor 
controllers. Assuming that the response of each machine 
can be approximated by its speed-droop, then the response 
of the system can be approximated by a piece-wise linear 
speed-droop, R. The mechanical power of the system, as a 
function of the frequency change, can thus be 
approximated as: 
ெܲሺο߱ሻ ൌ ቀͳ െ ο݂ൗܴ ቁ ൈ ଴ܲெ (11) 
where 'f is the per unit change in frequency and P0M is 
the mechanical power at the pre-fault instant.  
 
 
Fig 7. Area C frequency response for the critical contingency. 
 
The speed-droop of the system can be assessed during 
operation, studying the frequency response of a known 
disturbance, e.g. the trip of a generator, as:  
ܴ ൌ െο݂ οܲீൗ ൈ ܲீ  (12) 
where 'PG is the production change and PG is the total 
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production of the system. In the studied scenario, the 
speed-droop of the system is approximated to:  
R=4.3%  
The frequency in area C, measured at the B-C tie-line, 
is shown in Fig 7.  
From this frequency measurement and the calculated 
speed-droop of the system, the approximate equivalent 
mechanical power of the sub-system, PM('Z), is derived 
from equation (11), and illustrated in Fig 8-II.  
The PTCC accelerating area can then be approximated 
to:  
ܣ௔௖௖ȁ ெܲሺο߱ሻ ൌ 3000MW 
This area is drastically smaller than the area calculated 
using constant mechanical power. This implies that the 
impact of simplified assumptions is large, thus to design 
appropriate SIPS solutions sufficient details are needed to 
be considered.  
 
4.3.3 Assessing the minimum level of rejected 
generation to fulfil the equal-area criterion 
 
Assuming that the SIPS action affect on the frequency in 
area C can be approximated by a linear decay, with 
nominal frequency reached at the maximum angle, GM, the 
decelerating area can be assessed as shown in Fig 8-III. 
The minimum SIPS action that fulfil the equal-area 
criterion is then approximated to:  
PSIPS≥206MW 
The resulting maximum angle equals:  
GM=99° 
 
4.4 Selection of suitable generators to participate in 
SIPS action 
 
Table II lists all generators in operation in area C.  
 
 
 
TABLE II 
GENERATORS IN SUB-SYSTEM C 
Bus number  
and generator ID 
Pre-fault  
production (MW) 
Selected SIPS solutions 
302 G1 10  B3 
302 G2 10   
313 G1 197  B3 
313 G2 197 C1  
313 G3 197   
315 G1-5 5x12   
315 G6 155 C2 B2 
316 G1 114 C3 B2 
321 G1 400 A1  
322 G1-6 6x25   
323 G1 155  B1 
323 G2 155  B1 
323 G3 350 A2  
 
If basing the SIPS solution on the rejection of a single 
generator, only the machines on bus 321 and 323 (G3) 
have sufficient production, i.e. PG≥PSIPS. These machines 
are selected to represent the solutions SIPSA1 and SIPSA2, 
respectively.  
Various generator selections are possible for SIPS 
solutions based on tripping several generators. Here three 
solutions have been selected: SIPSB1-B3.  
Solutions SIPSC1-C3 are based on single machines with 
production less than the identified minimum PSIPS level.  
The selected SIPS solutions are based only on the first 
criteria defined in section 3.3: the production level of the 
selected generators. The second criteria relates to the 
machines’ impact on the PTC and the sub-system, which 
can be difficult to anticipate. The machines’ reactive 
power capability and the relative closeness to the PTC 
determine their influence on the voltage level of the PTC 
bus. From the single-line diagram in Fig 5, it is noticed 
that bus 321 (SIPSA1) is relatively close to the PTC bus, 
thus this solution might cause voltage instability in the 
sub-system. This has however not been further 
investigated in this study.  
 
I) II) III) 
   
Fig 8. Assessment of PTCC accelerating area for the critical contingency, assuming: I) constant mechanical power, II) mechanical power as a function of the 
frequency deviation. III) Assessment of minimum generation rejection level to fulfill the equal area criterion. 
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4.5 Results from SIPS activation 
 
The response of the selected SIPS solutions are analysed 
in this section, showing simulation results in Table III.  
TABLE III 
RESULTS OF SIPS ACTIVATION 
SIPS 
ID 
Rejected 
power  
PSIPS (MW) 
Maximum 
angle GM (°) 
Decelerating 
area Adec (MW°) 
Post-SIPS PTC 
power transfer 
PM1 (MW) 
A1 400 - (unstable) 
A2 350 76 3000 420 
B1 310 77 2800 450 
B2 269 82 3100 470 
B3 207 83 2000 500 
C1 197 84 1800 500 
C2 155 84 1400 520 
C3 114 - (unstable) 
 
As anticipated, solution A1 results in an unstable 
solution. This is due to the location and size of the 
generator that is rejected in this scheme, leading to a 
significant voltage drop at the PTC and the system is not 
able to regain stability. Also solution C3 proved 
insufficient, which was expected from the insufficient 
level of rejected power.  
 
Solutions A2, B1, and B2, shown in Fig 9, all respond 
as expected, with stable solutions and the calculated 
decelerating areas are approximately equal to the 
accelerating area. For these solutions, the approximate 
accelerating and decelerating areas are quite similar. 
Better approximations are possible to achieve, if 
considering also the effects of the voltage changes in the 
sub-system. Furthermore, the participation of each 
machine in the acceleration of the sub-system should also 
be considered. Since the accelerating area of the PTC 
consists of the participation of each machine, the 
contribution of the rejected machines should be deducted 
from the total acceleration.  
It should be noted that solutions B3, C1, and C2, shown 
in Fig 10, have decelerating areas considerably smaller 
than expected. The reason behind this is related to the 
reactive power capability of the rejected machines. In 
these three cases, the generators in question were at their 
under-excitation limit, implying that their disconnection 
would lead to a voltage rise at the buses in the 
surrounding area affecting the load of area C. As defined 
by the dynamic representation of loads, described by 
equations (8) and (10), a rise in voltage on the load buses 
lead to an increase in active and reactive load. Thus, the 
SIPSA2 SIPSB1 SIPSB2 
   
Fig 9. Results from the stable SIPS solutions: A2, B1, and B2. 
 
SIPSB3 SIPSC1 SIPSC2 
   
Fig 10. Results from the stable SIPS solutions: B3, C1, and C2. 
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actions of these three SIPS solutions result in increased 
load of the sub-system, meaning that the equivalent 
mechanical power of the sub-system further decreases due 
to the voltage rise. Hence, in order to properly assess the 
decelerating areas, also the SIPS affect on the load needs 
to be considered in the equivalent mechanical power.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
The concept of applying the equal-area criterion on 
critical power transfer corridors appears theoretically 
feasible. The results from computer simulations show that 
it is possible to utilise this concept when designing a 
System Integrity Protection Scheme.  
Assumptions regarding the equivalent mechanical 
power of the sub-system prove to be of high importance 
for the success of the proposed concept. The  speed-droop 
characteristic and reactive power capabilities of 
generators, as well as the voltage dependency of loads, 
have significant impact on the results.  
The uncertainties in the approximation of sufficient 
rejected production, as well as the system impact by the 
rejected machines, may constitute a challenge during 
SIPS design in this context. The SIPS functionality and 
potential voltage and frequency stability problems should 
be appropriately tested through dynamic analysis.  
Utilising data from a Wide Area Monitoring System, 
the proposed adaptation of the equal-area criterion 
provide promising applications. In this way, the 
situational awareness can be enhanced, thus improving 
the security level of system operation. Furthermore, the 
proposed concept can be used to increase the efficiency as 
well as proving the adequacy of existing System Integrity 
Protection Schemes. 
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Abstract— This paper illustrates the usefulness of visualizing 
the secure operating domains and the value of dynamic analyses 
when considering the vulnerability of a power system. The paper 
includes studies of the secure power transfer limits and 
vulnerabilities of the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS). The 
limits and vulnerabilities are determined by simulating the 
dynamic response of single and multiple faults. The results are 
presented by visualizing the secure transfer domains as a 
function of the power flow on critical transfer corridors. The 
paper also provides an estimate for the frequency of blackouts 
related to the different operating domains. The results show how 
the vulnerability of the power system increases in steps as the 
amount of power transfer over a corridor increases.  
Keywords—Vulnerability, security, stability, multiple 
contingencies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring secure operation of a power system by identifying 
and mitigating vulnerabilities has been the topic for many 
rigorous studies. Several studies concentrate on a specific 
phenomenon that may jeopardize the security, such as 
cascading failures [1]–[4] or protective device failures [5]–[8]. 
Focusing on a specific phenomenon reveals vulnerabilities 
connected to the studied phenomenon but does not necessarily 
discover or value the vulnerabilities of other phenomena. 
Visualizing techniques such as nomograms have been used to 
describe N – 1 security of a system [9], [10]. N í 1 nomograms 
can give essential information to the system operator on the 
operating boundaries of normal operation. In general, multiple 
contingencies are not considered, thus failing to reveal the 
vulnerabilities beyond the normal operation conditions. 
In [15] and [16], blackout phenomenon are described as a 
process with separate phases. In [15], these phases are 
suggested to be separated by distinctive transitions and are 
defined as: a thermally governed phase and an unstable phase. 
The work in [15] underlines the importance of analyzing 
multiple contingencies when assessing a power systems 
vulnerability to large disturbances. This paper continues the 
work presented in [15], where large European blackouts are 
analyzed and the importance of assessing the vulnerabilities 
related to dynamic instability is highlighted.   
This paper presents a systematic analysis of the IEEE Three 
Area Reliability Test System 1996 (RTS) and quantifies 
vulnerabilities related to dynamic instability. The paper 
identifies the secure operating domains and critical 
vulnerabilities of the RTS by simulating the dynamical 
response of the system to faults. Phenomena defining the 
secure power transfer are described for different operating 
scenarios. 
Two-dimensional nomograms of multilevel contingencies 
are used together with deterministic and probabilistic 
quantifications in order to illustrate the difference in 
vulnerability for various operational scenarios. Further 
development of the use of nomograms is presented in this 
paper, where vulnerability domains are identified based on the 
calculation of the system collapse frequency.  
The paper is organized as follows: A short presentation of 
the RTS is included in Part II. Part III presents and visualizes 
the secure operating domains of the RTS. Part IV describes the 
vulnerability of the RTS deterministically and probabilistically. 
Part V describes the possibilities of mitigating blackouts. Part 
VI  includes the discussion and conclusions. 
II. IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 1996 (RTS)  
To obtain a more realistic dynamic response of the RTS 
model than the original described in [11], detailed dynamic 
models are used to represent the synchronous generators, 
turbine-governors, and excitation system, as proposed by [12].  
Further improvements on the RTS dynamic response have 
been made after the studies presented in this paper. These 
improvements may be found in [17], and are focusing on the 
voltage stability impact from load response and excitation 
system limiters. 
A single-line diagram of the RTS is presented in Fig. 1. The 
optional HVDC connection as well as the control of the phase-
shifting transformer, both connected between areas A and C, 
have been neglected in this study. Using HVDC or a phase-
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shifter control could significantly improve the reliability of the 
system, as the power flows in the system could be better 
controlled in case of disturbances. 
In several previous studies, the RTS has been used for 
analyzing the reliability limited to the (post-fault) adequacy 
rather than dynamic security of the power system. In this study, 
the added dynamic models have enabled the analysis of 
dynamic phenomena related to faults, i.e. the security. The 
dynamic analyses reveal the vulnerabilities that have remained 
hidden in the studies based merely on steady state power flow 
analyses.  
III. THE SECURE OPERATING DOMAIN 
The first part of this section describes a dynamic N í 1 
contingency analysis of the RTS, with a secure operating 
domain identified and visualized from these results. The 
second part describes the N – k security of the RTS, and 
visualizes an N – 2 secure operating domain of the system. 
These studies are based on analyses on approximately 50 
different operating scenarios. It should be noted that an infinite 
number of operating scenarios are possible, thus this study only 
covers a part of the total operational space and can only 
identify the vulnerabilities of the studied scenarios. 
A. N í 1 security assessment 
A dynamic N í 1 contingency analysis with generator trips 
and line faults was performed on the RTS. The studied line 
faults were three-phase faults with 100 ms duration, followed 
by a permanent trip of the faulted line. Line fault locations 
were near the line ends. The total number of studied 
contingencies was approximately 300. The list of contingencies 
together with the selected operating scenarios results in an 
N െ 1 contingency analysis based on around 15000 dynamic 
simulations. Based on this N െ 1 contingency analysis, the 
stability of the transition from the pre-fault state to the post-
fault state, as well as the adequacy (line loading and voltage 
levels) of the post-fault steady state were assessed.  
The angle differences over the line connecting area B and 
area C (the BLOCH–CLARK line) are presented in Fig. 2 for 
all studied line faults in operating scenario X. Details of this 
high transfer scenario are presented in Table I and in Fig. 3. 
The bold red curves in Fig. 2 show the instability of the studied 
system after the trip of the line from area A to area C (the 
ATTLEE–CURTISS line), when the fault occurred near either 
line end. This contingency is therefore considered as a critical 
contingency for scenario X. 
 
Fig. 2. Angle difference over the line connecting areas B and C for all single
line faults (with subsequent line tripping) of operating scenario X (see Table I
and Fig. 3). Blue curves correspond to faults resulting in stable operation,
while the fault and trip of the line connecting area A and area C result in an
unstable system (red curves). 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Time [s]
Other contingencies
trip of A-C tie-line
fault close to:            
 A-side                    
 C-side                    
Voltage angle difference: δA-B [°]
 
Fig. 1. Single-line diagram describing the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996 [11]. The dimensions do not reflect the line lengths. 
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B. The N í 1 security operating domain 
For the RTS, it is possible to identify critical transfer 
corridors directly from the system topology due to the weak 
connections between the three meshed areas. These transfer 
corridors can be used to visualize the secure operating domains 
of the system. In case of a multi-corridor system, such as the 
RTS, this would imply a multi-dimensional space. However, 
here we use more comprehensible two-dimensional 
illustrations for visualizing the secure operating domains. In 
this paper, two corridors connecting area C to the other areas 
are combined to form one dimension ‘area C surplus’ while the 
other dimension is the power flow on the corridor between 
areas A and B.  
By using the two-dimensional space of ‘power flow A–B’ 
and ‘area C surplus’, the thermal limitations of the secure 
operating domain are presented as a rectangle in Fig. 3. Long 
term emergency ratings defined in [11] were used as thermal 
limits for the lines. The circle in Fig. 3 represents the 
limitations induced by transient stability and defined by the 
dynamic studies of line faults and generator trips in different 
power flow cases. Inside this circle, no transient instability 
cases were identified among the studied scenarios. 
In Fig. 3, operating scenarios may be identified where a 
single fault leads to unstable operation even though the thermal 
limits are not exceeded in the post fault state (i.e. the domain 
inside the rectangle but outside the circle). Thus, N í 1 secure 
operating domain for the RTS would not have been defined 
correctly without the stability assessments. 
C. The Ník secure operating domain 
The most critical contingencies identified in the N í 1 
contingency analysis are the faults and trips of lines in the 
transfer corridors between areas A, B, and C. These 
contingencies were selected as the first contingency in an N í 2 
contingency analysis. Thus, the N െ 2 contingency analysis 
comprise of approximately 15000 dynamic simulations.  
Fig. 4 presents the N í 2 secure transmission limits for two 
successive line faults. A line disconnection significantly 
reduces the thermal limits between areas A and B compared 
with the N í 1 limits of the intact grid. The reason for this is 
that there are two 230 kV lines and one 138 kV connecting 
areas A and B. If one 230 kV line is disconnected, there is still 
one 230 kV line and one 138 kV line, and the thermal N í 1 
limit between the area A and B is roughly equal to the power 
that these lines can carry together (the alternative long path via 
area C does not carry significant amount of power). However, 
if two 230 kV lines are disconnected, there is only one 138 kV 
line between the areas in addition to the longer transfer path via 
area C. Now a relatively larger share of the power will flow via 
area C in the N í 2 case compared with the N í 1 case. The 
overall impact of this path on the transfer capacity between 
areas A and B is small due to the high impedance. Therefore, 
the difference between the thermal N í 1 limit, shown in Fig. 3, 
and the N í 2 limit, shown in Fig. 4, is roughly the thermal 
capacity of one 230 kV line connecting areas A and B. 
TABLE I  
Inter-area power exchange of studied operating scenarios X and Y.  
 Case X Case Y 
Power flow from area A to B(MW)  220 255 
Power flow from area A to C (MW)  -240 -150 
Power flow from area B to C (MW)  420 365 
Area A Power export (MW) 15 -105 
Area B Power export (MW) -640 -620 
Area C Power export (MW) 655 515 
 
Fig. 3. N í 1 secure operating domain for the RTS (green area). The rectangle 
domain represents the thermal rating of the lines while the circle domain
represents angle stability limitations. The operating point of two of the studied
scenarios, X and Y, are illustrated by a red and a blue ring, respectively.  
Fig. 4. N í 2 secure operating domain (green area) for the RTS. The
rectangle domain represents thermal long term emergency rating of the lines
and the circle domain represents angle stability limitations. The dotted lines
represent frequency stability limits, which ensure a successful islanding in
the case of the two lines connecting area C are disconnected. 
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The disconnection of any single line in the transfer 
corridors between areas A, B, and C has a smaller effect on 
transient angle stability limits than on thermal limits because 
the disconnection of any of these lines does not significantly 
affect the operating state of the generators (if the operating 
scenario is within the secure operating domain). However, line 
disconnections weaken the ability of the grid to absorb the 
kinetic energy from the generators, which explains the 
reduction from the transient angle N í 1 limit to the N í 2 
limit. 
When considering stable power transfers between areas A 
and B, the most critical combination of the successive N í 2 
line faults was the trip of both 230 kV lines connecting areas A 
and B. The same N í 2 fault combination also dominates the 
reduction in the thermal limits.  
The main difference between the thermal and stability 
limitations are that the thermal limits do not depend on the 
order of occurrence of the faults, whereas for stability, the 
order of the fault sequence and also the time interval between 
the faults are significant. The consequences can be completely 
different depending if the transient from the previous fault has 
stabilized or not when a second fault occurs. In this study, the 
system was assumed to have reached a steady state between 
subsequent faults. The most critical order of the faults was the 
following: first a fault and trip of ARNE–BARTON line (a 230 
kV line from area A to area B) followed by a line fault near bus 
AUSTEN in area A and the trip of the other 230 kV line 
between area A and area B: AUSTEN–BATES line. 
When considering the power surplus and deficit of area C, 
the most restricting set of successive N í 2 line contingencies 
is the disconnection of both lines connecting area C to other 
areas. This will isolate area C, and successful islanding requires 
that the available reserve power cover the power deficit in each 
isolated area. Furthermore, island operation also requires 
suitable power and frequency controls.  
Assuming that the frequency controlled instantly activated 
reserves equal 400 MW (the largest unit in the system) divided 
evenly between the areas (in each area the largest unit has the 
same size), results in 133 MW reserves in each area. Thus, the 
power deficit of area C in the initial operating scenario cannot 
exceed 133 MW to ensure successful islanding. Similarly, the 
power surplus of area C cannot exceed 266 MW to ensure that 
areas A and B have the required reserve power. In Fig. 4, the 
dotted lines represent these frequency stability limits. The 
rectangular thermal N í 1 and N í 2 limits, illustrated in Fig. 3 
and Fig. 4 respectively, are equal in 'C surplus' dimension 
because if both lines connecting area C to other areas are 
tripped, there remain no lines that could be overloaded. 
D. Change in system response 
If the operating scenario is not within a secure operating 
domain, and a fault occurs, the consequences are significantly 
different if the thermal limits of the lines are exceeded or the 
stability of the system is jeopardized.  
As described in the previous sections, when determining 
the secure power transfer limits, the limit is the one that is the 
lowest: either the thermal current carrying capacity of the lines 
after a fault, the ability of the generators to maintain the 
synchronism, or stable voltages during and after a fault 
transient.  
In the case with thermal limitations, overloading may 
eventually lead to protective actions that disconnect the 
overloaded component. Depending on the protection scheme 
and the level of overload, the protection may act in a few 
seconds or after several minutes. This protective action may 
lead to the increased loading of parallel components, leading to 
further protective actions in a (often rather slow) cascade. This 
part of a blackout process may be referred to a thermally 
governed phase [15]. If the cascade continues, at some stage it 
will lead to instability.  
If stability limitations are exceeded, the system enters an 
unstable and uncontrollable state, referred to as the unstable 
phase of the blackout process [15]. This phase is characterized 
by one or several of the following dynamic phenomena: 
oscillations of voltage, power, or frequency, or the decay (or 
rise) in voltage or frequency. Such phenomena often lead to the 
triggering of several component protections, where the affected 
area of the power system is difficult to anticipate.  
The consequences after exceeding stability limitations are 
usually faster and more wide-spread and therefore more severe 
than the consequences of exceeding thermal limits. Therefore, 
it is crucial to know not only of the actual security limits of the 
system, but the response of the system and the phenomenon 
that is limiting the system at different operating scenarios. For 
a system, originally limited by the thermal capacity of the lines, 
the loss of stability after it has faced several contingencies, 
corresponds to a change of the system response. 
 
Fig. 5. Results from N – 2 contingency analysis for scenario Y, showing 
voltage angles over the three tie-lines forming the corridor between areas A 
and B. The system reaches a stable state after the first contingency (a short 
circuit followed by the trip of line BLOCH–CLARK at t = 1 s) but is not able
to regain stability after the trip of generator 221 at t = 20 s.  
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Scenario Y in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 exemplifies the change in 
the system response. This operating scenario is N í 1 secure as 
shown in Fig. 3, but not N í 2 secure as shown in Fig. 4. For 
scenario Y, the N í 1 secure power transfer between area C and 
the rest of the system is thermally limited. Considering 
multiple contingencies however, the system can become 
instable after only two subsequent faults. Two successive faults 
can cause instability for scenario Y, for example the trip of the 
largest generator in area B (connected to bus 221, BEHRING) 
and the fault and trip of BLOCH–CLARK line (the only line 
between areas B and C). Regardless of the order of the 
contingencies, the system cannot maintain a stable operation 
after the second contingency, as Fig. 5 shows. This example 
describes the value of performing dynamic N í k contingency 
analyses, and not limiting to N í 1 analyses. 
IV. SYSTEM VULNERABILITY 
This section describes different aspects of system 
vulnerability. The first two parts examine the vulnerability of 
the RTS using a deterministic and probabilistic method while 
the last part discusses the consequences of protection system 
failures. 
A. Deterministic indication of vulnerability 
The vulnerability of a given operating scenario can be 
assessed deterministically by studying the combinations of 
contingencies that cause system wide consequences. The 
vulnerability of the system can thus be assessed using the 
indicator, kmin, defined in [15] as: 
݇୫୧୬ ൌ  ሺݏଵǡ ݏଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݏ௡ሻǡ (1)
where si is a set of contingencies leading to an unstable state at 
the specific operating scenario. The indicator describes the 
minimal number of contingencies after which instability 
occurs. Fig. 6 illustrates the vulnerability level quantified by 
the kmin indicator for the RTS, where kmin  3 indicates that the 
stability of the system is not threatened by any of the studied 
double contingencies. 
In the studied N í 1 and N í 2 contingencies, the fault 
sequences leading to system collapse consist of faults on the 
lines on the transfer corridors between areas A, B, and C as 
well as generator trips. 
B. System collapse frequency as probabilistic indication of 
vulnerability 
The frequency of a system collapse can be assessed by 
identifying the specific chains of events leading to the collapse. 
For a given operating scenario oi the frequency of a system 
collapse ܨ௢೔  that takes into account N í 1, N í 2 and N í 3 
contingency sets can be calculated as follows 
ܨ௢೔ ൌ σ ௟݂௢೔ேିଵ ൅ σ ௠݂௢೔݌௡௢೔ேିଶ ൅ σ ௥݂௢೔݌௦௢೔݌௧௢೔ேିଷ , (2)
where ௟݂ǡ௠ǡ௥
௢೔  is the frequency of the occurrence of a fault in 
contingency set N í k. ݌௡ǡ௦ǡ௧௢೔  is the conditional probability that 
an additional fault occurs before mitigating actions have been 
performed. The term with a minimum number of faults that 
lead to a collapse dominates in (2) and thus gives an estimation 
of the system collapse frequency. Therefore, the N í 2 and 
other higher-order events, which consist of a two or more 
successive independent contingencies, have less effect on the 
system collapse frequency than the lower order events.  
For the RTS, different domains of vulnerability caused by 
consecutive line faults are presented in Fig. 7. An estimation of 
the system collapse frequency is determined for every 
vulnerability domain (1–8 in Fig. 7) by summing the 
frequencies of the critical events. The critical events are chains 
of events that may consist of faults that cause instantaneous 
instability but also faults that lead to instability by causing 
overloading and a fault of another line. Table II presents the 
estimated system collapse frequencies. 
When estimating the system collapse frequency, it is 
assumed that mitigating actions to reduce power transfer in 
time, in case of line overloads, fail with the probability of 1 %, 
which causes a new line fault. The outage data of [11] is used 
for estimating the frequency of N í 2 contingencies.  
The first fault has the frequency of 'permanent outage' in 
[11] and the frequency of the second fault is the sum of 
permanent and transient outages in [11]. In the dynamic 
simulations, all the line faults were three-phase faults. 
Fig. 6. Quantification of system vulnerability using the kmin indicator. which
describes the minimal number of contingencies after which the instability
occurs. 
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The system collapse frequency as a function of power 
surplus in area C when power transfer from area A to area B is 
0 MW is presented in Fig. 8. Thus, the system collapse 
frequency illustrated in Fig. 8 corresponds to a move along the 
Y-axis in Fig. 7 from the N í 2 secure domain to the unsecure 
domain. In Fig. 8, the vulnerability increases in steps when the 
power flow exceeds certain limits. The steps are caused by the 
drastic increase in the number of single and multiple faults 
leading to undesired system consequences, which occur when 
the power flow exceeds the identified limits. The steps 
correspond to the border lines between the vulnerability 
domains in Fig. 7.  
The faults and fault combinations occur with a certain 
probability on a given time period and are independent of the 
power flow. The increment of the system collapse frequency is 
especially significant when the power flow exceeds the N í 1 
secure level. 
C. Impact of protection system and circuit breaker failures 
Failures of protection systems have been identified to have 
significant impact on events leading to a system collapse [6]. 
Protective device misoperations may aggravate the 
consequences of disturbances by leading to further 
disconnections or even transform the system directly to an 
unstable operating state. The failure of the circuit breakers or 
main protective relays to separate the faulty component of the 
system leads to further disconnections by the back-up 
protection or by the breaker failure relay. More importantly, it 
always extends the fault duration, which may lead to generators 
falling out-of-step and thus initiate a process leading to system 
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Fig. 7. Vulnerability domains of the RTS caused by consecutive line faults. 
1. Outside of N í 1 stability limits 
2. N í 1 stable, outside of N í 2 frequency stability limits and N í 1
thermal long term emergency ratings 
3. N í 1 secure, outside of N í 2 stability limits (and N í 2 thermal
long term emergency ratings) 
4. N í 1 secure, outside of N í 2 frequency stability limits and N í 2
thermal long term emergency ratings 
5. N í 1 secure, outside of N í 2 frequency stability limits 
6. N í 1 secure, outside of N í 2 angle stability limits (and N í 2
thermal long term emergency ratings) 
7. N í 2 stable and N í 1 secure, outside of N í 2 thermal long term
emergency ratings 
8. N í 2 secure 
TABLE II  
The estimation of the RTS system collapse frequency caused by consecutive line faults. The descriptions for the domains are presented in Fig. 7. 
Domain Restricting fault (set) and phenomenon Estimation of system collapse frequency [1/year]
 Line faults that cause instability Line faults that cause thermal overloading  
1 113–215 or  
123–217 or 
121–325 or 
223–318 
 >1 
2 121–325 and 223-318 121–325 or 
223-318 
1.38E-2 
3 113–215 and 123–217 or 
121–325 and 223–318 
 5.03E-3 
4 121–325 and 223–318 113–215 and 123–217 2.99E-3 
5 121–325 and 223–318  2.97E-3 
6 113–215 and 123–217  2.06E-3 
7  113–215 and 123–217 2.06E-5 
8   <2.06E-5 
 
Fig. 8. The estimation of the RTS system collapse frequency [1/year] as a 
function of the area C power surplus. The power transfer from area A to B is 
0 MW. The dotted line represents the N í 1 secure transfer limit.  
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collapse. As the protection system and circuit breaker failures 
often lead to severe consequences, characterized by a 
significant dynamical response of the system, it is necessary to 
analyze this response to identify the vulnerabilities related to 
protection system or circuit breaker failures.  
Since a stuck circuit breaker during a line fault should also 
be regarded as an N í 2 fault, additional simulations have been 
performed to analyse the system impact of such failures. Here, 
bus fault simulations were made for every bus in the RTS. The 
fault duration was selected to 250 ms, reflecting a fault 
sequence with a line fault, having a stuck circuit breaker at one 
line end and the clearing of the fault by the breaker failure 
protection. Simulations were done for all previously studied 
operational scenarios, resulting in an additional 3500 dynamic 
simulations. In contrast to the successive line faults, which 
resulted in instability for some operating scenarios, a 250 ms 
fault at buses located near large generators resulted in transient 
instability of all the studied operating scenarios. Therefore, for 
the RTS, a stuck circuit breaker during a line fault can be 
regarded as the most critical N í 2 fault. 
V. MITIGATION OF LARGE DISTURBANCES 
It is possible to implement remedial actions to prevent wide 
spread consequences caused by critical contingencies. To 
ensure that the system remains at a secure operating point, the 
TSO can use several preventive actions such as change the 
power flows of AC lines by controlling HVDC links, using 
phase-shifting transformers, or re-dispatching of power 
generation. If a critical contingency occurs when the system is 
not in a secure state, mitigating actions can be used to prevent a 
blackout. To prevent transient instability, the response of such 
actions might be required within fractions of a second after the 
undesired event has occurred; hence, only automatic actions 
are possible to prevent instability.  
One solution to mitigate blackouts is the implementation of 
system integrity protection schemes (SIPS), which are, in 
contrast to common component protection, designed to 
preserve the power system integrity during abnormal 
conditions. A possible classification of SIPS is on the type of 
activation signal, which can be either event-based (detecting of 
predefined events, such as breaker tripping signals) or 
response-based (measuring electrical parameters, e.g. 
frequency or voltage). 
Three SIPS solutions have been studied with the RTS, 
utilizing different activation signals:  
- SIPSCB: activated by status signals from circuit breakers  
- SIPSδ: activated by voltage angle measurements  
- SIPSf: activated by frequency measurements 
The results for the critical contingency of operating 
scenario X, shown in Fig. 9, illustrate the possibilities to 
prevent the system from becoming unstable. Here, an internal 
arming of the response-based SIPS is used together with a time 
delay to prevent unwanted action during switching events. 
Based on a dynamic contingency analysis described in [13], 
arming and activation signal magnitudes have been selected as:  
ΔδBC - arming: 40° for 200ms, activation: 50°. 
ΔfBC - arming: 0.2Hz for 200ms, activation: 0.25Hz. 
The total delay between measurement and the 
implementation of mitigating action is assumed to be no longer 
than 100 ms. 
Depending on the fault location, the transient behavior of 
the system sets different requirements on the response time of 
the SIPS solution. Such is also the case with different fault 
types and fault durations, meaning that the SIPS may not 
prevent instability in all scenarios.  
The response-based solutions, SIPSδ and SIPSf, are not as 
fast as the event-based, SIPSCB. The event-base SIPS will 
efficiently and fast provide the actions foreseen as sufficient to 
prevent the transient instability. However, since the trigger 
signal of the SIPSCB is based on the triggering of specific 
protections, the system is not protected against unforeseen 
events. The response-based SIPS will be able to provide 
increased protection against multiple or unforeseen 
contingencies, but might need longer response time depending 
on how the SIPS are designed. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
When performing a comprehensive vulnerability analysis, 
also post fault dynamics should be included. Studies based on 
steady state analyses can erroneously indicate “secure” 
operation outside the N í 1 stable domain, as the domain 
outside the circle but inside the rectangle in Fig. 3 clearly 
illustrates. It should also be noted that, when stability is an 
issue, an outage is not the only concept that should be analyzed 
since it is the fault that accelerates the generators.  
Furthermore, a line trip may weaken the system and lead to 
cascading disconnections due to instability. Thus, studies 
  
Fig. 9. Results from the SIPS study of operating scenario X, showing the 
angle difference over the corridor between areas B and C. The results 
describe the effect of different SIPS solutions for the critical fault, i.e. a short 
circuit located close to either side of the ATTLEE–CURTISS line followed 
by the trip of the line. 
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where dynamics are ignored may provide too optimistic results 
since they do not reveal vulnerabilities connected to instability. 
In our case study, the instability occurred inside the steady state 
(thermal) limits, a result that cannot be reached with steady 
state analyses only. In some cases, it may be possible to 
provide angle stability limits using simplified models as [14] 
shows.  
A proper identification of power system vulnerabilities 
requires knowledge of the dynamic behavior of the system in 
disturbed conditions and awareness of a possible change in the 
system response after several faults. Therefore, dynamic N í 2 
or even higher-order contingency analyses should be used in 
power system vulnerability assessments. As the vulnerabilities 
are identified, mitigating actions can be planned and 
implemented. 
It is shown in this paper that the vulnerability of the power 
system may increase in distinct steps as the amount of power 
transfer is increased over the critical corridors. Thus, increasing 
power transfer above certain limits may drastically increase the 
number of faults or fault combinations with undesired 
consequences.  
For the system operator, the identification of the secure 
operating conditions is essential, and nomograms may support 
identification of vulnerabilities of the system at different 
operating conditions. Nomograms can provide information of 
the existing restrictions on the secure transfer capacity as well 
as the margin to the security limits in an illustrative manner. In 
this paper two-dimensional illustrations are favored over 
multidimensional when visualizing the secure operating 
domain, this is done since two-dimensional illustrations are 
usually more comprehensible to the observer. The illustrations 
in this paper are based on the power transfer over critical 
corridors of the RTS system. For other systems, it may be more 
feasible to select other parameters, e.g. the demand in certain 
areas, as limiting factors. The presented visualizations of 
operating domains for the RTS are symmetrical in relation to 
power transfer, due to the symmetrical topology of the RTS. 
If the circuit breakers or main protective relays fail to 
disconnect the faulted component from the grid, the fault 
duration extends and several components are tripped by the 
breaker failure relays or by the back-up protection. This type of 
faults should be considered as multiple contingencies and must 
be included when assessing the risk of system collapse. 
Simulations made on the RTS system underlines the 
importance of considering this type of faults since the extended 
fault duration near critical generators significantly increases the 
risk of large disturbances, even in operating scenarios with a 
lightly loaded grid. 
Simulation results presented in this paper highlight the 
value of dynamic analyses, and illustrate that analyses based on 
steady-state studies (load flow) may overestimate the security 
of the system as they cannot reveal the vulnerabilities related to 
the dynamic response of the system. Therefore, dynamic 
analyses should be considered imperative in security and 
vulnerability assessment studies. 
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